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In the last several decades, increasing corporate abuses against labor, human 
rights, and the environment have sparked an explosion in the discourse around what 
corporations’ responsibilities are to society. One form of this discourse has been the 
production of specific sets of standards by the social responsibility movement to hold 
businesses accountable to society. While many in the movement continue to target the 
state to advocate for laws and regulations, the movement has also increasingly targeted 
corporations directly in an effort to create private standards to which they expect 
businesses to adhere. Relying on contentious outsider pressure against corporations, 
advocates work through institutional channels and with corporations to promote social 
change in a way that traditional social movement theories have largely ignored. 
This study examines socially responsible investing and social certifications as two 
particularly important sites for the development of private standards that function outside 
of the state. Each of these sites are conceptualized as social movement fields in which 
  
actors compete to define standards, and which have their own unique rules, opportunities, 
and constraints. Specifically, I ask: how are private social responsibility standards 
constructed? Within each field, I draw upon qualitative, in-depth interviews to examine 
multiple cases, or sets of standards, to understand how advocates translate their 
expectations into specific standards and what field-level mechanisms shape the standard-
setting process. I compare standards across time, and within and across fields to identify 
causal mechanisms that shape standards in similarly patterned ways. My findings show 
how power, culture, and institutions shape standards by including or excluding certain 
criteria and raising or lowering thresholds of socially responsible practices. By examining 
standard-setting within these fields, we can better understand how meanings are assigned 
to the different claims of social responsibility, the opportunities and constraints of these 
fields for the global governance of capitalism, and the relationship between outsider and 
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Chapter 1: The Social Responsibility Movement 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, NGOs expressed growing concern about the 
treatment of workers at Nike, one of the world’s largest and most well-known apparel 
manufacturers. Evidence was mounting that Nike was using a variety of unfair labor 
practices, including child labor, in its factories. By that time, none of Nike’s shoes were 
being made in the United States any more. Nike had long since moved their factories, or 
contracted with factories, in Vietnam, China, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian 
nations. Shoes that cost over $125 in the US were made by workers earning less than 
$2/day, a fraction of the labor costs in other parts of the world. Furthermore, enforcement 
of local laws, labor rights, and human rights was either inconsistent or nonexistent. 
Throughout the 1990s, activists identified an increasing number of abuses at these 
factories. Workers in Nike factories were often paid less than the legal minimum wage, 
forced to work over time, threatened when attempting to join unions, were not paid back 
wages, encouraged to take amphetamines to work through the night, exposed to 
dangerous chemicals, denied bathroom breaks and benefits, and coached to lie to 
company representatives (Oxfam 2002). Clearly, these practices were inconsistent with 
the company’s own voluntary code of conduct, a 1992 policy to portray themselves as a 
socially responsible corporation that sought to improve the lives of workers in developing 
countries (Soule 2009). 
As these practices made their way into media reports, public attention grew and 
an anti-sweatshop movement began to take shape. Labor rights groups and human rights 
NGOs applied pressure on Nike by publicizing its misdeeds and organizing boycotts 




in 1998 (Featherstone 2002) and staged protests and occupied university administrative 
offices (for up to 225 hours!). USAS, labor rights groups, and human rights NGOs used 
these contentious outsider strategies to raise awareness about the issues and discourage 
consumers from purchasing sweatshop products, including Nike shoes and apparel.  
Other organizations used strategies that were best pursued by corporate insiders to 
work with Nike and promote reforms from within the company (Galvin 1996). For 
example, through its ownership of shares of Nike stock, socially responsible investors 
with the United Methodist Church filed a shareholder resolution with the company in 
1996. Shareholder resolutions are a formal proposal presented to management, and voted 
upon by all shareholders, to make nonbinding recommendations to the company. The 
resolution stated “the image of Nike Incorporated is an extremely important corporate 
asset—recently valued at between $1.3 and 1.7 billion” dollars and that Nike’s own 
practices were putting the value of their brand at risk. They then proposed several 
specific policies for Nike that would institute more socially responsible practices to 
improve their brand image. Socially responsible investors also used social ratings, or 
indices, to evaluate Nike (and other corporations) based on social and environmental 
standards. In 1997, Nike became the first company to be get kicked off the Domini Social 
Index for poor labor standards, giving them more bad press and incentivizing their 
adherence to the standards (Donovan 2008). Finally, through the newly formed Fair 
Labor Association, other movement organizations worked with Nike to develop new 
social standards for their labor practices. Through each of these insider strategies, 
movement actors worked through institutional channels and directly with Nike to embed 




In response to this diverse and unrelenting pressure, Nike took a number of 
unprecedented steps. For the first time, the company began identifying their factory 
locations and acknowledged problems within them. They opened themselves up to 
independent monitoring and were able to meet the minimum standards created by the Fair 
Labor Association. At the same time, socially responsible investors continued to work 
with Nike and the company later passed their ratings. As a result, by 2010, Nike stock 
was part of the portfolios of many socially responsible investors. By many accounts, both 
the contentious outsider strategies and the market-friendly insider strategies were 
proclaimed a success of the growing social responsibility movement.  
In some ways, the Nike example can be placed within the long history of social 
movements seeking to regulate economic activity (Marx 1848/1967; Polanyi 1944/2001). 
Like earlier collective action, this movement attempts to change how business operates in 
order to meet certain social and environmental objectives. But whereas earlier advocacy 
efforts targeted state actors and regulatory law, contemporary advocacy increasingly 
directly target corporations (and other non-state actors) and seeks to embed business 
practices in private sets of standards. States have been reluctant or politically unable to 
regulate transnational corporations, so many movement actors have increasingly worked 
through and within markets to make economic activity more socially responsible and 
sustainable (Rowe 2005; Vogel 2008). Thus, recent efforts like those against Nike are 
qualitatively different than these earlier efforts. 
This shift in the target of social movements, for example, targeting Nike as 
opposed to petitioning the government, as well as the combination of outsider and insider 




for scholars of social movements, which have traditionally emphasized the state as the 
primary rulemaker of significance (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Polletta 2006). 
Contemporary social movement scholarship must take into account the fact that newer 
movements, such as the social responsibility movement, target a broader array of actors, 
institutions, and targets than ever before (King and Pearce 2010). To address these new 
modes of collective action, several scholars (e.g. Armstrong and Bernstein 2008) have 
called upon the field to broaden its conceptualization of social movements (Snow 2004: 
19). Proposing an alternative model of social movements focusing on fields and 
institutions, this social movement scholarship stresses how power is organized across 
these multiple arenas throughout society (Crossley 2002a; Armstrong and Bernstein 
2008).  
This broad movement, which I refer to as the social responsibility movement, has 
adopted a variety of tactics to regulate businesses and get them to operate in a more 
socially responsible and sustainable manner. I use the term “social responsibility 
movement” in a very broad and inclusive sense here. Others (e.g. Carroll 1999) have used 
the term “corporate social responsibility movement,” but such a label focuses exclusively 
on corporations, whereas I am interested in businesses of all sizes. Still others have used 
the term “corporate accountability movement” to refer explicitly to the promotion of legal 
mechanisms in regulating corporations (McBarnet et al 2009). While legal mechanisms 
continue to be important, the movement is increasingly working with companies to 
develop private social responsibility standards to which they expect companies to adhere 
(Bartley 2003, 2005, 2007a; Cashore et al 2004). These new standards reflect a new form 




of both social and environmental codes (Shamir 2010; Vogel 2008; Bernstein 2011). This 
“governance without governments” seeks to bypass regular political processes that are 
often closed to civil society actors. The social responsibility movement, therefore, 
includes movement efforts to regulate companies of all sizes, but which go beyond 
voluntary self-regulation, to include both legally binding mechanisms and private 
standards systems. 
This study focuses on private standards to better understand how the movement 
develops social responsibility standards to regulate economic activity. Standards are 
private in the sense that they are not enacted or controlled by the state but are regulatory 
in the sense that they promote adherence to a set of social and environmental 
expectations. My analysis focuses on standard-setting processes within two social 
movement fields: socially responsible investing (SRI) and social certifications. Within 
these fields, I draw upon qualitative interviews to examine two SRI cases and three social 
certification cases. The interviews are utilized to identify the range of standards within 
each case and to explain the social forces that shape the standard-setting processes.   
I focus on two fields within the social responsibility movement, socially 
responsible investing and social certifications, because these two fields are useful for 
seeing how movement advocates struggle to shape business practices via insider 
strategies such as the shareholder resolutions, Domini’s social ratings, and Fair Labor 
Association standards used in the Nike campaign. I examine each field by asking: how 
are standards for social responsibility constructed? Within the standard-setting process, 
what field-level mechanisms shape how standards are constructed? How are standards 




of this standard setting process, namely, 1) how standards shape, and are shaped by, 
engagement with companies; 2) the content and thresholds of actual standards; and 3) and 
the mediating mechanisms that influence the criteria and thresholds for social 
responsibility standards.  
By investigating patterns in how standards are constructed, I seek to uncover the 
mechanisms that alter standard-setting in systematic ways across organizations within 
each field and across the fields more broadly (McAdam et al 2008: 331). This 
examination of socially responsible investment and social certifications serves as a 
window into the larger processes of movement politics in an era of global capitalism. It 
can, for example, help us to understand the struggle with Nike, including how it came to 
be labeled socially responsible and what that label means for its workers and the 
environment. It can shed light on the strategies, opportunities, and constraints of private 
regulation and non-state (or hybrid) forms of governance (Shamir 2010). Furthermore, it 
helps us make sense of the various claims about social responsibility and the various 
contexts in which they are constructed. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I begin by examining the social context in which 
the social responsibility movement emerged and how they came to target corporations 
directly. I outline the rise of the transnational corporation, which is fundamental for 
understanding the organization and operation of economic activity today. My discussion 
focuses on the dispersion of economic activity into global commodity chains, which 
allow corporations to capitalize on cheap labor and lower environmental standards across 
different national contexts. This is important for understanding the role of globalization 




The rise of transnational corporations and a weak regulatory environment provide the 
context for social movements seeking to improve social and environmental practices of 
this business activity, with a focus on socially responsible investment and social 
certifications.  
Next, I review relevant literature that sets the stage for the theoretical framework 
used in this dissertation. I review recent developments and remaining gaps in alternative 
models of social movement theory, including a field-based approach to social 
movements, drawing upon literature from social movements and economic sociology 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). I outline how the field-based approach to social 
movements can be applied to studies of socially responsible investing and social 
certifications, which will be the focus of my empirical research.  
Finally, I offer an overview of this dissertation project and the chapters that 
follow. I summarize my methods, which draw upon qualitative interviews and 
comparative methods to examine how private social responsibility standards are 
constructed. I then outline my results chapters, which cover standard-setting in SRI, 
standard-setting in social certifications, and comparisons across the two fields, 
respectively. 
 
The Rise of Transnational Corporations and the Social Responsibility Movement 
Private social responsibility standards are a global phenomenon that has emerged 
in response to increasingly powerful transnational corporations and the social movements 
that have sought to address their social and environmental effects. In this section, I trace 




emergence of the social responsibility movement. I then discuss socially responsible 
investing and social certifications, two of the most important sites for developing private 
social responsibility standards to shape business activity. 
The rise of the transnational corporation has coincided with the emergence of an 
increasingly global economy. While there have been economic exchanges across national 
borders for thousands of years, the notion of a truly global economy is a relatively recent 
phenomenon (Sklair 2007). Earlier economic transactions emphasized trade between 
nations and companies within their respective nations, and were considered part of an 
international economy. More recently, and especially since the 1960s, there has been a 
dramatic rise in truly global economic institutions (e.g. WTO, World Bank, IMF) and 
corporations whose production networks are dispersed throughout the world (Harvey 
2007). In this context, the world has seen much higher levels of international trade, the 
rise of outsourcing, increasing eradication of trade barriers, more intense integration and 
circulation of goods and services, instantaneous global communication of digital 
information, and accelerated flows of money across borders (Ritzer 2007; Tonkiss 2012). 
 Transnational corporations (TNCs) are at the heart of this global economy. They 
operate in many different nations simultaneously through different branches and 
subsidiaries. Driven by the pursuit of greater profits and competitive advantages in a 
fierce global market, these globalizing corporations have increasingly expanded their 
operations into global networks of production, distribution, and consumption (Dicken 
2007). Through strategic relationships with contractors, sub-contractors, and other firms, 
they have sought to capitalize on local competitive advantages, whether that includes 




Taken together, these inter-firm linkages constitute global commodity chains, where 
different parts of the production and distribution of goods are divided and coordinated 
across geographically dispersed networks (Gereffi et al 2005; Gereffi 2012). 
 In this trend toward increasing globalization, corporations have grown 
dramatically in size and many corporations have become larger than the economies of 
most countries. For example, out of the largest 100 economies in the world, 51 of them 
are corporations. By 2008, the world’s largest 500 corporations had revenues of more 
than $18 billion, but only 99 countries had GNPs that exceeded that amount (Sklair 
2010). Many of these companies also earn greater than half their revenues from outside 
of their “home” country. With increasingly concentrated economic resources, 
corporations have also exercised an increasing degree of political influence as well 
(Kellner 2002). Working with governments (Robinson 2004) and promoted by 
governments (Harvey 2007), corporations dramatically shape the face of globalization 
processes. 
 As these global corporations have grown in size and power, academic researchers 
and activists alike have taken notice. Theorists began to grapple with the rapidly 
globalizing world, increasingly turning their attention to the role of TNCs in spreading 
capitalist globalization (Wallerstein 1974). For example, Sklair (2002) theorizes capitalist 
globalization as having three types of transnational practices. First, economic practices of 
transnational corporations (TNC) include their cross-border linkages within systems of 
production and circulation. Second, there exists a transnational capitalist class (including 
corporate executives) who act on common interests in expanding global capitalism and 




parties and international associations. Finally, Sklair outlines the culture-ideology 
practices of consumerism, which uses global media to create artificial desires to be 
satisfied through commodity consumption. These transnational practices constitute the 
new global economy. While other theorists dispute the role of a transnational capitalist 
class, it is clear that corporations are fundamental in promoting and coordinating the 
global economy (Ritzer 2007; Harvey 2007; McMichael 2008). 
Activists concerned with labor issues, human rights, child labor, and the 
environment have also been increasingly concerned with the reach of global capital. In 
the 1960s, protestors began mobilizing against companies profiting from the war in 
Vietnam. A rapidly growing environmental movement adopted a range of strategies to 
shape corporate impacts on the environment (Carmin and Balser 2002; McMichael 2008). 
In the 1990s, a far-reaching anti-sweatshop movement took shape (Featherstone 2002). 
As I show below, these examples reflect a wide variety of responses by social movements 
that have struggled against corporate power and sought to reshape and/or resist capitalist 
globalization (Kellner 2002; Pleyers 2010). Together, they form a broad-based social 
responsibility movement that seeks to construct a global economy that is more responsive 
to issues of equality, social justice, and the environment.  
 
The Social Responsibility Movement Emerges 
As corporate wrongdoings increasingly surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s both in 
the US and abroad, the movement against corporate globalization also grew. The 
mobilization quickly led to a variety of domestic regulations that sought to rein in 




of twenty new regulatory laws between 1965 and 1977 (Rowe 2005: 136). Outside the 
US, post-colonial nations increasingly nationalized industries and regulated foreign 
capital, peaking in the mid-1970s. At the global level, a coalition of these developing 
countries, known as the G-77, pressured the United Nations for a new global economic 
order. Then, in 1974, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) created the UN 
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) and after two years of work, they 
“made the formulation, adoption, and implementation of a draft for a comprehensive and 
legally binding UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations one of its top 
priorities” (Rowe 2005: 137). These movements represented a powerful push for the state 
regulation of corporations at the global level. 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) became increasingly organized in this 
environment (Rowe 2005: 139; Sklair 2001, 2002). They joined together in global 
business planning agencies such as the World Economic Forum (WEF), Trilateral 
Commission (TLC), and International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and worked closely 
with governments in the global economic institutions like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank (WB), and Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). They moved swiftly to influence the 
political process at domestic and global (i.e. UN) levels. Aided by a changing global 
economy during the 1970s, TNCs were successful in thwarting global regulations (Rowe 
2005). The push for a legally binding UN Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations was defeated, and replaced by voluntary self-regulation.  
 The global level was not the only stage where TNCs sought to transform their 




increasingly involved in domestic politics throughout the world, regardless of where the 
TNC was headquartered. By giving millions of dollars to presidential candidates and 
financing other political campaigns, corporations have been able to assert considerable 
influence over the political process (Domhoff 2010). Through “revolving doors,” 
individuals have moved back and forth between governmental regulatory positions and 
the industries they regulate, reflecting the capture of regulatory powers by corporate 
interests (Stigler 1971). Global economic institutions have forced more business-friendly 
policies on member nations (Sklair 2002). This facilitated the decades of deregulation 
during the late 1970s and 1980s, and which continues today with high degrees of 
interaction between TNCs and state governments (Robinson 2004; Harvey 2007). 
 In some states, national governments have been central in promoting deregulation 
and furthering corporate interests (Harvey 2007) while in others, states have been 
weakened by globalization processes and unable to promote effective regulation in the 
face of powerful corporations (Strange 1996). Both pathways have meant that effective 
domestic regulation has become increasingly difficult to attain and that civil society 
efforts for global regulation have failed. Social movements responded by expanding their 
strategies and tactics in their struggle for social justice and environmental sustainability. 
In particular, since the 1960s, and especially since the 1990s, groups have increasingly 
targeted corporations directly (Soule 2009; Conroy 2007; King 2008; Manheim 2001). 
While they have traditionally targeted corporations indirectly by advocating government 
regulations and union activity (Vogel 1978), this new trend marks an important change in 




 The central shift in these strategies is a new emphasis on working directly with, 
and often inside, corporations and other businesses to change their practices. Rather than 
operating through the state, they operate through the market to promote change. In 
particular, the social responsibility movement works in multi-stakeholder networks to 
develop private standards to which they expect companies to adhere. This “governance 
beyond the state” bypasses traditional state apparatuses that are often closed to civil 
society actors (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Hale and Held 2011). 
There are many reasons why activists have adopted such strategies. First, they 
often believe that working with governments, which are strongly influenced by these 
powerful corporate interests, is too time-consuming and less effective (Baron 2003). 
Second, because of globalization processes, many nation-states are much weaker in the 
globalized economy (Strange 1996) and there is no comparable transnational regulatory 
body with which social movements may make their grievances. To the degree that such 
organizations exist (e.g. WTO, IMF, WB), they function in the interests of business, are 
not democratic organizations, and are almost entirely closed off to access from social 
movement organizations (Kellner 2002). Third, technological changes in the Internet and 
social media have made it easier for transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 
1998) to exchange information regarding corporate practices in different parts of the 
world and to target corporations in their campaigns. Finally, activists are less likely to 





Regulating the Economy through Private Social Responsibility Standards 
Social movements have used a variety of strategies when directly targeting 
businesses and setting standards for social and environmental practices. One useful 
distinction we can make is between “outsider” and “insider” strategies, although the 
distinctions between these strategies can be fairly blurry (Tarrow and della Porta 2005). 
Through outsider strategies, social movements work outside of institutional channels to 
apply pressure to an industry or company to alter their practices (Soule 2009). 
Movements adopt insider strategies by working through institutional channels to promote 
change from within. While outsider strategies are highly confrontational, insider 
strategies are much more focused on cooperation and engagement. 
The most recognized outsider strategy is the boycott, which entails organized 
refusal to purchase products and services from a particular company (Putnam 1993). 
Boycotts are meant to express grievances about a company and promote change by 
hurting the company’s revenues (King 2011). Similarly, corporate campaigns entail 
sustained attacks against a corporation’s brand (Mannheim 2001; Conroy 2007). These 
campaigns may include protest demonstrations, where protestors make their appeals to 
broad audiences to shift public sentiment away from a company. They may unfurl large 
banners at strategic locations, organize outside shareholder meetings, or protest on the 
lawns of company executives. Using advocacy science, movements may commission 
scientific studies of a company’s practices to alert the public to health and environmental 
risks. In each of these strategies, movements seek to present a negative image of a 




In contrast to outsider strategies, insider strategies denote actions taken within and 
through institutional channels to affect social change. Within the global economy, some 
activists have used transnational legal actions by working through courts in one nation to 
shape corporate practices in a different nation (Dale 2011). For example, movement 
actors have sued US companies operating in Burma and other nations through US tort 
law (Holzmeyer 2009; Shamir 2004; Dale 2011). Movements have also adopted insider 
strategies by working directly with businesses themselves, and have even operated as 
partial owners (i.e. as shareholders, or investors) of a corporation to influence a company 
from the inside. This includes the use of shareholder resolutions, social ratings, and 
multi-stakeholder codes as a means to engage businesses and work within market-based 
institutions. In these insider strategies, movement activists work through institutional 
channels and directly with companies to promote more socially responsible and 
environmentally sustainable practices. But unlike other insiders, they also exhibit some 
level of contention to promote change, therefore blurring boundaries between insider and 
outsider strategies. Two of these strategies, socially responsible investing (SRI) and 
social certifications, are examined in-depth below. 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) 
The use of socially responsible investing (SRI) as a social movement strategy has 
its roots within the activism of the tumultuous 1960s (Soule 2009), making socially 
responsible investment organizations some of the most established groups attempting to 
redefine the role of business within society through a discourse of social responsibility 
(Sparkes and Cowton 2004; A. O’Rourke 2003). In those earlier years, activists began 




the war in Vietnam and apartheid South Africa. For example, the Medical Committee on 
Human Rights used their members’ ownership of stock in Dow Chemical to craft a 
shareholder resolution demanding that the company cease its production of napalm, a 
deadly chemical used in the war. Student activists also began pressuring their universities 
to divest from companies operating in South Africa (Paul and Aquila 1988). Activists 
used the market, through the institution of investing, to achieve movement outcomes and 
pressure companies to adopt more socially responsible practices. 
These early examples reflect the two most important strategies adopted by SRI 
activists. The first strategy entails using shares in a company to create shareholder 
resolutions seeking to change corporate policy. This “strategy of engagement” seeks to 
bring activist shareholders into dialogue with a company through formal resolutions 
proposed by institutional investors and activist organizations. For example, shareholder 
proposals may seek to get a company to produce a sustainability report, disclose the 
company’s policies and procedures for political contributions, require a corporation’s 
board of directors to seek input from stockholders on executive compensation, and so on. 
The proposals then go to a general vote among all shareholders within the company. 
While socially responsible proposals rarely get a majority vote, their positive impacts 
tend to come by generating publicity and developing a dialogue between movement 
organizations and the companies themselves (A. O’Rourke 2003). 
The second mechanism through which social movements use SRI to influence 
companies is through social indices, or social ratings, used to screen companies into or 
out of socially responsible mutual funds. By collecting quantifiable social and 




standards for determining whether or not companies pass the ratings and would be 
eligible for investment in a fund. Companies may fail a ratings system or be screened out 
of a fund because of negative criteria (e.g. a poor environmental record or the production 
of unsafe products) or pass the ratings and be screened into a fund because of positive 
criteria (e.g. demonstrating best practices in environmental or labor practices). If a 
company fails a rating and is not considered socially responsible, they are not considered 
for investment potential.  
This strategy of using social ratings has been described as an attempt at “private 
regulation” (King and Pearce 2010). In social ratings, image-conscious corporations 
became interested in how they are evaluated, what the funds’ social and environmental 
standards entailed, and how the company could meet them (Clarke and de la Rama 2004). 
Furthermore, one recent quantitative study found this rating system to be effective, 
arguing that “ratings are particularly likely to spur responses from firms that receive poor 
ratings,” therefore documenting an indirect regulatory effect (Chatterji and Toffel 2010: 
917; see also Slager 2010). As such, SRI can therefore be used as a strategy to discipline 
corporations by measuring, quantifying, and publicizing acceptable and unacceptable (i.e. 
socially responsible and irresponsible) practices (Déjean et al 2004). 
SRI has grown dramatically in recent decades and by the early 2000’s, it had 
become a widely used tool to shape corporate activity (Schueth 2003; Sparkes and 
Cowton 2004). According to the Social Investment Forum (2010), there are $3.07 trillion 
in total assets that are invested under some type of socially responsible investment in the 
United States. They also note that since 2005, the growth of professionally-managed SRI 




three percent. As a result, some commentators have suggested that SRI has “matured” 
and become an “investment philosophy adopted by a growing proportion of large 
investment institutions” (Sparkes and Cowton 2004: 52). 
With the dramatic rise of SRI (Sparkes and Cowton 2004), and its newfound 
legitimacy in engaging companies around social and environmental issues, a vast network 
of organizations has emerged and institutionalized. This new field includes more than just 
social movement activists, but non-profit and for-profit data collection agencies, 
producers of socially responsible mutual funds, and SRI research organizations and trade 
associations. Movement activists, including institutional investors and organizations 
promoting SRI, operate within this social movement field by recruiting and mobilizing 
new investors, and engaging companies. They make public claims about socially 
responsible practices and develop explicit standards that measure these behaviors.   
However, despite SRI’s dramatic growth, it remains a highly contentious site of 
struggle, waged in academic journals, shareholder meetings, and other outlets. For 
example, in his article “The Myth of Social Investing,” Entine (2003) attacks SRI data 
and the movement itself. He argues it is a form of “propaganda” and a “pseudosceince on 
a par with astrological research.” Many corporate managers, conservative think tanks, 
and a variety of traditional investors also continue to criticize SRI. Arguing that social 
and environmental criteria have no place in the business world (Friedman 1970), they 
have pushed back against SRI to maintain the traditionally narrow focus on financial 
performance. They draw upon the institutional logic of investing, known as fiduciary 
responsibility, which requires that money managers pursue the best financial interests of 




agents struggle for legitimacy, seeking to promote or retard social change in business 
practices.  
One important dimension of understanding standard-setting within this context is 
first identifying the range of standards and criteria used to construct social and 
environmental standards. Research on this issue has remained at a very narrow focus. For 
example, scholars have examined what issues investors focus on in shareholder 
resolutions concerning the environment (Monks et al 2004) and more general global 
issues (Proffitt and Spicer 2006). Others have examined how well social ratings measured 
environmental performance (Chatterji et al 2009; Delmas and Blass 2010; Rahmin and 
Post 2012). This research tends to focus on environmental criteria and it has largely 
ignored how socially responsible investors construct the thresholds for both social and 
environmental performance.  
Beyond the measurement itself, the literature largely ignores the broader context 
of how those criteria and thresholds are constructed in a particular way. Instead, 
researchers have particularly dwelled on whether or not SRI funds are as profitable as 
conventional funds (Orlitzsky et al 2003; Shröder 2007). This issue has received more 
attention than any other issue within the literature on SRI. Researchers have also 
examined when companies ultimately engage socially responsible investors (Hockerts 
and Moir 2004), and if SRI has an impact on company practices (Chatterji and Toffel 
2010; Hellsten and Mallin 2006). Yet they have not examined how these interactions, or 
other social factors, may have shaped the standard-setting process itself. Some initial 
research has examined how movements construct frames to legitimate socially 




shape shareholder resolutions (A. O’Rourke 2003), but there remains a dearth of research 
on broader SRI processes. How are standards embedded within processes of engagement? 
How are the standards for social responsibility constructed? These questions are 
fundamental for understanding what social responsibility means within the context of SRI 
and how struggles over its meaning reflect broader movement politics. 
Social Certifications 
A second strategy to privately regulate corporations is through social 
certifications (Bartley 2010b, 2011). While non-governmental and trade industry 
certification systems have been around since the 1890s, their use by social movements to 
regulate economic activity is fairly recent (Conroy 2007). It started in the late 1980s 
when environmental advocacy groups and other social movement organizations seeking 
to address tropical deforestation, and dissatisfied with boycott campaigns, began 
exploring a certification system that would develop verifiable criteria for sustainable 
forestry. These groups came together with forest products companies to create the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) and their FSC certified label. Around the same time, social 
movement organizations became concerned about the concentration of global food supply 
chains and the challenges small-scale agricultural (e.g. coffee) producers faced in 
increasingly volatile global commodity markets. They explored ways to shield small 
farmers from market fluctuations and ultimately constructed the Fair Trade certification 
system, which has become one of the most well-known set of standards today (Taylor 
2005a, 2005b). The FSC and Fair Trade labels are two of the most prominent examples 




as an important social movement field in the regulation of global capitalism (Bartley 
2007a; Jaffee and Howard 2010).   
Social certification systems have several key components. The most fundamental 
component is the social and environmental standards that a product must meet (while SRI 
focuses on companies, social certifications focus on products). The second component is 
the certification logo that signals that standards have been met to consumers and others 
within the field. Finally, there are auditing procedures that ensure compliance with 
certification standards and verify that the certification logo has been used appropriately. 
In globalized commodity chains, they function as a “chain of demands and assurances” 
that products are produced and sourced in a socially and environmentally responsible 
manner throughout the supply chain (Bartley 2010b).  
Certification systems can be internal to a firm (e.g. Starbucks’ CAFÉ standards), 
created and controlled by trade associations (e.g. the Sustainable Forestry Initiative), or 
be controlled by an independent, third party (e.g. FSC, Fair Trade). The latter form of 
certifications is perceived to be the most legitimate form of certification because they are 
constructed with a more diverse set of stakeholders and monitored by an independent 
third-party (Conroy 2007; Dean 2009). The certification systems are made up of a variety 
of stakeholders including a network of social movement organizations, advocacy groups, 
monitors and auditors, participating corporations and small-scale producer communities, 
research organizations, and in some cases, governmental actors (Bartley, 2010b; Boström 
and Hallström 2010). Because these third-party certifications achieve the highest support 
and involvement from movement actors, they will therefore be the focus of this study. 




anti-corporate campaigns to entice companies, who are often initially resistant, into 
involvement (Conroy 2007).  
Social movements, therefore, use these standards to engage producers and shape 
economic practices throughout a company and its supply chains (Cashore et al 2004; 
Haufler 2003; Lipschutz and Fogel 2002; D. O’Rourke 2003). The producers, who 
receive greater legitimacy with diverse stakeholder involvement, must divulge 
information about their production processes and supply chains, and allow inspections at 
their facilities. It provides new information to movement actors while facilitating direct 
involvement in corporate governance and policy, marking a shift in strategies from 
castigation to cooperation (Elgert 2012). Companies benefit by improving their brand 
image and gain access to these markets when they comply with the binding standards 
(Haufler 2003; Conroy 2007). Movements then use certifications to educate and mobilize 
consumers around production and consumption issues (Nicholls and Opal 2005), build 
markets for socially responsible alternatives (Gulbrandsen 2006), and in doing so, further 
pressure companies to submit to regulatory certification. Movement advocates do not see 
these certification systems as replacing state regulation, but see it as a powerful 
supplement in the absence of transnational state regulatory apparatuses (D. O’Rourke 
2003; Bernstein and Cashore 2004) or a “layering” of rules that strengthen the regulatory 
environment (Bartley 2011).    
Like SRI, the institutionalization of social certification systems marks an 
important new site for political struggle and field for social movement activity (Bartley 
2005, 2007a; Jaffee 2010). Within this field, movement actors make explicit claims about 




at least, exclusively) through protest or state-level policy change. They endeavor to 
implement their preferred standard privately, seeking to continuously “ratchet up” 
standards as more producers comply over time (Sabel et al 2000). However, movement 
activity and their successes within social certifications have led to a “countermovement” 
by corporations, seeking to steer the certification movement in their favor (Fridell et al 
2008). In addition to making their own abstract claims about social responsibility, they 
have continued expanding firm-driven and industry-driven certifications, and have 
become increasingly involved in the development of third-party certifications as well 
(Bartley 2010b). Corporations have relentlessly worked to coopt standard-setting 
processes and sought to weaken standards in Fair Trade, the Forest Stewardship Council, 
Organic agriculture, and Responsible Soy, amongst others (Jaffee and Howard 2010; 
Jaffee 2010; Bartley 2003, 2007a; Moore 2010; Elgert 2012). Certifications, therefore, 
are highly politicized environments and increasingly important sites for regulating (and in 
many ways, sustaining) global capitalism.  
While this field has recently caught the attention of scholars, empirical studies of 
movement efforts to regulate capital through certification have generally focused on an 
individual certification (Cashore et al 2004; Haufler 2003) or documented different 
classifications of standards (Conroy 2007; Raynolds et al 2007; D. O’Rourke 2003). By 
one estimate, there are more studies conducted on the Forest Stewardship Council than all 
other certifications combined (Vogel 2008). Studies in the area have proliferated 
dramatically, with particular focus on the spread of certifications (Conroy 2007; Bartley 
2007a) and the effects or implications of certification systems (Bartley 2010a; Seidman 




(Gulbrandsen 2006; Nicholls and Opal 2005) and the legitimacy of private standard-
setting bodies (Bernstein and Cashore 2004; Bernstein 2011; Wilkinson 2007).  
Some scholars have also noted the value of comparing different standards, 
especially to comprehend the range of standards within certification systems. But while 
some work has compared standards across sectors (e.g. Bartley 2003, 2007a, 2010a), 
most comparative studies have focused on forestry standards as well. For example, these 
studies have described the structure and procedures of competing certifications (Meridian 
Institute 2001). They have examined the perceptions of various stakeholders regarding 
different certification standards (Mater et al 2002) and the relative ease or difficulty in 
meeting certain standards as compared to others (Gale 2004). In some studies, they have 
extended these analyses to the role of monitoring and information reporting in different 
standards (Hickey et al 2006), and evaluation of different criteria across standard systems 
(Holvoet and Muys 2004). One of the few existing studies that seeks to develop a more 
systematic approach to comparing certifications (McDermott et al 2008) focuses only on 
a single dimension of forestry standards (i.e. riparian buffer zones). By evaluating 
regional FSC standards, the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), and Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative (SFI), McDermott et al (2008) provided descriptive differences on 
policy approach, level of prescriptiveness, and threshold requirements. However, like the 
studies above, their “comparison focuses on written standards and policies, and [did] not 
address standards development” (McDermott et al 2008: 48).  
There are a very small number of studies that have looked at standards 
development, or how the standards themselves are constructed. For example, Tim Bartley 




efficacy of movement networks (Bartley 2007a) and funding foundations (Bartley 
2007b). Several studies have examined the role of “mainstreaming” Fair Trade or the 
effects of scaling up Fair Trade to large corporate producers, and how this process, has 
diluted standards (Jaffee and Howard 2010; Jaffee 2010; Moore 2010). These studies 
show that as corporations have become involved in the process, they have mobilized their 
disproportionate levels of power to gain concessions and lower certification standards. 
Elgert (2012) has documented similar political effects in the development of Responsible 
Soy standards. Factors such as level of economic development and enforcement capacity 
can also play a role in “setting the bar” for certification (McDermott et al 2009). 
With the exceptions above, there are few studies that compare certifications 
across sectors or that focus on the development of social and environmental 
certifications. Almost no studies combine these research designs to adopt a comparative 
perspective in understanding the standard-setting process. This gap is striking given that 
several scholars have noted the benefits of such research (Bartley 2010a; McDermott et al 
2009), including the ability to explain different mechanisms and causal pathways in 
standards development. With little known about the political and cultural factors shaping 
the processes of engagement and standard-setting in social certifications, I examine how 
standards are developed within social certifications. How are standards embedded within 
processes of engagement? How are standards for social responsibility constructed?  
Furthermore, no studies that I am aware of compare multiple fields within the 
social responsibility movement. By looking at both SRI and social certifications, we can 
draw upon more powerful comparisons that might highlight more nuanced mechanisms 




argue, would shed light on how power is distributed throughout the social responsibility 
movement; how non-state institutions and cultural processes mediate movement 
outcomes; and how actors negotiate these fields of power. What do these practices and 
the construction of these standards tell us about the organization of power between 
corporations and the movements seeking to regulate them? How is standard-setting 
shaped across the two different arenas (SRI and social certifications) discussed here? 
 
Theoretical Framework: Social Movement Fields 
 The theoretical framework I use for analyzing these fields draws upon the 
intersection of social movement theory and neo-institutional theory. In this section, I 
review this literature and I begin by defining social movements. Next, I describe the 
dominant models of social movement theory, political process and contentious politics, 
noting how scholars have taken these approaches in new directions to account for more 
recent movement activity. I then outline a field-based approach to social movements, 
which integrates contentious politics with neo-institutional theory, and which guides my 
empirical research of the social responsibility movement. 
 
Defining and Theorizing Social Movements 
 There is no single definition or theory of social movements (Jasper 2007). Some 
authors define them vaguely as “collective attempts to promote or resist change in a 
society or group” (Benford et al 2000: 2712), while others provide a very narrow 
definition of movements as exclusively operating outside of institutional channels 




definitions, there are key similarities and important distinctions in contemporary 
movements that provide a useful basis for building a definition of social movements 
(Soule 2009). First, social movements are forms of collective action that have some kind 
of common goal. Second, movements seek to promote or resist change (although theorists 
debate how much change is necessary to be considered a movement). Third, movements 
have some level of organization and coordination. Many theorists note that too much 
organization in movements result in short-lived efforts, but there must be some degree of 
formal and informal networks within movements (Della Porta and Diani 2006). Fourth, 
there is some level of temporal continuity with movements being sustained over time. 
This dimension excludes things like mobs or spontaneous group behavior. One additional 
dimension of movements—the degree to which they operate outside of institutional 
channels—is a particular point of debate and requires more extensive discussion here. 
 Some scholars of social movements have argued that social movements explicitly 
operate outside of institutional channels and target the state. The rationale for viewing 
them as operating outside of institutional channels is that it excludes things like political 
parties and interest group activity. Furthermore, many scholars operating within the 
political process and contentious politics models have emphasized the state (Armstrong 
and Bernstein 2008; Polletta 2006). These scholars (McAdam et al 2001: 5; see also Tilly 
2004) assume that in social movement activity, “at least one government is a claimant, an 
object of claims, or a party to the claims,” and are the only rulemakers of significance 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). Like the fight for civil rights in the US, these 
movements sought new benefits for marginalized groups and inclusion in the state. 




focus on governments, scholars have produced a wealth of knowledge about social 
movements and political processes in the formal political arena, including the state 
regulation of economic activity (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Schneiberg 2002; 
Campbell and Lindberg 1990; Rowe 2005) and state sovereignty within the political 
process (Carruthers 1994).  
Indeed, all such movements operate at least partly outside of institutions and 
normal political channels. For example, the social responsibility movement wages a 
variety of campaigns against corporations. These include protest demonstrations, 
boycotts, the use of advocacy science, and legal suits. But these social movement efforts 
also encompass a broader array of actors, institutions, and targets than ever before, with 
an increasing emphasis on targeting corporations, investors, and consumers across 
multiple arenas throughout society. These social movements have increasingly targeted 
non-state actors in an effort to make economic activity more socially responsible and 
sustainable because states have been reluctant or politically unable to regulate 
transnational corporations (Rowe 2005; Jaffee 2010). They target corporations to entice 
them to agree to abide by private standards for social responsibility. They target investors 
to garner more support to change corporations from within. They target consumers to 
shape culture and develop markets for socially responsible goods and services, promoting 
greater demand for socially responsible products and companies. As such, these 
movement actors hold a more ambiguous role, without clear dividing lines between 
outsider and insider (Tarrow and della Porta 2005: 238). 
Several scholars (e.g. Armstrong and Bernstein 2008) have suggested, therefore, 




focused on political action and protest events” and lack the conceptual framework to 
adequately theorize or explain these newer change efforts (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005: 
38). They have described change-oriented activities not fitting into this model as 
seemingly “awkward movements” (Polletta 2006) and scholars have called upon the field 
to “broaden our conceptualization of social movements beyond contentious politics” 
aimed at the state (Snow 2004:19). To grapple with these new challenges, several 
theorists have recently proposed an alternative model of social movements focusing on 
fields and institutions, and how power is organized across these multiple arenas 
throughout society (Crossley 2002a; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). They have re-
conceptualized social movements as “collective challenges to systems or structures of 
authority … within and to institutional, organizational, and cultural domains other than 
just the state” (Snow 2004: 11). Drawing upon this more expansive view of social 
movements, I will outline a theoretical framework that is more suitable to understanding 
the multi-level, multi-targeted, and shifting nature of contemporary collective action that 
can be found in the struggles for promoting more socially responsible business practices 
(amongst others). 
 
A Field-Based Approach to Social Movements 
A field-based approach to social movements is rooted in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979, 
1990, 1993) theory of fields but with a more direct emphasis on fields as both sites of 
reproduction and change
1
. For example, Crossley (2002a) interprets social movement 
                                                 
1
 Bourdieu is often heavily criticized for only having a theory of social reproduction and not having a 
theory of social change. Of course, Bourdieu acknowledges social change, as exhibited here (and 




fields as the different arenas where individual and organizational actors (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991) collectively and continuously struggle to change society. Each field has a 
game-like structure with its own objects of value, rules, forms of social control, and 
objectives—which converge to provide unique structures of opportunity and constraint. 
In this “game,” actors are positioned relationally and adjust their positioning based on the 
perceived actions of others within the field (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). Fields also 
impose these relations through institutions that become internalized by actors operating 
within that arena.  
From this perspective, institutions
2
 are defined as “cultural rules” that classify 
different groups of actors, their proper roles, their relationships to other actors, and 
expectations for how the field does and should operate (Meyer et al., 1997). These 
schemas (Poletta 2008), or cultural systems of beliefs and practices, that outline these 
rules are known as institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991) or field frames 
(Lounsbury et al 2003). They may be formalized in laws and institutional regulations or 
they may exist informally through norms and belief systems. They are coercive and 
normative orders that orient actors toward particular meanings and actions, thus enabling 
a compatible set of practices (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001). In addition to specifying 
actors and their inter-relationships, they also “render alternatives unthinkable, irrational, 
                                                                                                                                                 
belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 80; emphasis in original). The issue is that he rarely discussed when, how, who, or under 
what conditions change can and does occur. The literature addressed here, both from social movements and 
neo-institutional literatures better elaborate processes of change, in addition to processes of social 
reproduction from a perspective that is consistent with Bourdieu’s theory of fields. It can be understood as 
supplementing and refining his theoretical framework, rather than seeking to replace it. 
2
 Note that several scholars cited here differ on how they conceptualize fields and institutions. While I have 
adopted the more common approach found in the literature, which differentiates the two concepts in the 
ways described above, some others view fields and institutions as similar theoretical constructs. For 
example, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) treat fields and institutions as “roughly interchangeable” 




or inefficient” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007: 649). Alternative interpretations that 
might be imported from external fields (Rao and Giorgi 2006) can be made unrealistic 
based on their incompatibility with institutional logics dominant within the field. 
A field is further characterized by particular distributions of resources and power. 
Based on their levels of capital, certain positions (and the individual and organizational 
actors that occupy them) maintain different degrees of power in constructing regulations 
and meaning (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). This includes economic, social, or cultural 
capital, which are distributed unevenly within a field (Bourdieu 1979, 1990, 1993). The 
structural location of particular actors, therefore, shapes both their belief system and 
levels (and composition) of capital. Because particular institutions orient actors toward 
certain values, the institution itself at least partially constitutes both their identities and 
interests based on the types of capital that are valued in that field. As such, they reflect 
both symbolic and material structures, and have their own logic(s), relational dynamic, 
and structures of control. But despite these institutional logics and structures of power, 
fields are sites of struggle where actors can challenge existing institutions and promote 
social change. 
This perspective differs significantly from theories of institutional determinism, 
which assume that institutions have a clear and consistent functional logic and “will 
virtually always act in particular ways” (Buzbee 1997: 1). An increasing number of 
scholars also recognize that while institutions are highly durable, they may also comprise 
multiple logics, ambiguities, and contradictions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007: 649; 
Rao and Giorgi 2006). Institutions are sites of struggle and contestation; they can, and do, 




entrepreneurs” grasp such opportunities and promote change through collective action 
(Beckert 1999; Hwang and Powell 2005). For example, institutional entrepreneurs 
simultaneously draw upon cultural capital that signals their membership within an 
institution but also their ability to “stand out” or be innovative in reconstructing meanings 
(De Clerq and Voronov 2009). By reframing interpretations of existing laws, norms, and 
beliefs, social movements de-institutionalize current orders (Rao et al. 2000). They seek 
to identify existing problems in an institution by introducing new ways of thinking and 
disrupting the everyday taken-for-grantedness (or “cognitive encumbrances”) of 
institutional arrangements (Voss 1996). Social movements introduce legitimacy crises 
(Stryker 2000) in an effort to construct cultural resources and mobilize institutional 
members. They develop networks and organize resources to challenge institutional 
orders, leverage existing contradictions, and magnify competing logics and frames. In 
doing so, social movements recast previously unthinkable schemas as viable alternatives, 
and seek to translate alternatives into a new institutional order. These efforts at re-
institutionalization are the fundamental goal for social change aimed at institutional 
channels. 
Institutional struggles, however, are highly contentious. Institutional regulations 
can constrain actors and limit their pathways. Actors empowered by existing institutional 
arrangements use their capital to preserve their position and delegitimize alternative 
cultural interpretations (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007). Ultimately, the ability of 
challengers to articulate alternatives, the resonance of competing institutional logics, and 
the capacity to translate new logics and frames into institutional practices is contingent on 




a variety of factors, including the political and cultural opportunities within the 
institutional context; their ability to mobilize supporters, constituents, and resources; and 
the resonance of competing cultural frames (King 2008). 
A field-based approach to social movements, therefore, focuses on how power 
and culture are shaped and enacted to construct both regulations and meanings, 
examining institutions that include, but are not limited to, the state. It begins with the 
assumption that insights gained from a state-centered focus cannot necessarily be 
generalized to non-state institutions; rather, each field has its own logic, relational 
dynamic, and structures of control.  According to Armstrong and Bernstein (2008), 
movement analysts working in this approach start with an examination of institutional 
and cultural power in specific contexts and they investigate how activists understand this 
power and select strategies within it.  They argue that by shifting from a state-centric 
model to a field-based model, an analysis of “power in this way will allow theorists to 
begin to make some modest generalizations about forms of power and how activists 
interpret, negotiate, and challenge those forms of power” (Armstrong and Bernstein 
2008: 92).   
Initial empirical work using these models have explored specific contexts and 
fields to understand the dynamics of this new social movement activity. For example, 
Armstrong (2002) examined the proliferation and institutionalization of LGBT 
organizations in San Francisco, from the 1950s to the 1990s, seeking to explain why and 
how they target culture, identity, and churches. Similar analyses can also be found in 
studies of anti-war protests by activist scientists (Moore 1999), mental health movements 




decriminalize consensual adult sodomy (Bernstein 2005).  Together, this scholarship has 
helped reveal how power operates through discourses of normalization and classificatory 
practices, how it is challenged by both insiders and outsiders, and why movement actors 
selected their non-state targets and strategies. 
This dissertation project seeks to further develop this new social movement 
paradigm by extending it to economic institutions and governance (Crossley 2002b; 
Campbell 2006). As discussed above, social movements have increasingly targeted non-
state actors to effect social change. After decades of unsuccessfully seeking more 
comprehensive state regulation of corporations, the corporate social responsibility 
movement, or social responsibility movement more broadly (which engages both large 
and small businesses), has emerged as an important example of this type of movement. 
By targeting companies through socially responsible investing and social certifications, 
the movement has increasingly engaged directly with companies, attempting to get them 
to abide by new social and environmental standards. Because of this social movement 
pressure and the regulatory void that existed (Bartley 2007), these fields have emerged 
(and been reshaped) whereby movement activists, advocacy networks, and companies 
themselves have sought to shape the outcomes of these new social standards and 
practices. The standards become encoded in social certification standards, SRI standards, 
and shareholder proposals. But like all fields, these standards are socially constructed 






Overview of the Study 
One fundamental question guides this study: how are standards for social 
responsibility constructed? In other words, how is standard-setting structured within and 
across the fields of SRI and social certification? In order to understand this broad 
question, I examine how the social responsibility movement engages with corporations 
and other producers, how they construct the criteria and thresholds for social 
responsibility, and what field-level processes structure these interactions and the 
standards that emerge from them. Amongst the myriad claims of social responsibility in 
the market, the private standards that are created in SRI and social certifications are two 
movement-driven standards that attempts to regulate corporate behavior, and 
understanding how these standards are constructed is meant to shed light on what it 
means for a company or commodity to be considered socially responsible. By examining 
the contexts in which standards are developed in each of these fields, I will elaborate the 
social and cultural mechanisms that shape expectations for social responsibility. 
Understanding these mechanisms will then enable us to better understand the 
opportunities and constraints for shaping corporate behavior outside of the state. It will 
help us better theorize the relationship between business and society, highlighting how 
economic activity can be shaped in an era of deregulated and globalized capitalism.  
      To understand how social responsibility standards are constructed, I examine 
specific standards as individual cases. In chapter two (“Data and Methods”), I elaborate 
how specific SRI ratings agencies and social certifications can be conceptualized as 
unique cases and the primary actors involved within each of them. I then link these cases 




three social certification cases. In addition to analyzing each case over time (through 
process-tracing), the multiple cases allow me to make comparisons across cases through a 
method known as typological theorizing (George and Bennett 2005). This comparative 
design enables me to identify unique sets of conditions and causal mechanisms that shape 
standard-setting in patterned ways. 
It is important to begin my analysis by focusing on a single field to understand 
how standards are constructed within a specific context. In chapter three (“Standard-
Setting in SRI”), I present my findings for the field of socially responsible investing. First 
I analyze how socially responsible investors disrupt and attempt to reconstruct 
institutional logics to make social and environmental standards relevant for business 
practices. I examine how they engage corporate producers through shareholder 
resolutions and social ratings to understand how standards are embedded relationally 
within processes of engagement. Most importantly, I explore how the different cases set 
the bar for social and environmental responsibility, and the field-level conditions that 
shape these standard-setting processes. By exploring how the standards have developed 
over time (i.e. process-tracing), and how they compare across cases within SRI, I seek to 
broaden understanding of the processes that shape social and environmental standards. 
Social certification is another important field where movement actors seek to 
develop private standards for socially responsible business practices. Accordingly, I shift 
my focus to the field of social certification in chapter four (“Standard-Setting in Social 
Certifications”). Similar to my examination of SRI, I first analyze how certification 
networks reconstruct institutional logics by developing market alternatives that reward 




practices. By continuing to parallel the previous chapter, I then examine how they engage 
companies with multi-stakeholder dialogues in the construction of the standards. I show 
how standards have developed over time, and how they vary across certification cases, 
highlighting the different standards that certifiers adopt. These comparisons are then used 
to shed light on the field-level conditions that shape standard-setting processes. 
As Bourdieu (1979: 226) argued, one can also conceive of a “total field of these 
fields” or higher order fields that shape relations between actors. In chapter five (“The 
Meta-field of Private Social Responsibility Standards”), I step back from each individual 
field to look across the two fields in order to see commonalities and differences in how 
standards for social responsibility are constructed. I treat the broader social responsibility 
movement as a meta-field in this sense to identify broader processes that influence 
standard-setting. In this chapter, I conduct higher-level comparisons to analyze common 
mechanisms that operate across SRI and social certifications to shape standards in 
patterned ways. This chapter builds upon the previous chapters on SRI and social 
certifications by combining earlier results with newly reported data to identify more 
general mechanisms at play in the broader social responsibility movement.  
Finally, in chapter six (“Conclusion”), I tie the preceding results chapters back to 
theory on social movement fields in general, and the social responsibility movement in 
particular. By returning to issues raised earlier concerning insider and outsider strategies, 
I use this study of market-based movements to further develop our theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between insider and outsider strategies. This will be 
used to advance our understanding of power, culture, and institutions in field-based 




movement. I also emphasize several issues concerning globalization, including the role of 
global-local interactions in shaping local struggles and the development of standards. I 
finish by drawing particular attention to power struggles in SRI and social certifications 







Chapter 2: Data and Methods 
 
This study seeks to better understand how social movements construct private 
standards for social responsibility to regulate economic activity. Standards are private in 
the sense that they are not enacted or controlled by the state but are regulatory in the 
sense that they promote adherence to a set of social and environmental expectations. My 
analysis focuses on standard-setting processes within two social movement fields: 
socially responsible investing (SRI) and social certifications. Within these fields, I draw 
upon qualitative interviews to examine two SRI cases and three social certification cases. 
The interviews are utilized to identify the range of standards within each case and to 
explain the social forces that shape the standard-setting processes.  
In this chapter, I begin by discussing how I conceptualize cases within these two 
social movement fields. I describe my research design, how I selected the five cases that 
form the heart of this study, and how I collected my data. I describe each case in detail 
and the comparative methods used to analyze each case within and across these fields. 
My intent is to understand how, within each of these contexts, social and environmental 
standards used to regulate corporations are constructed. It is in these standards where 
movements draw boundaries signifying social responsibility, and by examining their 
construction, we can better understand the relationship between power, culture, and 
institutions within our era of global capitalism. 
Theory and Method in the Study of Social Movement Fields 
At the broadest level, there exists a social movement that struggles to make 




practices in a more socially responsible manner. While this broad movement has been 
referred to by different names within both activist and scholarly communities
3
, I refer to 
this movement as the social responsibility movement. The movement operates on many 
different fronts, or within many different fields. These fields are defined as “the diverse 
and differentiated range of arenas in which movements wage their struggles” (Crossley 
2002a: 183). In each field, actors encounter a unique game with its own cultural rules, 
objects of value, and objectives. In the social responsibility movement, the fields can 
range from anti-corporate campaigns waged in the media to legal fields including 
regulatory law and the courts to private arenas for standard-setting like SRI and social 
certifications. Figure 1 depicts this movement and its many different fields of struggle. 















 While there are many fields within which the social responsibility movement 
wages its struggles, this study examines two fields in particular: SRI and social 
                                                 
3
 As noted in chapter one, this movement goes by many names including the “corporate accountability 
movement” (Dale 2011; McBarnet et al 2009). While I have chosen to use the term “social responsibility 
movement” here, it includes movement efforts to regulate companies of all sizes, and includes efforts that 




certification. I have selected these fields because I am interested in the development of 
how private standards for social responsibility are constructed. As noted in chapter one, 
movements have increasingly bypassed the state to develop private standards for social 
and environmental responsibility. Whether movements have viewed targeting 
governments as too time-consuming and less effective (Baron 2003), or if they see 
national states as being too weak to regulate transnational corporations (Strange 1996), or 
are trying to avoid state repression (Soule 2009), there has been an explosion in 
movement attempts to embed business practices in private standards for social and 
environmental responsibility. In an increasingly globalized world that lacks global 
governance apparatuses to regulate this activity, SRI and social certification have 
emerged as two of the most important fields in which they have developed private 
standards systems. But given that they function through the market, and outside of states, 
we need new analyses to understand how these standards are developed. 
To understand these fields, we must examine relationships between and among 
the actors within them. These actors include both organizations and individuals. Because 
of the importance of organizations and organizational processes in shaping outcomes, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) refer to such fields as “organizational fields.” Drawing 
upon Bourdieu, they view a field as comprising all the organizations that played some 
kind of role within a relevant activity. For example, in studying corporate social 
responsibility, SRI constitutes a field; organizations within the SRI field include social 
ratings agencies, social data providers, shareholder activists, institutional investors, trade 
associations, consultancy organizations, federal agencies regulating investment, and of 




network, but also includes distributions of capital and unique institutional configurations 
as well (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). Organizational actors within that network have 
different levels of economic, cultural, and social capital to strategically deploy within a 
set of take-for-granted cultural rules and perceptions of how the field operates. 
Viewing corporate social responsibility as a field is important because this 
perspective goes beyond simple organization-environment dichotomies that only focus on 
some vaguely defined external environment. Instead, this perspective includes the 
specific organizations themselves and conceptualizes them in relational terms within the 
field (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). Therefore, it is not enough to situate an organization 
(e.g. a certifier or social ratings agency) as responding to some kind of political or 
economic circumstances, but rather to conceptualize how that organization operates over 
time relative to competitors, targets, regulatory bodies, trade associations, consumers, or 
any other relevant party.  
While a specific SRI rating or certification standard tends to be administered by a 
single organization, studying that single organization is never adequate for understanding 
the process of standard setting as well as the contents of standards that ensue. Instead, we 
must understand the standard within the inter-organizational network that is relevant for 
the construction of that standard. Therefore each set of standards is conceived of as part 
of an organizational network.  
Cases constitute another important construct for this study. While theorists 
conceptualize cases in many different ways (Ragin and Becker 1992), cases can be 
defined as a “class of events” that include phenomena of scientific interest, such as 




to study with the aim of developing theory (or ‘generic knowledge’) regarding the causes 
of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of events” (George and 
Bennet 2005: 17-18; Ragin 1992).  As a research design, case studies are particularly 
useful when seeking to answer questions about why and how certain social phenomena 
has occurred. It is used to investigate phenomena in “its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident” Yin 1994: 13).  
Within any given field, a case may look slightly different. For example, a case in 
the field of state law and regulation may include the struggle over shaping a new 
corporate regulation or a new law that requires specific socially responsible purchasing 
policies for government agencies (Dale 2011). A case in the field of judicial courts may 
include legal action against corporations filed under the US Alien Tort Claims Act 
(Holzmeyer 2009; Shamir 2004; Dale 2011). The definition of a case must fit the realities 
of a particular field, and when a study covers multiple cases, they must be similar enough 
to warrant comparison (Ragin 1992).  
In this study focusing on the two fields of SRI and social certification, a case is 
the unique set of social and environmental standards associated with a specific SRI or 
social certification initiative. The case is associated with an organizational network that 
includes both the organization that maintains the standard as well as the broader network 
of organizations responsible for shaping its construction. For the purposes of this study, 
each standard is referred to by its “owner” or secretariat—i.e., the organization that 
maintains administrative control and final decision-making authority over it. An SRI case 
may include social ratings (e.g. KLD, Calvert, and FTSE4Good) and shareholder 




Stewardship Council, Marine Stewardship Council, and Fair Trade). Figure 2 illustrates 
how these cases are nested within the social responsibility movement and their respective 
fields. 
Figure 2. Relationship between Movement, Fields, and Cases in SRI and Social Certifications
Social Responsibility Movmement












To move from a field to a case within SRI or social certification, the first 
objective is to identify relevant organizations that have played a meaningful role in 
standard-setting for that particular case. Many scholars studying social certifications have 
noted the challenges of this fundamental methodological issue (McDermott et al 2008; 
Bartley and Smith 2008; Boström and Hallström 2010). We can understand some of the 
complexity of this endeavor in Meidinger’s (2003) description of sprawling and dynamic 
forest certifications: 
All of the forest certification programs self-consciously operate in a larger context 
best described as a sprawling, largely unmapped, highly changeable, loosely 




monitor each other. It includes many environmental organizations, large and small 
production, wholesale, and retails firms, trade associations, professional certifiers, 
labor unions, human rights organizations, indigenous groups, government 
agencies, [and so on] … Relations among them involve a complex, shifting mix 
of mutual observation, direct communication, trust, distrust, mutual adjustment, 
cooperation, coordination, and competition (Meidinger 2003: 276; cited in Bartley 
and Smith 2010: 359). 
This complexity can make drawing the boundaries around a case particularly difficult 
(McDermott et al 2008). As stated by Bartley and Smith (2008: 8), “collecting data of 
this sort is complicated by the fact that the boundaries and logics of involvement in 
certification are themselves unsettled and ambiguous.” It requires the identification of 
relevant organizations, and individuals within those organizations, that have important 
roles in standard-setting within social certifications and SRI. Identifying these 
organizations requires in-depth knowledge of each case, which for the purposes of this 
study, emerged by a process of triangulation between the literature, analysis of 
organizational websites, and interviews with my respondents (I describe this more fully 
in the following section). In this way, I was able to address the complexity of each case 
by conducting a thorough review of key organizations and individuals. 
In the sections that follow, I explain these methods in detail. I begin by describing 
my research design, then move into a description of my data collection procedures and 
interview techniques. I then offer detailed descriptions of each of my five cases. I also 




cross-case comparisons. Finally, I illustrate how my comparative analyses are linked to 
my results chapters. 
 
Research Design 
My research design entails a comparative, case-based approach to understanding 
how standards for social and environmental responsibility are constructed in SRI and 
social certifications. Each case consists of a network of organizations relevant for 
understanding and shaping processes for a particular set of standards. To examine each 
case, I rely on public documents, and more importantly, in-depth interviews.  
I selected cases based on their role in creating social responsibility standards to 
make companies more socially responsible through SRI and social certifications. In each 
field, I sought cases that 1) had specific and identifiable standards for social and 
environmental responsibility; 2) were leaders in the field of social responsibility; and 3) 
had recently revised their standards or were in the process of revising their standards, in 
order to speak with representatives that were actively involved in these processes. For 
each case, I interviewed multiple representatives of the organization that administered 
and controlled the standard, but I also sought out additional interviews with organizations 
in their broader network. Most importantly, I sought interviews with organizations 
involved in constructing the standard, but I also spoke with respondents more generally 
involved with standard-setting processes and others within the field to triangulate my data 
(Yin 1994).  
To select respondents to interview for each case, I relied on the academic 




the literature to understand the primary organizational actors and movement participants 
within the SRI and social certification fields. Second, I reviewed public documents 
produced by the organizations with which I sought interviews. These documents include 
statements made on organizational websites, press releases, and promotional material, 
and discussed the standard and/or the construction of the standard. I always began my 
interviews in a particular case with representatives of the administrator of that set of 
standards. Third, I drew upon these initial interviews to understand what other actors 
were important in shaping the standard-setting process. This practice, known as snowball 
sampling, led me to additional respondents. Between the literature, publicly available 
information, and referrals from other respondents, I was able to interview the most 
important actors in constructing standards and a variety of individuals within standard-
setting organizations and their broader networks. 
When selecting relevant organizations (and representatives from those 
organizations) for a particular a case, I reviewed relevant literature and collected initial 
information on the cases themselves. The heart of the particular case is the organization 
that actually owns or administers the standards. By using public documents and informal 
discussions with others in the field, I was able to map the additional primary 
organizational actors involved in each case, and then subsequently confirmed, 
supplemented, and focused my sample using further interviews with respondents. In this 
way, the selection of organizations (and representatives from those organizations) was 
rooted in knowledge about each individual case. I made additional effort to broaden my 
scope in identifying other actors in the field that may have been excluded from, or have 




types of organizations within the field. I provide a conceptual map for my cases in Figure 
3, and I will describe my respondents for each case in greater depth in a later section. 
Figure 2. Conceptual Map of the Social Responsibility Fields and Cases
Social Responsibility Movmement
SRI Field           Social Certification Field
= An organization within the field, which is positioned relative to one or more cases
= Network connection between 2 organizations
Note: The organizational nodes and linkages in the diagram are given for 
  conceptual purposes and do not represent actual organizations in the study.
SRI Case 1 
(CRR)
SRI Case 2 
(Corp 
Indexing)
SC Case 3 
(Ethical 
Sourcing)
SC Case 1 
(Justice 
Certifiers)






Within SRI, whose relevant networks are arguably somewhat less complex than 
social certification networks, the heart of the network includes organizations producing 
social ratings and shareholder resolutions. Their relevant organizational field (which can 
shift in respect to each case) includes NGOs, institutional investors, trade associations, 
research institutions, consultants, and competing ratings agencies. The heart of social 
certification networks included the certifier themselves, and further encompassed current 
and former NGOs involved in the development of standards, consultants, trade 
associations, competing certifiers, and ethical consumer organizations. These networks 
included representatives who both promoted and were critical of the standards. Ideally, I 




producers and retailers), but I have focused exclusively on the movement side of 
standard-setting systems. My focus was motivated by questions about the movement 
itself and also by a desire to study several cases that would allow me to make cross-case 
comparisons. Nonetheless, this focus did limit my data by excluding how participating 
businesses viewed themselves as shaping (or not shaping) social standards. And while 
governments are increasingly involved in standard-setting systems (Bartley 2011), my 
respondents generally indicated little or no government involvement and respondents 
from those organizations were also not interviewed for this study. 
I interviewed respondents with a focus on five cases (two SRI cases and three 
social certifications). On the one hand, this number of cases was small enough to gather 
the depth of information necessary for thoroughly examining individual cases. The 
interviews allowed me to develop thick descriptions of the standard-setting process in 
each case, exploring the interactions and other forces that shaped the inclusion (or 
exclusion) of certain criteria, or where thresholds were set. I analyzed the interviews 
through process-tracing to understand the causal mechanisms that shaped how the 
standards that were produced. On the other hand, my use of multiple cases was broad 
enough to enable cross-case comparisons that are a fundamental dimension of my 
analysis (Sandelowski 1995). By looking across organizations within the same field, and 
later across fields, I looked for patterns in how standards were constructed. The themes in 
my data revealed mechanisms that shape standard-setting processes and could explain 




Data Collection and Interview Techniques 
The data used for this study included publicly available documents and 40 in-
depth interviews. The public documents included statements made on organizational 
websites and promotional material, and discussed the standard and/or the construction of 
the standard in some way. I sought any documentation available on a standard’s website 
that made reference to the standards or how they were developed. I used these documents 
to identify the types of criteria included in an organization’s standard, other organizations 
involved in developing or promoting the standard, and participating business 
organizations. These gave me, in very broad strokes, a sense of what was included in a 
standard and who the key actors were. They also informed the questions I asked during 
my interviews, which were the primary source of data in this study. 
The interviews used in this project began in the Fall of 2006, when I first started 
exploring standards for social ratings used to develop socially responsible mutual funds. 
While I completed 11 interviews at that time, this dissertation research ultimately grew 
out of that earlier project. I have, therefore, more recently interviewed an additional 29 
respondents involved in socially responsible investing and social certifications between 
March 2010 and March 2011. In other words, I conducted a total of 40 interviews for this 
research. 
I identified respondents for each interview either by examining an organization’s 
website for individuals involved in standard-setting processes or through a direct referral 
from another respondent. I recruited potential respondents by sending them a formal 
letter that explained my interest in understanding how social responsibility is defined and 




participation and indicated that I would follow up with a phone call or email, and 
provided them with my full contact information. When applicable, the letter also 
identified the person by which they were referred. I then followed up the letter with a 
phone call to confirm their participation and set up the interview. This method was highly 
successful in recruiting respondents in this population.   
Whenever possible, I conducted my interviews in person, but I also conducted 
several interviews over the phone and via Skype when necessary. Twenty-four of the 
interviews were conducted in-person, with all but two of those taking place in the 
Washington, DC, metro area (the other two interviews took place in Cambridge, MA and 
Berkeley, CA). Thirteen interviews took place over the phone with respondents located in 
the US, and three interviews were conducted via Skype with respondents located outside 
the US.  
I began identifying respondents by seeking those involved in creating social 
responsibility standards, and continued soliciting interviews until 1) I was able to 
interview informants that were involved in the fundamental aspects of each standard’s 
construction; and 2) I reached a point of “theoretical saturation,” or the point at which 
respondents did not introduce new concepts relevant to explaining the process for each 
case and variation across cases (Sandelowski 1995). This led me to between three and 
eight interviews with each organizational case, an additional five to seven interviews with 
representatives of organizations within their network, and a handful of respondents 
outside of their immediate networks (as discussed below). 
Before each interview, and as part of their consent agreement, I informed 




names would also be kept confidential unless they approved the use of their name in a 
research publication. This permitted respondents to discuss organizational processes, and 
encouraged them to give potentially critical personal views and perspectives of the 
standard-setting process and issues in the field. All individual and organizational names 
used here are pseudonyms. 
My interview questionnaire was divided into four primary components. The first 
component positioned the respondent (and their organization) in relationship to the 
standard-setting process. It sought information about their job, their organization, and 
how they related to the relevant standards. The second part sought to evaluate the range 
of criteria that were of concern to the respondent and the organization, and how this 
related to the actual contents and thresholds for social responsibility within the 
standard(s). The third section sought to understand how these standards themselves were 
constructed, asking the respondent to walk me through several examples in detail to 
examine each step within the process. In this section, I sought to understand variability 
and change within the standards, including what issues got included and excluded, where 
disagreements existed, and how standards changed over time. The fourth section 
examined how these processes related to other actors and processes concerning the 
standards. For example, I was interested in the interactions between the respondent and 
standard-setting organizations or with companies evaluated by the standard. I asked about 
how standard-setting might have been related to auditing or promotion of the standards. I 
also asked governance-related questions, including how respondents perceived the 




In my research, I quickly found that such general questions could often lead to an 
overwhelming amount of information and that each respondent was not able to 
knowledgably discuss every part of the interview protocol. Therefore, I began preparing 
for each interview to better tailor interview questions relative to specific standards. For 
each interview, I reviewed public documents that discussed the standard in their 
particular organization (in general terms). Because many of these organizations consider 
transparency to be an important goal, the administrator of the standard generally made 
certain dimensions of their standard-setting procedures public and this background 
research was very helpful in guiding my questions. For example, when I observed that 
one standard included an issue while another standard did not, I was able to ask informed 
questions to understand why that issue was not considered or ultimately excluded from 
the standard. When conducting subsequent interviews with members of an organization 
or field, I also drew upon my knowledge from other respondents to draw out comparisons 
between standards and examine how standards changed over time. I now turn to detailed 
descriptions of the cases themselves. 
 
Case Descriptions 
For this study, I examined a total of five cases (two SRI cases and three social 
certification cases). For each case, I conducted between three and eight interviews within 
the organization that administered the standard, plus an additional five to seven 
interviews with actors in their broader network. I give an overview of the total interviews 
in Table 1, and a detailed listing of my respondents is available in Appendix 1. Note that 




overlapping affiliations (where they either worked in different organizations/roles across 
time, or held multiple positions simultaneously). 
Table 1. Interview Summary 
 
Total Interviews by Field and Case # of Interviews 
Socially Responsible Investing (19 interviews) 
 
 
Corporate Responsibility Researchers 8 
 
Corporate Indexing 4 
 
SRI Advocacy Network 7 
Social Certifications (21 interviews) 
 
 
Justice Certifiers 8 
 
Eco Certified 5 
 
Ethical Sourcing 3 
 
SC Advocacy Network 5 
Non-SC or SRI (7 interviews) 
 
 
Social Responsibility Advocacy Network 7 
   Note: Numbers do not sum to 40 because many respondents 
have overlapping affiliations. 
  
In the following sections, I describe each case and the network of actors I 
interviewed that were involved in each case. I also give some background on the case and 
why it is relevant for this study. I describe the case with an emphasis on the organization 
that maintains the standard, but I also discuss the broader organizational network that is a 
part of that case and with which I conducted additional interviews. All individual and 
organizational names used here are pseudonyms. I follow this description of the cases 
with a detailed discussion of my data analysis. 
 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) Cases 
 
I have examined two different SRI cases. At the heart of each case is an 
organization that collects data on the social and environmental practices of corporations, 
develops social ratings for the companies, and produces socially responsible mutual funds 




representatives of that organization in each case below before describing the broader 
network of organizations and representatives within which the case, and its distinct set of 
standards, is situated. 
SRI Case 1: Corporate Responsibility Researchers 
 
My first case is Corporate Responsibility Researchers (CRR). Founded in the 
early 1970s, CRR is one of the oldest organizations promoting socially responsible 
practices through investing and is considered a leader in the field. CRR conducts research 
on corporate environmental, social, and governance performance to serve a variety of 
functions. One function is to use research to work with institutional investors to develop 
customized socially responsible mutual funds. Based on feedback from NGOs and 
institutional investors about important social and environmental issues, CRR develops 
indicators to measure company performance on these issues. Next, they collect data from 
company reports, SEC filings, lawsuits, newspaper reports, and meetings with companies 
to develop their database. Using this database, they are able to compare companies within 
and across sectors regarding their social and environmental performance on issues of 
interest. CRR then works with investors to select and weight social issues, develop 
thresholds for socially responsible behavior, and screen companies into or out of mutual 
funds. As the field has developed, CRR has expanded the issues that they cover and has 
increased their sophistication in researching and evaluating company performance. 
A second function that CRR fulfills is conducting research and reporting on 
shareholder resolutions. Specifically, they publish reports on important issues in 
shareholder resolution campaigns and offer information to investors voting on 




within shareholder resolutions and have a particularly important role in framing how 
issues are addressed within them. CRR is a for-profit company but they work with a great 
number of non-profit organizations and institutional investors to evaluate social 
performance data, develop social ratings, vote on shareholder resolutions, and engage 
with companies. Furthermore, they are highly active in the broader SRI field, with 
leadership roles in SRI conferences and research. 
I interviewed eight respondents that worked at CRR, and ten others that were 
partners with or clients of CRR, or were within their broader sphere of influence. For my 
initial interviews, I spoke with several CRR representatives that collected social data used 
in their ratings and customized mutual funds. For example, I spoke with several Research 
Associates and Research Analysts that operationalized social issues into measurable data 
points and collected company data for their assigned industries. This led me to speak with 
a Team Lead that coordinates social research and interfaces with institutional investors 
about their social and environmental data, and an Operations Manager that worked 
directly with institutional investors to develop screens and ratings for customized mutual 
funds based on investor interests. I also interviewed two research analysts that researched 
shareholder resolutions, writing issue-based reports to guide voting on SRI-related 
shareholder resolutions, and the Director that oversaw research and reporting on 
shareholder resolutions.  
In addition to respondents within Corporate Responsibility Researchers, standard-
setting within SRI takes place within a broader field of networked actors. Positions within 
that field are linked relationally, with actors influencing the actions and meaning-making 




throughout this advocacy network. These respondents were identified by interviews with 
my informants in CRR and CI, and were identified as having knowledge about trends in 
SRI, standard-setting processes, and engagement with companies. Given that I 
conceptualize each case above as part of a network of actors (and not simply the 
individual organizations themselves), I treat this network of respondents as part of my 
two cases, with overlapping boundaries between the cases. 
In this broader SRI network, I spoke with informants of the following 
organizations: a coordinator and a former chair of the Association for Socially 
Responsible Investment; the director of the SRI Research Institute, which develops and 
promotes the “theory and practice of responsible investment through research, dialogue, 
and action”; past and present managers and researchers at competing socially responsible 
funds (e.g. Sustainable Investing, Responsible Investment Management); a manager and 
a Vice President at the Responsible Investment Coalition, a national network of investors, 
NGOs, and other public interest groups that work with companies; the President of an 
organization representing faith-based, socially responsible investors (Ministry Alliance 
on Ethical Business); and several activist investors (e.g. members of Ethical Traders and 
Responsible Economy). Interviews with members of this advocacy network helped me to 
identify some of the fundamental issues in socially responsible investing, supplement 
accounts of SRI standards within CRR and CI, and provide alternative perspectives about 
SRI standards and strategies of engagement. 
SRI Case 2: Corporate Indexing 
 
Corporate Indexing (CI) is my second SRI case and another leader within the 




most well-known for their social ratings. The company describes their social ratings 
system as a “rigorously constructed benchmark for measuring” the social responsibility 
of large, U.S.-based companies. But unlike CRR’s customized ratings, CI offers a 
standard ratings system, which is available to both individual and institutional investors 
(CI does also offer customized funds, but these are a less significant part of their 
activities). Their screening criteria and thresholds are determined more by internal 
procedures, and when I interviewed respondents at CI, they had nearly completed an 
internal evaluation of their standards system. Through processes similar to CRR, CI 
conducts research on the environmental, social, and governance performance of 
companies to determine whether or not companies are considered socially responsible 
and eligible for investment. They operationalize social issues, collect data on individual 
companies to evaluate their social and environmental performance, and construct metrics 
to rate companies. Based on the pool of “socially responsible companies” (i.e. companies 
that pass their social ratings), a subset is then selected for investment in their mutual 
funds based on the fund’s market objectives and  financial performance of the various 
companies.  
CI is also highly active in filing shareholder resolutions. For companies that are 
within CI’s investment portfolios, they often file shareholder resolutions with the 
company to encourage them to continue improving their business practices in a more 
socially responsible manner. They file resolutions, often in conjunction with co-filers, 
and advise their clients to vote accordingly. CI also advocates for improving laws 




regulations. Like CRR, they are an active participant in the broader industry, including 
SRI conferences and research. 
I interviewed four respondents that worked at CI, in addition to the ten others that 
were partners with or clients of CI or CCR. For example, I interviewed CI’s Vice 
President of Sustainability Research, who oversaw their research and analysis of 
company data in their social ratings system. I spoke with a current and a former Social 
Research Analyst who performed investment analysis of environmental, social, and 
governance data, and led the development of investment policies on issues related to 
human rights, bribery, and corruption. In terms of shareholder resolutions, I spoke with 
their Director of Shareholder Advocacy that directed the company’s shareholder 
advocacy program to engage directly with companies. Finally, I spoke with CI’s former 
Chair of their Advisory Council, who was responsible for advising the organizations’ 
social investment funds. In addition to the members of CI, I interviewed individuals 
within their broader network, as described in the next section.  
Given that I conceptualize this case as part of a network of actors (and not simply 
the individual organization itself), I interviewed an additional ten respondents who were 
part of my two cases, with overlapping boundaries between the cases. As mentioned 
above, these additional respondents included a coordinator and a former chair of the 
Association for Socially Responsible Investment; the director of the SRI Research 
Institute; past and present managers and researchers at competing socially responsible 
funds; a manager and a Vice President at the Responsible Investment Coalition; the 




Social Certification Cases 
 
As noted in chapter one, the types of social certifications can vary from internal 
company certifications (e.g. Starbuck’s CAFÉ standards) and industry-led standards (e.g. 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative) to independent, third-party certifications developed 
through multi-stakeholder involvement. The latter form of certification is the primary 
form of certification that involves movement-based certifiers and civil society actors, and 
is therefore, the focus of my analysis. I studied three in-depth cases of independent, third-
party certifications. Each case covers both social and environmental criteria. 
Social Certification Case 1: Justice Certifiers 
 
My first social certification is Justice Certifiers, a very well-known certification 
within the field. Justice Certifiers is the US branch of a global certifying body for a 
variety of socially certified products. They are best known for their coffee certification, 
but they also cover a variety of other products such as agriculture (including bananas and 
flowers), vodka, and handicrafts. While they are part of the broader global organization, 
they are responsible for developing their own national standards within that global 
framework. Furthermore, they recently launched a new certification for garments and 
apparel, which is independent of the global certification body.  
At the time of my interviews, this certification standard for garments and apparel 
was being tested in a pilot project. The development of this standard was a lengthy 
process that included a great number of stakeholders and multiple rounds of consultation. 
Justice Certifiers worked with producers, workers, many NGOs, academics, and others 
from civil society to gather input about the standards. After each revision of the 




generated hundreds and hundreds of comments about the standards from the various 
groups. Having recently completed the standard-setting process, it was now being tested 
in a handful of different countries. To limit the scope of my interviews, I focused on the 
development of standards for garments, and to a lesser extent, coffee, although 
respondents sometimes commented on standards for other products as well. 
To better understand the construction of Justice Certifiers’ standards, I 
interviewed several individuals involved within the organization and their broader 
network. For example, I interviewed the senior manager who oversees the standard 
development (including implementation and monitoring of program), a labor activist who 
was involved in developing the standard but dropped out because she considered the 
standard too weak on labor issues, a religious-based promoter of Justice Certifiers who 
has provided input on the standard, and the Board Chair of the organization. I also 
interviewed a farm worker organizer involved with Justice Certifiers; a representative of 
an advocacy organization promoting Justice Certifier educational resources to support the 
movement; the Strategic Relations Manager for the certification body, who serves as a 
bridge between Justice Certifiers and a variety of stakeholders; and the Executive 
Director of an industry association that promotes businesses committed to Justice 
Certifiers’ products.  
In addition to understanding the specific process of standards construction, I 
interviewed a broader network to better understand multiple perspectives of Justice 
Certifiers’ standards, how standards may differ for different commodities, and how they 
are situated in the broader movement for social and economic justice. For example, I 




CEO at the Sustainability Guide, which is a buying guide that provides information to 
consumers about certified products and their standards (they also have ratings 
methodologies for their buying guide which uses SRI data and reports on social 
certifications); a labor activist that promotes a labor-approved buying guide and 
certification systems; a well-known activist that speaks, publishes, & conducts workshops 
on issues ranging from the dynamics of the global economy to how we can replace the 
power of transnational corporations with local green economy networks; a well-known 
green consumer activist that has started several nonprofits promoting ethical consumption 
and social certifications; and a Manager at the Global Certification Coalition (GCC), 
which is a global association for social and environmental standards that diffuses best 
practices to standard-setting bodies. 
Social Certification Case 2: Eco Certified 
 
The second certification I studied was Eco Certified, which focuses on 
agricultural products, including coffee and tea. Eco Certified is a network of 
organizations in which different members construct the standards while others oversee 
certification, accreditation, and labeling. Like Justice Certifiers, Eco Certified standards 
include both social and environmental standards. However, the organization was started 
by environmental movement organizations and it has a heavy emphasis on environmental 
sustainability. At the time of my interviews, Eco Certified was expanding the types of 
products they certified (e.g. cattle products) and the issue areas included within their 
standards (e.g. climate change).  
Eco Certified’s procedures are very similar to the procedures followed by Justice 




stakeholder involvement, which includes workers, producers, NGOs, academics, and an 
occasional government representative. The standards typically undergo multiple rounds 
of revision and varying lengths of public consultation periods. My interviews focused on 
a variety of agricultural products, but especially coffee and tea. 
I interviewed a total of five respondents that were representatives of Eco 
Certified, and many others within their broader network. My respondents were involved 
in creating and/or managing certification standards, including collecting data about and 
evaluating farms, soliciting input on standards from stakeholders, revising standards, and 
implementing the organization’s strategic mission within the standard setting process. For 
example, I interviewed the Senior Manager of Standards and Policy who coordinated the 
creation of Eco Certified standards, the Chief of their Agricultural Program that advises 
the group that creates standards, and the Operations and Outreach Coordinator that 
coordinates the technical team that integrates their field work in the standard-setting 
process. I also interviewed the Vice Chair of the Board of Directors and the Vice 
President who guides the strategic direction of Eco Certified and fosters support for their 
certified products.  
The interviews I completed with Eco Certified’s broader network of organizations 
overlaps with the broader network of Justice Certifiers. Accordingly, I also interviewed a 
researcher at a competing certification; the CEO of a buying guide that provides 
information on Eco Certified products; a labor activist that promotes a labor-approved 
buying guide; activists promoting alternative economies and ethical consumption, and a 
Manager at the GCC, of which Eco Certified is an active member. 





The third and final certification with which I conducted my research was Ethical 
Sourcing. Ethical Sourcing was initially created as a certification exclusively aimed at 
ending child labor in the production of handmade carpets. As time went on, they sought 
to expand their standards, partially because of the pressure received from consumers, 
retailers, and others to include a broader array of issues. As a result, they have been 
“scaling up” over the last several years, and expanding their certification to include many 
different social and environmental criteria within their standards. I interviewed 
representatives of Ethical Sourcing as they were completing their expanded standards and 
entering pilot projects to evaluate how they may be effectively implemented. 
The expansion of standards for Ethical Sourcing looked very similar to that of 
Justice Certifiers and Eco Certified. For example, they enlisted a similar set of 
stakeholders, seeking as diverse of a stakeholder group as possible. They labored through 
multiple revisions of their standards and public consultations periods. The most important 
reason for these similar protocols in standard development was their participation in the 
Global Certification Coalition (GCC), a non-profit organization that consults with social 
certifications around the world. GCC produces guides for best practices in developing 
standards, evaluating impacts, and assuring compliance with certification standards. 
Among the broader network of actors that I interviewed, I spoke with one representative 
from the GCC. 
At Ethical Sourcing, I interviewed two current and one former member of the 
organization. Specifically, I spoke with the International Standards and Policy Officer 
who is the primary US representative creating the new international Ethical Sourcing 




Director, who amongst other functions, oversees and manages market development for 
Ethical Sourcing certifications and directs consumer awareness campaigns. Finally, I 
spoke with a former Development Officer that was involved in earlier processes of 
standard-setting.  
Like both certifications above, the broader network of certification advocates also 
helped situate the Ethical Sourcing standards within the field. To repeat, I interviewed 
respondents at another certification; representatives from several buying guides featuring 
socially certified products; and activists in labor, alternative economies, and ethical 
consumption. These respondents discussed the role of certification and standards in their 
work, their work in developing and/or promoting standards, and their views (both critical 
and supportive) of the roles of certification within the movement. 
 
Other Informants in Social Responsibility Advocacy Networks  
The previous sections documented respondents that operate within the fields of 
SRI and social certifications. My descriptions of them emphasized their positions within 
social ratings agencies, certifiers, and other organizations that are relevant to shaping 
their standard-setting processes. I also broadened my scope to understand how do others 
outside of SRI and certifications, but within the social responsibility movement, view 
these standard-setting processes. In order to capture other (possibly critical) views of SRI 
and certification standards, I interviewed some other respondents who held outsider 
perspectives relative to these fields. 
In total, I interviewed seven additional respondents that were not directly involved 




recommendations of others within SRI or social certifications, and with which I expected 
them to have more involvement with them. I conducted some of the interviews knowing 
that they were not involved but wanting more outsider views critical of them as private 
standards. My respondents in this category included individuals who started socially 
responsible businesses; led national non-profits in market campaigns to promote social 
responsibility; advocated laws regulating corporations; worked in non-profits promoting 
socially responsible businesses; created socially responsible buying guides; and a 
business association seeking to work with business members to make them more socially 
responsible. These respondents provided insights into the broader field of social 
responsibility, issues around framing social responsibility, concerns of different agents, 
and the institutional logics of different fields. Together, they help to give a broader view 




During the interviews, semi-structured, open-ended questions were used to direct 
conversation naturally and allow me to identify new themes and relevant information 
(Lofland et al 2005; Weiss 2004). Through series of follow-up questions, I would 
continue to use interview probes to acquire greater detail and fully explore new topics. 
This allowed themes to emerge from the data and during data collection, I wrote memos 
(Charmaz 1983) that iteratively and continuously situated interview data within the 




triangulation between my past interviews, ongoing interviews, and the literature allowed 
me to explore important issues and served as preliminary data analysis.  
Interviews varied in length from forty-one minutes to an hour and fifty-five 
minutes, with the average interview lasting one hour and eighteen minutes. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. Transcribed interviews were loaded into Atlas.ti, a 
commonly used software for analyzing qualitative data. The software enabled me to 
easily organize my data into themes, and facilitated my comparative analysis. 
There is a consensus emerging among comparative methodologists that 
combining within-case analyses and cross-case comparisons provides the strongest means 
of drawing inferences using case studies (George and Bennet 2005: 18). Accordingly, my 
data analysis incorporates both techniques through a methodology known as typological 
theory (George and Bennet 2005). The typological approach focuses on the processes or 
mechanisms linking causes and effects, rather than focusing on correlations between 
independent and dependent variables.  It seeks to identify and explain the relationships 
between a set of conditions and their particular outcomes that can be applied across a 
variety of contexts.  It has been influential in the study of social movements, and is 
consistent with recent methodological statements in the field (e.g. see the special 
symposium in Qualitative Sociology dedicated to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s [2008] 
methods for measuring mechanisms of contention).   
The first dimension of this typological method is process-tracing, which is a 
technique for within-case analysis (see also George and McKeown 1985; Bates et al 
1998; Hall 2003).  Process-tracing investigates the sequence of events that lead to a 




information, how they reach decisions, and the effects of institutional arrangements and 
different contexts on meaning-making. Within organizations, it can be utilized to identify 
how groups evaluate competing meanings and decisions, how the organization 
collectively selects among the alternatives, and how they develop certain expectations 
and strategies. Ultimately, process-tracing seeks to identify the “intervening causal 
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennet 2005: 206). 
To understand how standards social responsibility are constructed, I have identified and 
theorized key causal mechanisms that shape these processes within SRI and social 
certifications.   
While there are many different definitions of “causal mechanisms” in the 
literature (Mahoney 2001), I adopt the view of several leading social movement scholars 
who define them as “delimited changes that alter relations among specified sets of 
elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam et al 
2008: 331). Causal mechanisms focus on sets of conditions and the processes (which can 
take many different forms) through which they lead to certain outcomes. Beyond 
conventional accounts of linear causality, process-tracing may uncover the convergence 
of multiple conditions or certain path dependencies that lead to particular outcomes. 
Furthermore, the study of causal mechanisms in social movements (McAdam et al 2008), 
including the social responsibility movement (Soule 2009), have tended to focus on 
processes of mobilization and coalition-building, leaving work to be done on other field-




There are some commentators that suggest that causal mechanisms cannot be 
directly observed (Mahoney 2001), but McAdam et al (2008) documented several ways 
to both directly and indirectly observe their presence and operation. Among this set of 
methods, they advocate greater use of field-ethnographic methods, which are consistent 
with the methods of data collection discussed in the previous section. Qualitative data, 
such as in-depth interviews used for this research, can be a particularly effective means of 
understanding processes (Weiss 1993) and mechanisms (George and Bennet 2005) that 
link a set of conditions to particular outcomes.   
The strengths of process-tracing help overcome some limitations in other 
comparative methodologies, such as John Stuart Mills’ methods of agreement and 
difference.  Specifically, Mills’ approach to case selection required the identification of 
cases that are similar along all important variables except one, which is then used to 
explain differences in the dependent variable. Such a criteria for case selection among 
social responsibility standards would be impossible, given the significant variation in 
criteria and how they are applied. However, according to George and Bennet (2005), 
process-tracing can overcome this limitation when executed correctly. With in-depth 
information and richness of individual cases, process-tracing permits the analyst to 
evaluate “whether each of the potential causal variables in the imperfectly matched cases 
can, or cannot, be ruled out as having causal significance” (George and Bennet 2005: 
214). It allows the researcher to compare less perfectly matched cases, and opens up 
possibilities for identifying single or multiple paths to a particular effect and the 




The fundamental challenges in the deployment of process-tracing are to, first, 
ascertain an uninterrupted causal path linking the factors that led to specific standards in a 
way that adequately captures the processes or mechanisms themselves, and second, to 
consider alternative causal mechanisms that match the evidence. To overcome these 
challenges and increase internal validity, I have followed several important protocols. 
Following the procedures described by Njølstad (1989), I sought to understand possible 
disagreements, addressing as many relevant theoretically-informed variables as I could 
identify, drawing upon and exploring alternative explanations from competing theories, 
and clearly elaborating scope conditions. Like I did during my data collection, I 
continued to craft memos (Charmaz 1983) during my data analysis that iteratively and 
continuously situated interview data within the theoretical literature on social 
movements, fields, and institutions.  
Through these procedures of process-tracing, I first conducted a round of “open” 
coding to identify emergent themes. This open coding allowed me to evaluate the various 
factors that shaped how standards were constructed in each case, and how these factors 
differed across cases. As I proceeded with my open coding, I grouped these factors into 
various themes. After a round of open coding, I then selected common themes that 
appeared to be most significant in explaining how social responsibility standards were 
developed. Using this limited set of themes, I then conducted a second round of “closed” 
coding with all my transcripts. This final round of coding became the basis for 
identifying the conditions and causal mechanisms in shaping social and environmental 




My data analysis and subsequent theory construction was strengthened by 
integrating this process-tracing with cross-case comparisons (George and Bennet 2005: 
chapter 11). The strength of this comparative approach is to explain how particular 
standards are constructed “rather than another in a particular context” (Oliver and 
Johnston 2000: 45; McAdam et al 1996). In other words, is has allowed me to examine 
why one set of conditions led to one set of standards, relative to a different set of 
standards or conditions. Such comparisons made across cases yield more robust 
explanations of how standards are constructed and are a particularly useful means of 
exploring how causal mechanisms operate in different contexts (Falleti and Lynch 2009).  
Accordingly, I proceeded with my data analysis using typologies that group cases along a 
specified set of characteristics or factors. But following George and Bennet’s (2005: 241) 
caution to researchers to “avoid a premature, a priori characterization,” I strove to locate 
these types within the data itself. While my interview questions were theoretically-
informed from existing literature, typologies emerged from empirical differences in the 
data and the explanations of the cases, rather than any pre-defined expectations based on 
existing literature. 
While the process-tracing was conducted for individual cases, I began my cross-
case comparisons by comparing cases within the same field. First, in chapter three, I 
focus on standard-setting within the field of SRI. How are social standards constructed 
within SRI? What mechanisms shape the standard-setting process? How are the standards 
embedded within processes of engagement? I focus on conditions that shaped SRI 
standards in an individual case over time and I seek to identify the mechanisms that 




examining the interactional and institutional contexts within which SRI standard-setting 
is embedded. I then analyze how the bar for social responsibility is constructed and the 
mechanisms that influence these processes in similarly patterned ways.  
In chapter four, I focus on standard-setting within social certifications. Having 
examined how standards are constructed within individual cases through process-tracing, 
I present the themes that emerged when comparing the three social certification cases. 
Again, I start with an analysis of the interactional context within which certifications 
standards are embedded. Next, I show the diversity of thresholds in certification systems 
and seek to explain variability in standards through cross-case comparisons. I discuss 
several different types that shape the standard-setting process within and across the 
certification systems. 
Finally, in chapter five, I step back outside of each individual field to look at all 
five cases across both social movement fields. This chapter builds upon chapters three 
and four to identify higher-order mechanisms that operate within the social responsibility 
movement. They consider more diverse sets of conditions across fields that lead to unique 
outcomes in an attempt to theorize the mechanisms that shape standard-setting within the 
social responsibility movement.  
This data analysis, as I have presented it here, is an inductive approach to 
typological theorizing. Theory is constructed using a gradual “building-block” approach, 
in which generalization is not based upon large, random samples (Firestone 1993; Weiss 
1994). Rather, qualitative research projects such as this, base generalizations around 
alternative modes of analysis such as “analytic generalization” (Yin 1994: 37; Firestone 




to a population. Support is achieved by providing “thick descriptions” of the cases and 
analytic procedures, offering “multiple and interconnected” observations of data (Ragin 
et al 2004), and more generally “specifying the conditions under which a study is done 
and their relevance to multiple theories” (Firestone 1993: 18).   
In chapter six, I develop my analytic generalizations by linking my causal 
mechanisms of standard-setting to my evidence and theories of social movements and 
institutions, enabling what Armstrong and Bernstein (2008: 92) refer to as “modest 
generalizations about forms of power and how activists interpret, negotiate, and challenge 
those forms of power.” The results, which include patterns of observations across 
multiple sites that make possible the creation of typologies, are connected to the 
underlying structure and dynamics that operate within and across other social movement 
theory (Weiss 1994). And as Firestone (1993) argued, claims for analytic generalization 
are particularly strong in multi-sited qualitative research such as this one.   
This typological method allows limited generalization by specifying causal 
mechanisms operating within other social movement organizations that fit the same type 
(George and Bennet 2005: 236).  It is this level of abstraction and theoretical induction 
that facilitates some degree of generalization, but also requires clear scope conditions 
(Firestone 1993). In this research, my scope conditions are limited to people involved in 
the day-to-day operation of movement activities, such as movement leaders and 
operatives. It does not, for example, capture the “common sense” or “everyday 
knowledge” of rank-and-file movement participants, potential recruits, and bystanders 
(Benford 1997). Furthermore, it refers explicitly to the standard-setting processes within 




methodology is particularly suited for identifying causal mechanisms, it cannot specify 




Chapter 3: Standard-Setting in Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) has become an increasingly important field 
for advocates to promote more socially responsible business practices. Through SRI, 
activist investors strategically work within the field of investing to target corporations 
directly. Bypassing the state, they develop specific private social and environmental 
standards to which they expect companies to adhere. They use institutional channels to 
engage corporations in dialogue, communicate best practices for socially responsible 
behavior, and push them to meet SRI standards. Although SRI has grown dramatically in 
recent decades (Scheuth 2003; Sparkes and Cowton 2004), this growth has not been easy 
and movement actors must continuously struggle to legitimate their position within the 
field and use it strategically to promote desired changes.  
While investigating how movement advocates developed social responsibility 
standards in my two SRI cases, I found it was important to understand the interactional 
context in which the standards were embedded. Positions within the field are linked 
relationally and the strategies advocates used to mobilize conventional investors and 
engage companies reveals how they are positioned and respond to one another 
(Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). Therefore, I begin by analyzing advocates’ location 
within the field and their interactions throughout their networks. I examine how rating 
agencies and shareholder activists interpreted their environment and strategically took 
action to de-institutionalize and reconstruct institutional logics. By analyzing the goals 
that actors had within SRI, and how they intended to use SRI to shape business practices, 




possible pathways for change. For socially responsible investors, this meant the 
development of alternative frames to disrupt and reconstruct the cultural logic of financial 
investing. These framing processes shaped how they mobilized and engaged others 
within the field and were important contexts for understanding how standards are 
constructed.  
 Having established how SRI advocates position themselves relative to 
conventional investors and corporations, I then describe how social ratings agencies 
select criteria and thresholds for social responsibility standards. There is an 
overwhelming number of claims for what constitutes social responsibility by 
corporations, NGOs, and others, and my focus here is to understand what how these 
claims are assigned meaning within SRI. Through process tracing, I analyze a particular 
set of broad-based standards in depth and I explain in detail how certain criteria are 
selected and where the bar is set. I supplement my analysis with details from my second 
case to identify similarities and differences across cases and establish patterns (George 
and Bennet 2005).  
 I am especially interested in the field-level mechanisms that shape the standard-
setting process, and which will improve our understanding of the opportunities and 
constrains that movements experience in their attempt to develop rigorous standards in 
SRI. For example, I seek to explain why certain criteria are included in one standard but 
not another, and why thresholds are set at one point rather another in social ratings and 
shareholder resolutions. Accordingly, I conclude this chapter by identifying and 




investors and their advocates selected from among the possible standards for social 
responsibility. 
 
Using Alternative Frames to Disrupt and Reconstruct Institutional Logics 
In social movement theory, frames have become a central component of empirical 
research and a way to understand social movement processes and outcomes (Benford and 
Snow 2000). Snow defines framing as referring to “the signifying work or meaning 
construction engaged in by movement adherents (e.g., leaders, activists, and rank-and-file 
participants) and other actors (e.g., adversaries, institutional elites, media, 
countermovements) relevant to the interests of movements and the challenges they mount 
in pursuit of those interests” (Snow 2007). Drawing on the work of Erving Goffman 
(1974), frames are “schemata of interpretation” that invoke a particular set of values and 
provide a meaningful way of interpreting events and organizing experiences (Benford 
and Snow 2000). They simplify the social world into an intelligible form, and in a 
movement context, are done to garner broader support and mobilize potential adherents.  
Within investing, traditional financially-based frames dominate the discourse. 
Using financial criteria and analyses, investors and fund managers evaluate company 
performance and make investments based on their financial goals and expected rates of 
return. Investors may be, and likely are very interested in moral and ethical issues, but 
such domains are thought to be entirely separated from business decisions. Social and 
moral issues are a matter of public policy, and working within their legal limits dictated 
by public policy (or sometimes not), investors strive to maximize their financial returns. 




business.” In other words, business’ responsibility to society is to make money and 
should not be concerned with social or environmental concerns; they are someone else’s 
responsibility. 
Socially responsible investors have entered this world with a different way of 
interpreting investment criteria. They invoke alternative systems of meaning and utilize 
non-financial criteria to evaluate investments. When I asked respondents how they 
differentiated SRI from conventional investing, they consistently invoked these 
alternative schemas of interpretation. Adam was one of my respondents who worked for a 
company that produced data for socially responsible investors. He coordinated social 
researchers and networked with socially responsible investors to help them construct 
custom mutual funds. He described these frames in this way: 
Anybody who wants to apply these kinds of non-financial values to investment 
decisions [is] either because they find something morally objectionable or because 
they think there's a competitive advantage, a business case, to invest in companies 
who use good policies and practices on environment, and human rights, and labor. 
(Adam, Corporate Responsibility Researchers) 
As Adam and many other respondents noted, socially responsible investors view non-
financial criteria relevant to investment through two types of lenses, or frames. The first 
frame, what I will call the morality frame, seeks to embed business decisions within an 
ethical framework. This may be motivated by religious or political ideologies (Oliver and 
Johnston 2008), and seeks to make financial concerns secondary to moral or ethical 
frameworks. The second frame, what I call the business frame, attempts to translate social 




priority structure of financial and non-financial criteria, it recasts what constitutes a 
financial concern. 
It quickly became clear that SRI activists recast social and environmental issues 
with the business frame much more frequently than the morality frame. For example, 
Kristen worked at the Association of Socially Responsible Investing, an industry-level 
association in the field of SRI. She worked with member organizations to facilitate best 
practices and address issues common among SRI practitioners and advocacy 
organizations. She stated: 
If you’re talking with somebody and you’re like listen, child labor in Asia is a 
reputational risk … You’re not factoring in all the costs there because some of the 
costs are unforeseen and unpredictable. You don’t know if some investigative 
reporter is going to be in your factory or not. You don’t know if the Indonesian 
government might all of a sudden deal with labor laws or if it might actually start 
enforcing their own labor laws, or you don’t know, because they’re unknown, so 
the way that you’re structuring your economic analysis is inadequate. So you can 
see where, investors can see where the mind road blocks are. (Kristen, 
Association of Socially Responsible Investing) 
In this way, issues of social and environmental concern are viewed as business risks. A 
company that has strong social and environmental practices is seen as mitigating their 
risk and this can appeal to investors regardless of their moral or ethical position. The 





Actually a lot of shareholder activists try to relate social and environmental 
proposals to the bottom line. If you read a lot of the resolutions that are filed, 
typically they will say - at some point in there they will say, “This will have a 
negative impact on profits because X, Y, and Z.” (Melissa, Corporate 
Responsibility Researchers) 
The business frame provides an alternative vision of business-society relations and 
functions as a strategy to align economic practices with the values of existing and 
potential supporters.   
 Social movement organizations and activist investors use these frames to alter 
how the institution of investing functions and promote more socially responsible 
practices. But are activists wasting their time by operating within institutions? From one 
theoretical view, fields such as investing are path dependent (Mahoney 2000), whereby 
past decisions and actions have resulted in a specific course of development, and the 
institutional pattern is simply reproduced. One could argue that the business frame within 
SRI, and its explicit focus on financial criteria, is self-reinforcing. After all, the business 
frame emphasizes profitability and maintains the prioritization on financial criteria, with 
the rewards going to financially-motivated investors (Markowitz et al 2012). Such a view 
would focus on the power of isomorphic diffusion and characterizes institutional 
structure by homogeneity and conformity (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007). 
 However, investment institutions are not so internally consistent. Instead, they are 
riddled with ambiguities and contradictions. Despite hundreds of years of accounting 
practice, the valuation of companies—and especially of brands—is not an exact science. 




both the environment and human health. Despite claims that “the business of business is 
business,” it is not always clear what is considered business or not business. Consider 
what happens when a social movement targets a company for poor social or 
environmental practices. If that movement is successful at attacking their brand and 
assigning new meanings to those brands (Conroy 2007), thereby driving down the share 
price of that company’s stock (Bartley and Child forthcoming), then clearly that company 
must address that social dimension. If a company pollutes the environment, and ruins the 
productive capacity of that environment and the health of its people, then it may face law 
suits, which drives down its price. It is probably no surprise, then, that the majority of 
research conducted on SRI seeks to evaluate the financial performance of SRI funds, as 
compared to conventional funds (Schröder 2007).  
 The important point for our purposes is that this scenario highlights an 
institutional contradiction within investing. It becomes an entry point for social 
movements to construct a new institutional order, where companies measure and manage 
the financial costs of social and environmental performance, and which had not 
previously existed. This measurement is a way to internalize their social and 
environmental costs. But to encourage the adoption of these practices, movement 
activists must mobilize more investors to pressure management and send a signal for the 
company to adopt such practices. I spoke with Simon, the founder of the Ethical Traders, 
a high-profile social movement organization. He described his organization’s attempt to 
strategically mobilize other investors using the business frame: 
We do shareholder activism, we would do a thing where we’d have protestors 




we’d have tactical diversity. We’d have one of our major donors who owns a lot 
of stock in the company gets up and says “look, Coca-Cola is buying genetically 
modified corn syrup, this is really dangerous, blah, blah” and he gives the 
scientific rationale. They have to listen to him because he owns 2 million shares. 
[Another one of our activists] gets up and she says “I’m with the Ethical Trading 
Initiative and we’re going to piss on your brand and we’re going to drive down 
the value of your stock” the barking dog. (Simon, Ethical Traders) 
In this scenario, protestors outside the meeting held signs and shamed Coca-Cola for their 
environmental practices in hopes that their arguments would attract media attention and 
resonate with viewers and bystanders. This would put pressure on the company to act. On 
the inside, one of the investor activists provides a scientific argument for why Coke 
should adopt particular practices. Their other activist in the meeting holds a very 
ambiguous position—serving simultaneously as insider because she owns shares in the 
company but as outsider because she is highly contentious, threatening to damage the 
company’s brand. But the most significant dimension of this scene is that it creates a 
context for my respondent to speak. He continues with the following: 
I’m in a really nice suit way over on the other side of the room, no association 
with these people. I get up and I say “look, I’m a small shareholder. I don’t want 
my Coke stock to go down like my Nike stock did when these radicals started 
pissing on the brand. You don’t want to get in a pissing match with a skunk, just 
get rid of him. Give them what they want and get rid of them because they’re 
going to hurt our share price.” In the coffee break the other suits come up to me 




don’t get on their wave length, if you don’t get inside their thinking—it’s easy for 
them to reject protestors with signs but somebody who looks like them and is 
dressed like them, and wearing a nice watch with an attaché case making a point 
that’s in their self-interest and that’s what we’re about here is how do you 
redefine self-interest. (Simon, Ethical Tradres) 
In this example, activists with Ethical Traders sought to disrupt the everyday taken-for-
grantedness of the institutional order. For many investors, they take their conceptions of 
financial value and self-interest for granted. They compartmentalize business from 
presumably moral arguments on protest signs and messages invoked by activists, and 
such messages are easily rejected by investors. Such images neither challenge investors’ 
taken-for-granted assumption about the social order nor are they effective at assigning 
new meaning. They do, however, serve as effective positions to juxtapose against 
competing messages that leverage existing contradictions within the institution.  
Ethical Traders strategically placed these messages to challenge their assumption 
about the role of social dimensions in the financial performance of the company. They 
constructed a link between Coca Cola’s practices, protest, and share price. But the link 
was facilitated through the conscious manipulation of competing ideas and symbols. 
They positioned messages relationally, so that the difference between the speakers was 
made visible: he was not (or at least did not appear to be) an activist and was not 
concerned with labor issues or health issues. As compared to their morality frame, he 
provides a business-oriented frame to reinterpret their concerns for the company’s social 
practices. Simon is able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of other shareholders by framing 




By positioning him (physically and socially) far from any seemingly “radical” activist, 
they used the distance between these more radical views to make his support of more 
environmentally progressive policies seem conservative. Drawing upon these cultural 
symbols he re-frames what their business interest actually is, expanding the possible 
range of alternatives, and is successful in winning the support of at least some of the 
other investors.  
The pressure placed on companies by movement outsiders and the tactics used by 
SRI activists, as insiders, are meant to ultimately engage companies in dialogue about 
their business practices. Socially responsible investors mobilize other investors and 
leverage these outsiders to entice companies to engage in a number of ways. In the next 
section, I analyze how investors achieve this engagement, how that engagement is used to 
shape company practices, what SRI activists perceive to be the successes of such 
engagement, and ultimately how standards are embedded within these processes of 
engagement. 
 
Shaping Practices through Company Engagement 
Ultimately, what institutional insiders want is to be able to engage companies to 
encourage new company practices. They seek to use institutional channels to get access 
to executives and other influential people within an organization. For example, Corporate 
Responsibility Researchers (CRR) is an organization that produces research for socially 
responsible investors. Gayle has been with the agency for over 20 years and she told me 
how investors are increasingly using SRI research to influence companies. Gayle told me 




are saying “thanks for that research, I’m going to use it now to engage with 
companies more thoughtfully” and get them to make changes now, so that there 
isn’t a huge problem down that road that’s going to melt down the share price. 
(Gayle, Corporate Responsibility Researchers) 
Armed, therefore, with information that measures a company’s performance on social 
and environmental criteria and compares them to their industry peers, investors construct 
and demand new company practices. The means of engagement between investors and 
companies can take many forms. I review several of these forms of engagement, and their 
perceived impacts here, but it is important to note that I do not evaluate their actual 
impacts per se. 
 One form of engagement that investors use to shape company practices is through 
multi-stakeholder dialogues. In this arena, investors organize community groups, NGOs, 
and the companies themselves to reach consensus on appropriate social and 
environmental practices. Steve is a manager at Corporate Indexing, and he described one 
of their stakeholder dialogues on business in China. China is one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world and most major corporations have made efforts to enter the 
Chinese market in some capacity. But to enter the Chinese market, which remains under 
the control of a totalitarian government guilty of widespread human rights abuses, 
companies must acquiesce to government demands. One of the high-profile sectors in 
which this tension has unfolded is high technology and internet services, and includes 
companies like Microsoft, Cisco, Google, and Yahoo. The Chinese government has 
required that companies help filter search results to stifle dissent and the government 




information to the government to track down people who criticize them publicly. This has 
created backlash against companies that willingly participate in violating the human 
rights of Chinese citizens. Steve described the process of engagement this way:  
There’s a multi-stakeholder dialogue made up of investors, companies, and 
human rights NGOs that has come together to come up with a standard of how 
companies should behave in a country like China or a company that oppresses 
human rights and violates privacy. So we think this is a really great opportunity, 
really important way to establish a standard that has NGO, investor, and corporate 
buy-in all at the same time, and once that standard is accepted, then we’ll work 
with the companies to make sure they’re taking steps to implement the standard. 
It’s better than the NGOs coming up with the standard, or the corporations 
coming up with the standard on their own, because the two sides will walk down a 
different path and may not produce an agreement, and the companies are less 
likely to adopt the NGO’s standard unless they’ve been involved in the 
conversation to develop it. (Steve, Corporate Indexing) 
For socially responsible investors like Steve, this process of engagement is important 
because it is a collaborative process that gets approval from all stakeholders (McLaren 
2004). He sees it as effective because it facilitated direct involvement by social 
movement actors (whose legitimacy as moral actors lends credibility to the process), 
socially responsible investors (who embrace the social dimensions and business 
opportunities), and the businesses that ultimately must comply with the standards while 




standard could not have been reached. Socially responsible investors, through their own 
systems, then track and evaluate company implementation of the standards. 
 It is essential that businesses also have incentive to engage with NGOs and 
socially responsible investors. I spoke separately with Spencer, who represented a 
business association that promoted more socially responsible and sustainable practices. 
Speaking about the same internet issue in China, he discussed the opportunities this 
provided business: 
What that does to their companies is they are collaborating now with the human 
rights groups and the internet freedom organizations, which is actually our 
experts. And it’s almost consulting for the companies to anybody who 
understands the issues, and the dialogue is happening in a room like this instead 
of the New York Times or the war words like on the internet somewhere. So, it’s a 
good form of risk management for the companies and it’s really helping advance 
the issues. (Spencer, Green Business Network) 
Businesses, therefore, are better able to manage their brands and reduce their risk. While 
they must give up some autonomy in the collaborative dialogue, they are also able to 
influence the standards and expectations. However, without the fear of public shaming 
(e.g. in the New York Times or the internet), they would not have the incentive to 
participate. It is this level of contention from outsiders, and their inability to control 
external dialogue, that motivates their engagement with NGOs and activist investors. 
 To facilitate effective engagement, SRI activists are careful in selecting targets 
within a company. Kimberly works with a coalition of non-profits, SRI activists, and 




Before we actually bring companies into [our] network, we make sure that there is 
a relationship that we have with senior management or the CEO. So you know, 
that’s another leverage point. If we have access to the highest levels of the 
company, it makes us [more influential]. Even if we aren’t specifically getting 
those CEO’s to the table at the stakeholder dialogue, although that does happen 
you know, we do have a message to get to the senior levels, most senior levels of 
the company, to just try and you know get conversations around on how to get 
more change. (Kimberly, Responsible Investment Coalition) 
From Kimberly’s perspective, effective engagement could only be achieved when 
working with senior-level executives. These executives are the main people for shaping 
the future direction of the company and to achieve genuine change, activist investors 
must get the buy-in from this level of management. This type of engagement serves as a 
“leverage point” for promoting more socially responsible practices. 
 Respondents repeatedly noted that engagement can be a very effective platform to 
shape company practices. However, companies are often not quick to work with investors 
and management is frequently resistant to being told how to run their business. In these 
cases, investor activists turn to a more contentious tactic to get management’s attention: 
The engagement itself can achieve some really remarkable things [if] the 
company is receptive to it; if it’s not, then you have to go more public [with a 
shareholder resolution]. But, basically what you are trying to do is get the 





When corporations are not responsive to investors, one strategy is to use their rights as 
shareholders in a company to file a shareholder resolution. Through shareholder 
resolutions, investors make nonbinding proposals for concrete actions that are voted on 
by all shareholders. Jackie, who works for a small investment company that was one of 
the first to produce socially responsible investments, is actively involved in filing 
shareholder resolutions. She likens resolutions to a weapon used to force a company to 
pay attention. Jackie continued by saying that shareholder resolutions make specific 
companies “more likely to be named and that’s not going to be good and nobody ever 
wants to be in a bad headline.” The companies, she argues, are worried about their “brand 
image” and filing shareholder resolutions can be a very public platform to shine light on a 
company’s practices in an unwanted manner.  
To maximize the attention given to shareholder proposals, filers often seek to 
mobilize other socially responsible investors around the issue. Sometimes, the resolutions 
were also coupled with broad-based campaigns. Julie is at CRR, where she conducts 
research on shareholder proposals. She explained how filers might mobilize investors to 
increase a resolution’s profile and get a higher vote. In this case, a group of  
ex-nuns who had been filing shareholder resolutions would then go advise the 
Connecticut Retirement Employee system, huge pension funds. [The nuns used] 
social activism [to convince them] how to vote on issues or how to take a stand on 
an issue, etcetera, if a fund wanted to be socially responsible. A lot of these 
religious organizations, they’d coordinate with CRR. And they kind of, you know, 
a resolution might have a primary filer and lots of co-filers, because having lots of 




list who was on the list of filers and if they combine on their number of shares 
that they were holding at a company, a shareholder resolution just becomes more 
prominent. I guess there’s more weight. (Julie, Corporate Responsibility 
Researchers) 
Activist investors reached out to institutional investors and others to build support around 
socially and environmentally-oriented resolutions. These tactics have been particularly 
effective when organizing mission-driven organizations like public employee retirement 
funds and university endowments. These organizations, more so than mainstream 
financial investment firms, function largely with missions beyond financial profit and 
thus are more readily aligned with the objectives of SRI. As a result, obtaining their 
support can dramatically increase the votes in favor of passing a resolution, thereby 
sending a stronger signal to company management.  
Another form of engagement that socially responsible investors use to engage 
companies is through social ratings. There are a growing number of organizations that 
provide social ratings of companies. These organizations collect data about a company’s 
social and environmental performance, and use the data to develop quantitative metrics 
that rate the company and compares them to other companies within their sector. This 
type of index is an effort to make company performance comparable to each other, 
establish benchmarks for social and environmental performance, and provide signals to 
companies about their own performance. Steve describes how their organization uses 
social ratings to engage companies: 
Once we produced the ratings and sent [the companies] a letter that said here’s 




normally don’t engage with, contacted us and said “can you tell us why we have a 
two in labor relations or workplace practices?” And then that lead to some good 
dialogue with some companies. So it was an interesting advocacy platform 
because putting that list up there, and making that public, makes companies a bit 
squeamish. Coke wants to know they have [a] two while Pepsi has a three in a 
certain area. (Steve, Corporate Indexing)  
Like shareholder resolutions, social ratings are a very public evaluation of company 
performance. But ratings go a step further by facilitating comparison between companies. 
It asserts that there are socially responsible companies, and within a given industry, it 
calls out specific companies for not measuring up. Socially responsible investors act on 
this information, then, by dropping the company from their investment portfolios. Steve 
elaborated on the different company responses in this way: 
We have the Corporate Index, a public index that whenever we fail a company 
from the index, we send out a press release and we let the company know right 
after we let the press release out, that the company has been flipped out of the 
portfolio. And they’re often angry about it—they want to know why, and they 
want to know why we didn’t contact them, although in many cases we’ve made 
an attempt to contact them and they haven’t responded. But once that press 
release is out there, then suddenly they’re responsive. (Steve, Corporate Indexing) 
In this way, investors punish companies for not meeting social and environmental 
expectations. Other respondents corroborated this account, noting that “falling off the 




 Once a company begins the engagement, socially responsible investors seek to 
develop relationships with a company that promotes long-term change. For shareholder 
activists like Steve, this is part of a continuous process: 
While the resolve clause [on the shareholder resolution] may say produce a 
sustainability report in accordance with GRI [the Global Reporting Initiative] or 
something along those lines, once we get into a discussion with the company, then 
we can really look [at] this [as] about setting up a process of continuous 
improvement. We want you to identify the impacts, and even though our resolve 
clause doesn’t say disclose environment, workplace, human rights, [they] enter 
our discussions with the company. (Steve, Corporate Indexing) 
In SRI, activists view dialogue dynamically and part of a process of “continuous 
improvement” and way to “ratchet up standards” (Sabel et al 2000). The various forms of 
engagement—multi-stakeholder dialogues, shareholder resolutions, and social ratings 
comparisons—are all used to set up relationships with companies in a way that social 
movements had not previously attempted. This sentiment was echoed by Simon at Ethical 
Traders: “… Over those 10-12 years, we developed relationships with people up in the 
executive level and we started to meet and started to actually grow to respect each other 
as individuals.” Such strategies of engagement did facilitate new relationships and 
opened institutional pathways for social change. Through these relationships, movement 
activists built social capital as a resource to more effectively embed practices within 
social standards. 
Of course, achieving engagement is highly uneven across sectors and companies. 




into new practices. When I asked my respondents about whether or not these 
engagements were successful in meeting their objectives, their responses reflected these 
nuances: 
There’s some companies that really understand this as part and parcel of doing 
business now. I mean they actually report in their corporate responsibility reports 
how they reach out to stakeholders and engage them and learn from them and 
interpret to them what they’re doing. So, there’s companies who get it and do it 
well and do it regularly, and then there’s some companies who have never had a 
conversation ever on ESG [environmental, social, and governance] issues with an 
investor. Maybe nobody asked but they’re just not used to it and there’s some few 
who will say, “I’m not interested in engaging in compensation.” So, you get that 
whole range. Increasingly if there’s a trend, it’s clear that more, or more 
especially large companies, do get it and are willing to engage. It doesn’t mean 
they’re willing to agree but willing to engage with share owners on these issues. 
(Travis, Social Asset Investors) 
Overall, my respondents did note a trend of companies increasingly willing to engage 
with activist investors. For example, Simon’s organization, which had used long used 
outsider tactics, found that combining these with SRI was able to get them access to high 
level executives at many corporations. He had gone on to tell me that not all these 
meetings were particularly productive, but some were, and it became one way to 
genuinely affect corporate behavior in a more socially responsible manner. For example, 
environmental organizations have been able to get companies to measure, report, and 




increased racial diversity and female representation in leadership positions. Companies 
like Nike, Gap, and others have enhanced their monitoring policies and procedures, 
improving labor practices and human rights. As noted by Jessica (Corporate 
Responsibility Researchers) above, “the engagement itself can achieve some really 
remarkable things,” even if it was not always successful. 
  In sum, through SRI, movements have been able to 1) leverage pressure against 
corporate brands and mobilize new investors to include these criteria into their evaluation 
of company performance; 2) get access to high level executives to communicate social 
and environmental standards with significant decision-making authority within their 
organizations; and 3) in some—but not all cases—these engagements have translated into 
visible and identifiable changes in corporate practices. As such, they have used investing 
to create new pathways for embedding company practices in social and environmental 
standards. It is worth reiterating that one limitation of this study is that my data only 
reveals my respondents’ perceived impacts of these campaigns. My data does not allow 
me to evaluate the actual impacts that multi-stakeholder dialogues, shareholder 
resolutions, and social ratings have on actual business practices in farms or factories, for 
example.  
In the next sections I examine how social standards, which are embedded within 
these processes of engagement to promote social change, are constructed. I show how 
they develop the standards themselves within this interactional and institutional context. I 





Setting the Bar: Standards for Social and Environmental Responsibility 
As demands for more socially responsible business practices have grown, it is 
becoming increasingly important to understand what it means for a company to be 
socially responsible. Indeed, there have been many different definitions of social 
responsibility (Carroll 1999) and investors themselves have varied widely in how they 
define socially responsible practices (Proffitt and Spicer 2006). To better understand the 
process by which investors develop explicit standards for investments, it is necessary to 
examine the social ratings systems for socially responsible mutual funds.  
Some SRI funds emphasize vastly different issues to cater to different types of 
socially responsible investors. For example, some investors are only interested in 
environmental sustainability, so fund producers may only screen companies based on 
environmental criteria for some funds. Some religious investors, such as Islamic 
investors, may only be motivated by specific religious doctrines. For example, Islamic 
funds following Shari’ah law may exclude companies that earn substantial revenues from 
pork products or conventional banking services. There is tremendous variability in these 
customized funds. 
Rather than focusing on idiosyncratic funds that are highly variable, we can get a 
better sense of the process by focusing on the larger, more standardized social ratings 
produced by the top fund managers within the industry (see Slager 2010). These social 
ratings tend to cover similar types of issues, although they may vary in how they 
operationalize them in specific criteria. Corporate Indexing is one of these many SRI 
organizations to offer a public index of companies based on their social and 




Steve, Manager of Advocacy at the Corporate Indexing, helped to create 
standards for the index, including the development of the algorithms that constitute their 
scoring of company performance. Steve described this process, which began with scoring 
each company based on five issue areas: labor/workplace, human rights, community 
relations, the environment, and governance. The issues were selected based on extensive 
consultation with NGOs, activist investors, and other movement organizations. My 
respondents also noted being conscious of other SRI funds and industry trends when 
determining the relevant issue areas to cover on their standardized indices. Over time, 
new issues emerge or no longer become relevant, so the issue areas also changed 
dynamically over time. 
Construction of the index is very similar to sociological research in many ways. 
First, each issue must be operationalized, where the issue has multiple indicators to 
measure performance on that issue. For example, a score for environment might include 
the number of superfund sites, carbon emissions, levels of other pollutants, and so on. 
These individual values were aggregated into a scale or index and “every [company] was 
graded from –10 to 10” for that issue area (Steve, Corporate Indexing). This might mean 
that companies cluster around low scores in a very skewed distribution. Then, using 
statistical techniques, “you’d normalize the data” relative to other companies in their 
industry group. An algorithm then produced company scores for each area that reflected 
how many standard deviations a company was from the mean. Companies were then 
assigned a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 on each issue area, with the bulk of scores at the mean, which is 
a 3. Remaining scores are distributed 1 or 2 standard deviations from the mean. Based on 




The fundamental thing was that every company that passed had to get a 3, 4, or 5 
in all the areas to pass.  And anything with a 1 or 2 in any particular area, they 
don’t pass [pause] relative to the peer group.  If you figured out where the median 
score was, that was a 3, and then you figured out a range, what's that standard 
deviation?  I think 2 standard deviations was a 1, so you didn’t have an even 
distribution across.  You didn’t have to have a 1 in every area.  (Steve, Corporate 
Indexing) 
By manipulating the algorithm, researchers were able to ensure that approximately 35 
percent of the companies would fail their criteria and the standards were determined 
accordingly. The algorithm and statistics gives the impression of neutrality and 
objectivity, but this was really a way to ensure that investors had a wide investable 
universe, which as we will see below, was mediated by the institutional constraints of 
SRI.  As such, their methods of evaluation guaranteed that the majority of companies 
would be classified as socially responsible ipso facto. 
This strategy was common among social ratings organizations that I spoke with. 
However, many socially responsible investors set even lower standards for defining 
social responsibility. In this quote, Jessica recounts working with SRI groups in setting 
such standards. She said: 
A lot of our clients are looking for the worst of the worst, you know like who 
really is considered the worst?  The worst 5 percent?  The worst 3 percent?  The 
worst 10 percent?  Trying to find the thresholds that leave the universe wide 
enough so they have some financially good companies to invest in, but narrow 




sometimes it’s a little bit delicate to strike. [It] takes a few renditions sometimes. 
(Jessica, CRR) 
Jessica created customized ratings (and socially responsible mutual funds), based on 
specific requests from institutional investors. In comparison to Corporate Indexing, which 
was a broad standardized index, these customized ratings may vary from one group of 
investors to another. In these standards, it is clear that expectations for social 
responsibility had at least as much to do with fitting one’s social expectations with 
current practices, as they do with aligning corporate investments with those expectations. 
It directly affected the types and severity of actions that are defined as responsible, 
normalized, and legitimated.   
This is significant because a low standard means more companies will be deemed 
socially responsible. If there are widespread problems within an industry, and those 
problems are the norm (such as human rights abuses in the apparel industry or 
environmental problems in resource extraction industries), then it is possible that 
companies with poor social and environmental practices can be considered socially 
responsible. It also has consequences for engagement. We learned above that ratings are 
used to engage companies when companies that previously passed the index, but now fail 
it. Publicizing their failings is effective for movements to engage companies. However, 
the further a company gets from the average performance, the fewer the companies are 
there, and the less movement up and down exists. This ultimately means that fewer 
companies will be engaged through this tactic. 
  This begs the question of why and how standards are set so low. If investors 




standards for social and environmental responsibility? Next, I examine the social factors 
that shape and constrain these standard-setting processes. These field-level factors limit 
pathways for change and reinforce the existing institutional order. 
 
Institutional Constraints on Standard-Setting and Engagement 
 While activist investors have identified ambiguities and contradictions within the 
field of investing to promote social change and engage companies, institutions are not so 
fluid that they may be easily reconfigured through new collective challenges. Institutions, 
by their very nature, have some level of stability and continuity, promoting conformity at 
multiple levels. In addition, actors empowered by institutions also leverage existing 
arrangements and mobilize resources at their disposal to delegitimize new challengers 
and reinforce the status quo (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007). The degree to which 
institutions maintain their durability, and social relations within them remain “sticky,” is 
an empirical question that is still vastly underexplored. In this section, I examine the 
constraining mechanisms and processes that limit opportunities for activist pressure, 
channel that pressure into less threatening cultural forms, and thereby maintain 
institutional structures of power and control. 
 
Data Availability and the Socio-Technical Infrastructure of SRI 
 
For socially responsible investors to construct social ratings, they begin by 
identifying the issues areas in which they seek to promote change. These issues can 




safety, environmental sustainability, gender and racial diversity, and so on. As mentioned 
above, responsible investors then develop ways to measure company performance in 
these issue areas and the construction of these measurements is very similar to 
sociological research. Social ratings agencies operationalize the issue area using a variety 
of indicators (with quantitative or yes-no scores) and then aggregate them into a scale or 
index. The resulting value reflects a company’s score on that issue area and is compared 
to other companies in their industry group or with other corporations more broadly. 
 This process of measurement and evaluation all begins with data collection. Steve 
described the role of data collection in developing the indicators: 
It was important to see what data was available. You don’t want to create 
something that you don’t really have the information to populate and provide you 
with the data. (Steve, Corporate Indexing) 
Like any kind of empirical research, there must be a way to measure variables used to 
construct the social indices. If no data exists, then there can be no measurement. The 
availability of data, therefore, serves as the socio-technical foundation for the social 
ratings systems. Data limitations can arbitrarily limit the types of issues or claims that can 
be made about the social and environmental performances of companies.  
 This can be a significant problem in SRI. Companies have not historically 
reported on many social dimensions, and even have limited reports on environmental 
performance. And when a company does report this data, they may report it in a different 
form than their competitors, preventing comparability across companies. As a result, the 
social responsibility movement has been working for years to promote more 




the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which is “a network-based organization 
that produces a comprehensive sustainability reporting framework that is widely used 
around the world” and whose “core goals include the mainstreaming of disclosure on 
environmental, social and governance performance” (GRI 2011). The GRI has helped 
promote this type of reporting but social analysts continue to report challenges with the 
data: 
Even with something standardized like the GRI, there are questions as to like the 
real comparability between companies and industries … It’s not as standardized 
as a numbering system of look, you scored a 7.2 on whatever the criteria is. There 
is these long monologues in the GRI, and there are numbers as well, and it’s 
becoming much more quantitative than qualitative … so [that] should make 
comparison easier, but when you’re looking at, especially information that the 
company will give you on like this long monologue and some data points, then 
you look at another company and their long monologue and data points, well, how 
do you compare these two things? Because the information they’re gonna give 
you is different because they’re thinking about it differently. (Kristen, Association 
of Socially Responsible Investment) 
Without clearly standardized means of reporting data, companies are describing their 
performance on an issue in ways that make sense to them. However, without a common 
conceptual framework, different companies come at it in different ways, allowing only 
limited comparisons.  




That’s something that we never had to account for before because government 
just takes care of it. So they’re starting to think about how to deal with it, um, and 
the GRI doesn’t provide a whole lot of information for the user on how to think 
about each question, because it would be really difficult. The GRI is not for one 
industry and the information that they’re coming with on like regular accounting 
stuff, doesn’t have a whole science and school behind it. So people just come at it 
differently and come to different conclusions … in general um, I think it’s just, 
there's just not enough practice. (Kristen, Association of Socially Responsible 
Investing) 
This signals an emerging problem for social movement actors entering the realm of 
global governance. Whereas domestic governments have always specified reporting 
requirements, the new global reporting of social and environmental data has no such 
regulatory body. The GRI itself is affiliated with the United Nations and other global 
bodies, but does not have the regulatory capacity of nation-states. They also lack widely 
accepted scientific conventions, and must rely, instead on a “consensus-seeking, multi-
stakeholder process” which results in abstract guidelines that are open to multiple 
interpretations. 
 An additional problem with the implementation of global reporting and evaluation 
were national/cultural differences in the types of things that companies were expected or 
thought were necessary to report. Jessica described a difference between the US and 
Europe: 
For example job creation, none of our companies report anything on job creation 




job or not, or whether companies are providing jobs for people. It’s not something 
that the American culture cares about; a company isn’t there to be corporate 
citizens and provide jobs.  They’re there to make money. So no companies report 
anything about whether they’re creating jobs or not.  Whereas in Europe if you’re 
not a good corporate citizen and you’re not creating jobs for your community, 
you’re gonna have people after you. So job creation is huge there. (Jessica, CRR) 
Karl described similar differences between environmental reporting in Japan and the US: 
The Japanese companies in contrast, really report excessively. Especially on 
environmental practices, the Japanese sustainability reports were the 
environmental sections of the annual reports. Honestly they can tell you how 
much money they saved by recycling one lid of a specific type of sushi container 
and how much electricity that has saved them. Or if you were to standardize the 
savings in terms of revenue of energy saved, it’s all benchmarked, it’s extremely 
well documented, whereas [with] the American companies, it’s very poor. (Karl, 
CRR) 
Throughout my interviews, my respondents described local, national, and/or regional 
differences in the available data on corporate social and environmental performance. 
Shaped by different cultural contexts, it had become normative to report broad types of 
social and/or environmental data in some areas, as compared to others. This 
institutionalized variation may have been a result of social expectations of business (e.g. 
European businesses reporting about job creation) or perceived financial benefit (e.g. 




These national cultural differences ultimately shaped the standard-setting process 
itself. While specific social expectations enabled certain standards for socially 
responsible behavior in Europe or Japan, these very same standard-setting criteria were 
constrained in the US context. Their unique social and historical circumstances made it 
impossible to measure, and therefore develop criteria for issues like job creation or 
certain measures of environmental performance in the US. Because of the broad 
measures of comparison to develop social ratings in SRI, standards for any issue could 
only be developed if a critical mass of companies reported comparable data in a way that 
that issue could be measured. Accordingly, data availability and the local context for 
producing that data, shaped what may be said about social responsibility within the field 
of SRI. 
 
Power and the Politics of Voluntary Participation 
 
 The nature of these private standards that lack legally binding legislation, and 
required voluntary participation by companies, also had important effects on the 
standard-setting process. For example, socially responsible investors were normally very 
careful not to create too much conflict or be too demanding in order to maintain company 
participation. At the heart of this system of engagement were asymmetrical power 
relationships, in which corporations were at an advantage. For example, consider the 
issue above where SRI producers had difficulties acquiring data to populate their social 
indices. To improve data reporting, socially responsible investors often built relationships 




Responsibility Researchers, if there was there a way to assess how accurate the data was, 
he stated 
We took it at face value, if it’s in the SEC documentation, I guess it’s in the SEC 
documentation. We had no objective or you know, or third party verification 
standard at all, no enforcement standard at all. I mean it, we took what the 
government documents contained and we took what the company web said. If it 
says, in fact we were basically compelled to take, to maintain a good relationship 
with the company, we were basically compelled to take what they give us at face 
value as well. (Karl, CRR) 
As an organization that must secure the voluntary participation of corporations, they are 
cognizant of maintaining a good relationship with the company to continue receiving data 
access and engagement. They did not want to question the veracity of the data or be too 
contentious and risk losing that connection.  
 However, the nature of reporting and measurement was not merely a technical 
exercise embedded within cultural norms and principles. It took place, furthermore, in a 
field of power in which corporations, shareholder activists, and others possessed unequal 
levels and compositions of capital. For example, the economic capital available to 
corporations and socially responsible investors was highly uneven. This constrained 
investor efforts to collect data on company performance, especially in the construction of 
new criteria for social standards. Karl described the limited resources that they were able 
to dedicate to this data collection: 
Everyone of us, every research associate covered close to 240 companies 




gargantuan amount of work, I mean you never got through all the [work] … Each 
research analyst had to ideally update his or her realm of companies twice a year. 
We didn’t even manage to do it once a year! It was just insane and the sales 
people wanted to heap more on top of us. And I think it just never happened … 
We didn’t have time.  We were understaffed, we didn’t have time. (Karl, CRR) 
Karl’s frustration reflects the limited resources within SRI for collecting and analyzing 
social and environmental data. This limitation is striking when compared to the teams of 
accountants and financial experts employed by corporations, investors, and regulators in 
reporting, analyzing, and evaluating financial data. Social movements are often limited 
by the resources they can mobilize in their struggle, and within socially responsible 
investment, these limited resources shape how well investors can evaluate and track 
company performance. It reflects a dramatically unequal distribution of resources in favor 
of conventional financial measurements over the use of social and environmental costs, 
which continue to largely be externalized in traditional accounting systems. 
Another way of interpreting this access to data is to view it as a form of 
knowledge about corporate social and environmental practices. This socially constructed 
knowledge functions like all knowledge: as a form of power (Foucault 1972, 1977). 
While corporate accounting departments and financially-motivated investors possess 
large amounts of financial knowledge about company practices, movement actors 
struggle to develop knowledge about their social and environmental practices in the 
development of social ratings and standards. Their lack of knowledge about corporate 
practices limits their ability to measure and normalize these practices. Therefore, these 




the degree that they can construct legitimate broad-based systems of information on 
corporate practices, and that this becomes integrated within business frames, they can 
develop new systems of knowledge for normalizing corporate practices to a social 
standard.  
Another way that power constrains the standard-setting process is through 
company engagement. Above, we observed that standard-setting is embedded within 
processes of interaction, or engagement, with corporations. Because of the voluntary 
nature of these engagements, movement actors must continuously balance their ability to 
demand meaningful corporate engagement with setting a higher social standard for 
business practices.  
One important place where the politics of voluntary participation played out was 
with Responsible Investment Coalition (RIC), one of the largest and most well-known 
multi-stakeholder networks within SRI. The network includes members of a variety of 
labor groups, NGOs, socially responsible investors, and companies. Through consensus, 
RIC has developed a group of principles for socially responsible and sustainable 
practices, and member companies must publicly commit to the principles. In my 
interviews, however, it became clear that there were sometimes cases where participating 
companies would then systematically violate the principles they agreed to. Because the 
standards are voluntary, and there is no legal recourse to penalize transgressions, this 
created a dilemma for other members in the network. When I asked Kimberly if any 
companies had ever been kicked out of the network, she stated: 
Not, I should say - let me see, not currently what I would [say] kicked out. [Our 




than not, that we find that it’s much more constructive to have a dialogue and 
have an open discussion with a company than just to say, you know that we are 
writing you off.  That is not our mentality and it’s not our strategy, nor our 
nuance. (Kimberly, RIC) 
Kimberly emphasized RIC’s policy that it is better to engage with companies than not, 
but not all advocates agreed with this position. A respondent from a different 
organization told me: 
I sat down with one of the founders of RIC, and … I’m terribly frustrated that 
RIC is willing to sign up companies that then violate the principles. But because 
they sign, they’re not willing to say “we’re throwing you out.” “That wouldn’t be 
very powerful.” … I said “all it would take to throw GM out, and Ford, would [be 
to] immediately say: ‘out!’ We’re there. We’ll do it.” But they couldn’t bring 
themselves to do it … And RIC still does this. (Jeremy, Climate Change Action) 
Not only did these NGOs adopt differing strategies for dealing with companies that 
violated RIC’s social and environmental principles, but they reflect the challenges for 
movement organizations having such little power in the field. Most importantly, RIC 
relies on voluntary participation from corporations, and the external pressure against 
corporate brands to encourage their participation. The cultural capital that activists draw 
upon within the field is relationally determined to the cultural capital of corporations 
themselves. If contentious corporate campaigns are successful in damaging a corporate 
brand, their diminished symbolic value is then positioned more distant from the high 
symbolic value offered by more meaningful engagement with the NGO and activist 




order to maintain some level of engagement—their main leverage for change—they must 
be willing to look the other way when companies continue to violate their principles 
without any penalty. While there is dissent from others within the movement, this line 
becomes very fuzzy, and RIC has deemed it worthwhile to maintain the engagement 
rather than creating a negative image for the company by ejecting them from the network 
and publicizing their failed commitments. As such, they lose one of their own bargaining 
chips, which is to symbolically penalize a company by ejecting them from the network. 
 The ultimate outcome from this type of voluntary engagement is a set of low 
standards. This can be frustrating for activists, as indicated here: 
We do kind of our due diligence, talking to the non-profits, talking to the 
companies, and then coming up with “here are what we think are probably the 
most reasonable things we can ask for.” I mean sometimes we want to ask for a 
lot more, but we want to see what is reasonable and what is sort of a minimum of 
what we can ask for and go from there.  (Ashley, Corporate Indexing) 
In the context of voluntary standards, in which corporate involvement is contingent on 
risk and avoiding damage to one’s brand, and for which there is no legal recourse for 
infractions, challengers are left to start from a bare “minimum.” Such power differentials 
constrain movement actors in developing their social and environmental standards. These 
voluntary arrangements limit their ability to penalize companies for transgressing their 
commitments, or they risk losing the fragile engagement that has resulted in limited gains 





Financial Concerns and Investment Principles 
 
A third factor that shapes the standard-setting process is financial concerns, 
including investment principles. This includes investors’ desire for attaining material 
profit while promoting social change. After all, the point of investing in the stock market 
is to attain greater wealth within the capitalist system, and socially responsible investing 
does not challenge that fundamental goal within the institution. Therefore, the role of 
investors’ social and environmental concerns in determining standards was influential 
only to the extent that they could continue earning significant returns. As one of my 
respondents put it, 
I know for the most part, most of these funds that purport to be socially 
responsible funds base their claim on the mere fact that they consider social 
issues. I don’t think there’s a single fund that’s based entirely on where the buy 
decision issue is made entirely on social issues and not financial issues. 
Ultimately the buy decision is made on the return on investment. … And to the 
extent that social criteria interlock with the financial criteria, then yes, there is a 
social component to their investment decision. Beyond that, no.  (Henry, Research 
Associate, CRR) 
In this example, the “buy decision” refers to whether or not an investor or analyst decides 
to invest in a stock. And while companies may or may not be eligible for a fund based on 
their social or environmental performance, companies must ultimately be evaluated on a 
different financial set of criteria to determine that “buy decision.” Henry continued by 




too much” because being too restrictive will make it harder to earn the potential rewards 
of stock market investing.   
For investors, developing good returns on investment are guided by certain 
investment principles, and especially the principle of portfolio diversification. This was 
also necessary for these profit-driven companies to attract new clients. Henry discussed 
this pressure in this way: 
Ultimately no fund manager wants to restrict his universe too much. A successful 
fund is driven by how much the value of that fund goes up … And if you look at 
companies whose stock is really going up, it’s really large, highly diversified 
companies. If you were to have a very strict SRI fund, it’s highly unlikely you 
would be able to invest in GE, or in Nike, or Halliburton, or any of the oil 
companies, or anyone who has a defense contract.  So you pretty much have 
removed ninety percent of the Fortune 500 companies. (Henry, CRR) 
Here we see that material incentives, linked to investment norms and principles, lead to 
lower standards. By avoiding more strict standards, this allowed investors to invest in 
larger, more diverse companies because it guaranteed that a greater number of companies 
were deemed socially responsible. These interests ultimately constrained how strict 
investors would be in their demands for standards of social responsibility. 
This consideration became a fundamental part in the standard-setting process. 
Ashley described how this was routinized into the construction of the Corporate Index: 
I think every time you have a standard that might exclude a whole bunch of 
companies, it impacts portfolio, so every time we look at developing those 




boards will not really approve anything unless you do a portfolio impact 
assessment. (Ashley, Corporate Indexing) 
For socially responsible investors, however, the prospect of “exclude[ing] a whole bunch 
of companies” does not mean that they entirely abandon a particular criteria or standard. 
While they will not institute the standard immediately, they may integrate it into a longer 
term strategy. Ashley continued by stating: 
So you will say “well, it looks like we’ve developed these standards, only two or 
three companies meet it now, we’ll do a gradual process.” We’ll see how the rest 
of the companies do, we’ll encourage them, we’re not going to divest from those 
companies, but we’ll file resolutions or meet with management or encourage them 
to develop a policy and to develop monitoring programs, so you can do it in a step 
by step way, but you always have to keep in mind the portfolio impact, because 
that is essentially what we’re doing. (Ashley, Corporate Indexing) 
In this way, more strict criteria and higher standards will be integrated within a process of 
continual engagement whereby investors seek to encourage change over time. Many 
respondents noted that the long-term goal would be for such criteria to become integrated 
at a later date as the standards are “ratcheted up” (Sabel et al 2000). 
My respondents described how this impacted the various issue areas that were 
considered by socially responsible investors. For example, investors often seek to divest 
from companies that operate in countries with systematic human rights violations. This 
has been a focus of SRI since the 1970s when activists used SRI to promote change in 




You can divest your portfolio of companies doing business in Burma and 
companies doing business in Sudan, and you still have a lot left that you can 
invest in. South Africa was very tough, there were, depending on what time you 
were looking at your portfolio, during the anti-apartheid campaign, there was 150 
to 250 US companies and they were big names, IBM, General Motors, Ford, 
Mobil, PepsiCo, whatever, computer companies … (Gayle, Corporate 
Responsibility Researchers) 
When I asked Gayle why investors would be more concerned that there’s more 
companies that would fall into that category, she stated “Because then it’s harder to have 
a constructive portfolio that would have good performance” (Gayle, Corporate 
Responsibility Researchers). As a result, socially responsible investors will divest from 
some countries but not others simply based on how divestment would impact portfolio 
performance. For example, Gayle continued stating: 
I think with the exceptions of Burma and Sudan, the approach now among SRI 
investors who are looking at human rights issues is to say well what can 
companies do to be enlightened and how can we impress them to be enlightened? 
The big issue right, among the big issue[s] right now is China. I mean every 
company you invest in, is probably doing something in China. Um, so that’s an 
example where the South Africa divestment approach wouldn’t work and you 
have nothing in your portfolio, and China is arguably as bad as South Africa was 
in terms of limitations on personal freedoms. It has internal pass laws system, etc 




In this example, investors divested from small countries, like South Africa, Sudan, or 
Burma. Because these countries are small, the impact on portfolio divestment (and 
therefore profitability) are small. But a producer of SRI would scoff at the idea of 
divesting from China, which is also known to have systematic violations that can even be 
worse than some other countries that are divested from. From an investor’s point of view, 
there are too many countries operating in China, and to divest from the country would 
eliminate too many investing options and harm the performance of investments. The 
same goes for any social issue in which irresponsible behavior is the norm. If one were to 
look at the textile industry, and sweatshop conditions were the norm, investors would 
continue to invest in sweatshop producers in order to maintain a highly diversified and 
“constructive” portfolio. 
The evidence suggests that financial concerns had an effect throughout the field of 
investing, but the degree of its effect also varied by case. In an earlier section, we saw 
that thresholds for socially responsible behavior are set arbitrarily to exclude a certain 
percentage of companies, rather than to follow specific rules regarding social and 
environmental practices. These arbitrary thresholds, however, varied from five to thirty-
five percent of companies that were excluded. One major factor shaping these thresholds 
is the degree to which an investor was driven by financial interest. Socially responsible 
investors that worked with Corporate Responsibility Researchers and who adopted lower 
standards for customized socially responsible mutual funds tended to be more concerned 
with financial return. Investors that placed their money in the funds with higher 
thresholds for social responsibility (excluding thirty-five percent of companies) at 




more aggressive change. Investors therefore varied in their levels of motivation for 
seeking greater change or greater financial return. 
 
Professional Training and the Culture of the Institution 
 
Another factor that constrains standard-setting processes is the training and 
education of investment managers, corporate accountants, and institutional investors that 
activist investors seek to mobilize to their cause. In these instances, socially responsible 
investors engage other investment professionals to promote new evaluative criteria for 
investment. I spoke with Frederick at the SRI Research Institute, who talked about the 
narrow financial training that people have within the investment field. Using the 
investment giant, Goldman Sachs, as his example, Frederick explained that 
Goldman Sachs is just not designed for social investment … It’s designed to gain 
a great deal of money … via political influence and through corporate relations 
and investment acumen … You know, and also the people that work there do not 
sign up to make the world a better place; they sign up to retire by [age] fifty with 
enough money to live off the interest. You know and that’s a caricature, but you 
get the point. (Frederick, SRI Research Institute) 
By not being “designed for social investment,” Frederick meant that investment firms 
like Goldman Sachs have a particular institutional structure of rules and rewards systems 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007) oriented around financial profitability. Investment 
professionals come to work in these organizations with financial, rather than moral, 
motivations—not seeking to “make the world a better place.” When I asked Frederick to 




That’s how people are trained in business schools. It’s how they’re trained in their 
finance programs. It’s how they’re trained when they take the CFA [Chartered 
Financial Analyst] exams. So, there are all kinds of cultural barriers that I think 
are very important but they are also incentive structures, and they’re—the 
incentive structures are not just there for personal remuneration—they are there 
for money moves. They’re for how institutions are seen. There’s a whole cult of 
fiduciary duty. (Frederick, SRI Research Institute) 
For Frederick, professional training in business school and formal exams impart a 
particular set of cultural beliefs on their students. Neo-institutional theorists (Polletta 
2008: 84) describe such views of culture “less as people’s formal world views and values 
than as their ideas about how the organizations in which participate do and should work.” 
Business schools and CFA exams train their students to think about investment as an 
institution that should exclude social and environmental criteria; they teach them to see 
this as essential to properly functioning businesses. Socially responsible investors like 
Frederick view these ideas as “cultural barriers” because they prevent new ways of re-
conceptualizing the criteria for investment. Coupled with the material incentives that 
draw financially-motivated professionals to the field, they make the rules of investment 
appear more internally coherent or consistent than they actually are. This set of ideas was 
echoed by other respondents, such as Kristen: 
I mean you go to school or go through your training and you learn to think about 
finance and economic and business practices in a pretty standardized way, and 
while they want you to be creative for product development, you know, that’s sort 




this in different ways, and how do you communicate that to the company so that 
they start to realize the benefits. (Kristen, Association of Socially Responsible 
Investment) 
Because these financial and economic practices are presented in such a standardized 
manner, they prevent the adoption of cultural alternatives. They discourage creativity in 
the measures of financial performance and render alternatives unthinkable or irrational 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007) for those individual with conventional investment 
training. Jeremy reiterated this point by adding that institutional investors will “say I 
can’t do that [i.e. consider social and environmental criteria because] it’s not maximizing 
our returns; you’re looking at extraneous information.” These institutional logics are 
cultural hurdles for thinking differently about the institution and such ideas are mobilized 
to delegitimize alternative interpretive schemas. 
 At the same time, there are some business schools and related programs emerging 
that do emphasize social responsibility and sustainability. However, there is still no 
degree-granting programs in socially responsible financial management. As a result, the 
training of these financial managers, and their understanding of financial management, 
makes it harder to attract mainstream financial managers to the new evaluation schemes 
and criteria of SRI. In the standard-setting process, they must have clear connections 
between social criteria and traditional financial indicators. If socially responsible 
investors are unable to make these linkages in a convincing manner to quantitative and 






Formal Laws and Regulations 
 
On top of the institutional norms, culture, unequal distributions of power, material 
incentives, and socio-technical structure, socially responsible investors must also 
navigate the regulatory environment of investing. This institutional context was 
characterized by a set of laws and rules that codify the types of norms and reward 
systems described above, and which prioritize financial criteria in classifications of, and 
standards for, social responsibility.  According to one social researcher, the most 
important factor here was the notion of “fiduciary responsibility” for fund managers: 
There is no legal requirement for social responsibility. There is a legal 
requirement for fiduciary responsibility, but not for social responsibility for fund 
manage[rs], for money managers. And, as long as, on the one hand, it’s something 
nice to have, if you comply or don’t comply with social stuff, you can get some 
good publicity or not. If you don’t comply with your fiduciary responsibilities, 
then you’d get thrown in jail. (Henry, CRR) 
When I asked Henry to explain what fiduciary responsibilities are, he stated: 
Well that’s doing your financial duties as a fund manager. If you don’t, you face 
massive fines or you could even go to jail. Simply because of that, most funds 
would focus more on financial indicators and financial criteria, rather than social 
criteria. The law is a big player when it comes to investment. (Henry, CRR) 
In short, fiduciary responsibility meant that all individuals and organizations that 
managed investment funds, including SRI funds, were legally obligated to pursue the best 




responsibilities of corporations, from the perspective of SRI fund producers and 
managers, was secondary to maintaining profitable funds.   
 One of the most important places that these institutional regulations and laws 
affect SRI is in shareholder resolutions. Gayle described the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s rules regarding resolutions: 
The SEC allows companies to omit shareholder proposals that deal with “ordinary 
business.” So the idea is shareholders are shareholders, they’re not managers, they 
shouldn’t be in a position of second-guessing management on ordinary business 
issues, so shareholders want to talk about fair employment, employment 
discrimination, that’s not an ordinary business issue. That has significant, that 
raises a significant social question, but if shareholders say we think your entry 
level wages are too low, the SEC will say “nope, wage levels, that’s a 
management prerogative; that’s not for the shareholders to weigh in on.” So often 
shareholders may be concerned about low wages in companies’ factories in 
Mexico but they can’t really raise it as a wage issue. But they have to talk about 
… asking companies to issue a report on whether, issue a sustainability report 
assessing how sustainably, they’re managing their business. And their “whereas 
clauses” might talk a lot about these factories in Mexico with the idea that these 
workers have such low wages, that their communities aren’t very vibrant, there 
aren’t a lot of social services because their community is so poor, but they can’t 
get at the issue directly.  (Gayle, CRR) 
This issue was raised repeatedly by my respondents. Kristen made a similar statement, 




If you’re doing their day-to-day business, then the SEC, you’ll come and they’ll 
go to the SEC and say “listen, this interferes with our ability to manage our 
company and this is our shareholders being micromanagers” and then the SEC 
will take it off. (Kristen, Association of Socially Responsible Investment) 
It is up to the SEC, therefore, to determine the suitability and arbitrate “proxy fights” 
between investors and companies. The companies can actually request that proposals be 
excluded from their agenda for approximately 13 different reasons (A. O’Rourke 2003). 
Within SRI, the most common exclusion is on the grounds of “ordinary business” and is 
often done in regards to labor or employment issues. Shareholder activists must find 
creative, albeit less direct and less demanding, ways to get at an issue. This lessens their 
power to make certain requests, and can compromise their ability to make specific 
requests in a more public forum where they may be able to leverage outsider campaigns. 
In short, these institutional regulations limit pathways for change (Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury 2007). 
 As SRI activists seek to mobilize additional investors to support their proposals, 
these laws have implications for mobilizing more mainstream investors as well. Steve 
describes the challenges posed in reframing SRI issues in financial terms: 
One challenge is that you can’t talk about risk in these resolutions. You can’t ask 
a company for a risk assessment, which is really screwed up because as 
shareholders, that’s climate change is a perfect example. There’s a range of risks 
through climate change across industrial sectors, and many companies either 
aren’t addressing those risks or aren’t disclosing what they’re doing to address 




and whether the company has a good understanding of it, but you can’t ask for 
risk in the resolve clause … Institutional shareholder[s], they want to know the 
business case for why you’re asking a company to do whatever you’re asking in a 
proposal. And the best way to show that often is to establish that there’s risk 
involved in not doing it … But we are limited in talking about the impacts of a 
certain issue in the language of the resolution so we will expand that discussion 
once we get into a dialogue with the company and then we may not withdraw the 
resolution unless we think we have met sort of that underlying requirement of the 
resolution. (Steve, Corporate Responsibility Researchers) 
As noted earlier, socially responsible investors reframe social and environmental issues 
as financial issues in order to get broader support from more mainstream investors. Using 
this frame, they seek to disrupt the dominant institutional logic and leverage its 
ambiguities and contradictions. One very effective means of accomplishing this is 
framing a social or environmental issue in terms of risk. However, in shareholder 
resolutions, they are prevented from doing so. This takes away one of their more 
powerful cultural resources, which can effectively resonate with mainstream investors. 
But while this does constrain their use of this frame as a cultural resource, it does not 
exclude it entirely. If the investors are successful at achieving engagement, they can then 
expand on this frame within that stage. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the field of socially responsible investing (SRI) as a 




that by drawing upon competing frames of investing, activist investors seek to challenge 
the authority of single-minded traditional investors and restructure the institutional order 
to consider social and environmental criteria in business decisions. They leverage 
outsider campaigns that “name and shame” corporations to engage companies in a variety 
of ways. Through multi-stakeholder dialogues, direct company engagement, and 
shareholder resolutions, investors work with companies to develop consensus-based 
standards for socially responsible business practices. Perhaps most importantly, investors 
construct social ratings to identify socially responsible companies and further engage 
companies. In some cases, they have been successful at mobilizing investors and even 
translating these alternative institutional logics into concrete practices.  
However, the development of social responsibility standards in social ratings and 
shareholder resolutions is shaped by a variety of factors. For example, socially 
responsible investors have faced resistance from other investors and members of 
management trained in traditional investment frames and empowered by existing 
institutional arrangements. Drawing upon their cultural capital, socially responsible 
investors seek to overcome their deficits in financial capital and incentivize commitments 
to more socially responsible practices. But in constructing standards for such practices, 
investors are limited by their ability to collect data on company practices regarding social 
and environmental tissues. As an institution, investing is characterized by sets of laws, 
regulations, and cultural rules, which have constrained engagement with corporations and 
shaped how investors construct these standards. They must balance efforts for change 
with conventional investor interest in financial gain, integrate social standards within 




of fiduciary responsibility. These mechanisms limited their claims about social 
responsibility, constrained standards for socially responsible practices, and channeled 
their challenges into less threatening forms.  
Having shown how standards are constructed within SRI and how these standards 
are embedded within processes of engagement, I turn now to the second field in which 
movement activists seek to regulate business activity. I will now focus on how movement 
actors use social certifications as an additional strategy for promoting more socially 
responsible practices. Like SRI, I will show how social certifications construct social 
responsibility standards, how these standards are shaped by field-level processes and 





Chapter 4: Standard-Setting in Social Certifications 
The use of certification to evaluate quality and meet technical specifications has 
been around for more than a hundred years. However, their use by social movements as a 
means of regulating corporate activity to promote more socially and environmentally 
responsible business practices is relatively new. In the absence of adequate domestic and 
transnational regulation, movement advocates now use them as a strategy to regulate 
global capitalism. Working with businesses and other NGOs, certifiers develop global 
standards that monitor products throughout global commodity chains. They are private in 
that they are not maintained and controlled by governments, but seek to regulate 
production by embedding economic practices in particular social and environmental 
standards (Bartley 2007a). 
 In this chapter, I examine standard-setting processes within and across three social 
certifications (Eco Certified, Justice Certifiers, and Ethical Sourcing). Each case is 
composed of the certifier themselves, and a network of organizations that contribute to 
the development of their standard. In seeking to answer the question of how social 
certification standards are constructed, I found that I needed to understand how these 
organizations are positioned relative to one another. Like my examination of SRI, I begin 
my analysis here by showing how the certifiers and their advocates take particular 
positions within the field to develop market alternatives and shape business practices by 
engaging companies. My intention is to understand how this relational field is structured 
through cooperative forms of engagement, within which standard-setting is embedded. 
 I then move on to describe the different steps and objectives in how the 




interacted with each other during the process showed me that there are multiple points at 
which different actors offer input on social and environmental standards. I demonstrate 
how the certifiers consciously sought balanced input, but especially depended on 
participation from businesses, to develop multi-stakeholder based sets of standards that 
are feasible to implement given company practices. But while the certifiers adopted 
similar processes of standard-setting, they varied significantly in how they prioritized 
criteria and set thresholds for socially responsible practices.  
Finally, having traced how standards were developed within each case over time, 
and looking across cases, I identify patterns in the different factors that could explain 
why standards converged or varied. I focus on field-level factors that shaped actors’ 
assumptions about the role of standards in producing market alternatives, their beliefs in 
how social change worked within them, and how certifiers decided among competing 
alternatives for the various criteria and threshold levels. These causal mechanisms that 
shaped how standards were constructed and which emerged from analyses of my three 
cases, dramatically shape the expectations for socially responsible business within private 
standards systems. 
 
From Contention to Engagement: The Development of Market Alternatives 
 
 Within environmental movements and economic justice movements, there is a 
long history of disruptive tactics (King 2011). For example, organizations like 
Greenpeace have used direct action against corporations to stop destructive 
environmental practices (Davies 2010). Amongst other activities, Greenpeace blockades 




banners in highly visible public locations. Boycotts against specific companies have 
become a particularly common technique to disrupt corporate practices. From 1985 to 
1993, the use of boycotts quadrupled, leading one scholar to term the 1990s the “decade 
of the boycott” (Putnam 1993: 47). They have been used against companies and 
industries that clearcut rainforest timber or against known sweatshop producers, amongst 
others.  
 Social certifications have emerged as one strategy within this broader “repertoire 
of action” aimed at the market (Carmin and Balser 2002). One of my respondents, Cory, 
has almost 25 years of experience in the field and reflected on the emergence of 
certifications within this contentious environment. He reflected back on the movement’s 
use of these disruptive tactics: 
In the very late 80s, the NGO and activist response to the problems in the 
rainforest was boycotts. So the logic, which seems kind of silly now although 
there’s still some of it going on, was that if they’re cutting the forest to get wood 
or to grow beef or hamburgers or to grow chocolate or coffee, well then let’s just 
boycott those products and they’ll stop cutting the forest.  Well we knew that 
boycotts weren’t working and we wanted a way to address the rampant 
deforestation in the rainforest, all of the cut and run that was happening around 
the world. (Cory, Eco Certified) 
Disappointed with efforts to boycott companies in a contentious environment, activists 
like Cory felt that the “boycotts weren’t working” in promoting the desired change. Their 




more effective pathways for change. He continued by discussing how the movement 
shifted tactics: 
So we pulled together scientists and NGOs and timber company executives and 
the World Bank and international organizations such as that. We locked 
everybody in a hotel in New York City and said “don’t come out until you have a 
better idea than a boycott.” And that’s where the first, where this idea of instead 
of trying to castigate an entire industry, let’s figure out what's the responsible 
thing to do, put it into concrete and measurable verifiable criteria, find the willing 
and progressive actors that are interested in trying to do it, train people to verify 
that they’re doing it, and then give them a Green seal of approval.  (Cory, Eco 
Certified) 
In this case, Cory was not discussing the development of Eco Certified, but the formation 
of forestry standards in one of the first and most well-known certification systems. The 
development of this certification—along with other early certifications—signaled a 
juncture in the repertoires of movement activists (Carmin and Balser 2002). The 
exclusively confrontational and oppositional tactics then transformed into a more 
nuanced, multi-pronged approach (Conroy 2007).  
 On the one hand, movement actors have not given up their high pressure tactics 
against corporations. Indeed, such market campaigns are what incentivize companies to 
improve their brand image and engage with NGOs and movements in the first place. So 
while Cory saw boycotts as “silly,” movements continue to use such tactics today and 
while they have not been successful at entirely stopping practices, they do have some 




company’s brand (King 2011). Furthermore, we saw in chapter three that movements 
continue to rely on such confrontational tactics to open up opportunities for greater 
engagement. But the key here is that these disruptive tactics focused outside of 
institutions are no longer the only means that movements use to promote this change. 
These market campaigns are now practiced as a three-part strategy, which also includes a 
“stakeholder-based set of standards for improving corporate practices” and a “credible 
independent mechanism for certifying” products and companies (Conroy 2007: 17).  
 The emphasis on the market campaign is largely oriented toward addressing 
consumers. Like SRI, which seeks to mobilize investors, social certifications seek to 
mobilize and empower consumers in shaping markets. They seek to inform consumers 
about negative company or industry practices—but rather than boycotting those products 
entirely, they identify and promote alternative products that are produced in a more 
socially and environmentally responsible manner. One of my respondents was the 
Director of the Sustainability Guide that promoted these alternatives and compared them 
with other products in the marketplace: 
I think we’re trying to shift the balance of power in the market by delivering 
much more information than consumers have ever had before and giving them 
more of a voice in the marketplace so they know which products match their 
values and which products don’t.  So the starting point for this is we’re offering 
people a way to take individual actions around their purchases … and ultimately 
empowers collective action where people can make demands to make better 




The new information comes in the form of product scores and comparisons, or labels that 
signal verified practices for social responsibility and environmental sustainability to the 
consumer. The additional packaging of certified products go on to tell the story of where 
the consumer’s food, or shirt, etc., comes from. It raises consciousness around the 
conditions on farms and in factories. Richard at Biodiversity Labeling said that even 
standards that are “set fairly low” get “people thinking about certain things, and in terms 
of where coffee comes from, how it’s produced, who does the work on the farms, that 
kind of thing.”  
Within the Sustainability Guide, some of the products that are ranked the highest 
include products certified by Justice Certifiers and other social certifications. One of the 
primary people involved in setting standards at Justice Certifiers described the role of the 
labels, which are the mechanisms for communicating social certifications to consumers: 
Using the label as a mechanism for transparency and for opening up that dialog 
with consumers [gets them] them to start to think about “wow I vote with my 
dollars for where my food comes from.” (Sandra, Justice Certifiers) 
With this new consciousness, and empowered by information available about products 
and companies, consumers can advocate for (and support) more socially responsible 
alternatives. 
 Business has participated in developing these market alternatives for several 
reasons. As noted by Sandra (Justice Certifiers), “it’s been a risk management approach; 
companies are taking this action to try to avoid being attacked by anti-sweatshop 
activists.” But equally as important, my respondents noted that producers can earn 




(like the recent global economic recession), it can help differentiate their company and 
compete in increasingly competitive markets. But the end result is that it is beginning to 
change how business is conducted: 
Nobody talked about this issue before. Now, there's almost no one in the carpet 
industry that doesn’t know this is an issue and they better get their name on the 
school board if they’re not joining Ethical Sourcing or have an explanation for 
what they are doing. And maybe those things aren’t best in class but they’re 
something and it’s transforming the way business is being done. So, we really feel 
like we’re moving towards a tipping point in the foreseeable future. (Sarah, 
Ethical Sourcing) 
While this study does not evaluate impacts of social certifications, it is important to note 
that movement actors do perceive such gains. They view certification as one of many 
strategies for influencing companies by supplementing existing laws and regulations 
(Bartley 2011) or filling regulatory voids that exist. 
 In the next section, I show how movements use certifications to engage with 
producers. By engaging producers and developing certifications through multi-
stakeholder dialogues, they develop standards for socially responsible behavior. This 
interactional context is further structured by several important field-level mechanisms to 
shape standard-setting processes. 
 
Shaping Business Practices through Engagement 
 
Unlike investing, where activists targeted existing institutions in order to disrupt 




largely constructing a new field in which to engage producers and promote more socially 
responsible practices (Bartley 2007a). These early certification efforts were mobilized by 
“institutional entrepreneurs” (Beckert 1999) that had to bridge social networks in new 
and innovative ways. This institutional project had its own unique set of challenges. 
One of the most challenging factors was the need to bridge formerly contentious 
relationships between industry and activists/NGOs in order to engage corporations in a 
meaningful way. Rather than harnessing institutional contradictions to shape their 
relationship with corporate targets like in SRI, they had to construct these relationships 
anew. As Cory noted, “No one had ever - no activist or environmentalist had ever talked 
to [corporations] in a reasonable way before, it was always so confrontational” (Cory, 
Eco Certified). He went on to describe his group’s initial meetings with corporate banana 
producers: 
The banana growers and the environmentalists—when they first started meeting 
in the early 90s—sat at opposite ends of the room and there was just palpable 
tension in the room because there was so much suspicion and distrust and bad 
blood between the two sides.  (Cory, Eco Certified) 
A second certification I studied, Ethical Sourcing, certified handmade carpets. Sarah 
discussed similar challenges in starting to engage with producers in her industry: 
Prior to sort of trying to launch this initiative, [our founder] had connected with 
activists in different parts of the world to really draw attention to child labor in the 
carpet industry. So that was sort of a pre-cursor to the launch of the certification 
and it made everybody really angry so nobody wanted anything to do with Ethical 




activist side that didn’t trust anything the corporate entity had anything to do with, 
and wanted to expose the issue, and then this sort of lack of understanding that 
how can you work with the other side if you are out there exposing all the time—
and the industry feeling very threatened … Of course the initiative can’t succeed 
without partnership directly with the industry. And so the early days were a lot 
about trying to sort of overcome the sort of division between NGOs, activists and 
industry. (Sarah, Ethical Sourcing) 
For Cory and Sarah, engaging industry was not easy. They were embedded in movements 
characterized by outsider strategies emphasizing contention and producing distrust. But 
in developing this new strategy, they sought cooperation and trust in order to produce 
mutually agreeable standards for socially and environmentally responsible products. 
Without pre-existing institutional channels, they had to construct these connections on 
their own. 
 In the case of Eco Certified, their certification encompassed both social and 
environmental standards, but they focused much more on the environmental side and 
sought to work with producers in the Global South. Cory described how they approached 
large banana producers to begin the dialogue: 
We understood their challenges [but] we had our own information to bring to the 
table. We could talk the language of the scientist, that we could be trusted. We 
weren’t going to get information about how they were misusing pesticides 
deliberately or not and run off to the media. And we weren’t going away, that this 
was not a one shot thing, that we’re in this for the long haul and importantly that 




locals. So, this wasn’t someone coming from Germany or Sweden or Washington 
DC to try to impose some standards on them, these were - we were local people 
who most of us had grown up on farms including banana farms and coffee farms 
and so we understood the milieu that they were in. (Cory, Eco Certified) 
Knowing that other movement actors use negative information to publicize the 
company’s wrongdoings, Eco Certified was very conscious not to use information in a 
negative way. They deployed symbolic capital about their origins (i.e. local, Southern 
producing countries) in order to emphasize a different type of engagement. They 
differentiated themselves from consuming countries that did not have economic 
investment in the production of local agriculture, but rather sought to “impose some 
standards” on a place (or “milieu”) that they did not truly understand. As we saw with 
socially responsible investors (in chapter three), Simon used such symbolic and cultural 
resources to situate himself and his interests with financially-motivated investors. Like 
Simon, Cory sought to build common ground with corporate producers while 
differentiating his group from someone in “Germany or Sweden or Washington DC” that 
might “run off to the media.” He also went further by drawing upon the “language of the 
scientist” that is supposedly a more neutral position. Cory continued by elaborating on 
this science frame: 
Then we used scientists to broker the conversation so that it wasn’t the same old 
tired dialectic of the environmentalist shouting at the banana companies and the 
banana companies stone walling. So we had scientist to talk to scientist and 
everyone was asked to check their politics and their emotions at the door and then 





By having “scientist to talk to scientist,” Cory and his group sought to reframe 
certification not as a political issue but as a scientific or technical (i.e. non-political) 
issue. Indeed, members were explicitly “asked to check their politics and their emotions 
at the door” and deal with only “practical matters.” While debates over how science is 
used (and what counts as science) can also be contentious political issues, their emphasis 
on science over politics was a framing strategy that helped Eco Certified to develop 
relationships with their early partners.  
Engaging producers in a cooperative context was only one dimension of of 
broader multi-stakeholder dialogues. In fact, when looking at the three certification 
systems in this study
4
, they followed a similar pattern whereby they tended to draw on 
broader stakeholder groups than socially responsible investing. Such stakeholder groups, 
and the certifications that they developed, always emerged out of some kind of movement 
or set of movements that addressed particular issues (e.g. tropical deforestation, 
indigenous people’s rights, child labor, etc). These issues guided the content of 
certification standards and functioned as a starting point for dialogue. For example, based 
on these issues, a certification system constructs a standards committee. Sarah at Ethical 
Sourcing described the members in this way:  
Who makes up our standards committee? It’s people from the different countries 
where we were: labor experts, child rights experts, environmental experts, 
technical experts, people from within the organization, people who are experts on 
                                                 
4
 It is important to note that industry-led certifications (which are often developed to compete with other 
certifications) often do not have broad sets of stakeholders involved within their standards. The analysis 
here, however, focuses on independent, third-party certification systems that follow similar patterns for 




the ILO [International Labor Organization] conventions, different things. So those 
people guide the content … To make it meaningful—which is why we decided to 
have in addition to sort of mass outreach through email and some phone calling—
we decided to have certain in person meetings or webinars with key stakeholders 
to make sure we really, really, really got the input of the key people. It’s a lot of 
work to make that happen. (Sarah, Ethical Sourcing) 
Along with their stakeholder input, they conduct initial analyses and sometimes pilot 
studies of the issues, and “we develop a sort of first draft based on initial inputs for 
different criteria” (Susan, Eco Certified). 
The initial criteria then goes through a rigorous and systematic process of 
stakeholder input, or “public consultation which allows us to really evaluate the 
applicability of this criterion.” The window for public consultation is predefined, and is 
often a sixty or ninety day period. Susan stated that 
we did this through consultation workshops and an online platform and email so 
that we’re able to get as much feedback as possible on the different criteria. 
(Susan, Eco Certified) 
In some cases, the organization did not achieve what they perceived to be sufficient 
stakeholder balance during their workshops and public consultations. This was the case 
for one of Eco Certified’s standards: 
In the Philippines, we started with a first workshop. We had a great interest; we 
had like 60 participants and 95% were from the producer sector … So okay, that’s 
the first try, that’s not a stakeholder balance … Then we really worked hard with 




participation from the universities, from [NGOs] working on child labor issues. 
So by then really the discussion started to be much more profound. (Neil, Eco 
Certified) 
My respondents described going to great lengths to get input from a “balanced” set of 
stakeholders. This included physically travelling to locations without internet or 
infrastructure to engage producers and reaching out to all relevant actors. However, 
achieving the appropriate balance is not always possible. Susan stated that Eco Certified 
publishes 
a public consultation report that summarizes the results of the consultation. Those 
reports are the break-down by stakeholder group of how successful we were in 
getting inputs from the different groups. So for example, for the climate module, 
we had 82% of the respondents were from environmental interest group which is 
mostly NGOs and economic 9%, social sectors 9%. So if you look at it, that’s sort 
of an aggregate of economic/social/environmental because those are sort of the 
three pillars of the standard but if you look at the further breakdown into the five 
different categories we have NGOs about 45%, 24% came from 
academic/research, 11% from industry, 7% from producers and 3% from 
governments. I think we definitely have a long ways to go in terms of balancing 
that so that we get more of the other stakeholders involved. (Susan, Eco Certified) 
Consistent with their objectives for transparency, Eco Certified publishes a report that 
outlines and quantifies the level of stakeholder participation. This measurement allows 
them to evaluate the levels of stakeholder participation, and when necessary, to take 




may require additional outreach efforts and/or further rounds of public consultation to 
achieve this balance. But as Susan noted, they have been unable to achieve the desired 
levels of participation with some groups, and therefore, “have a long ways to go.” 
  In these workshops and consultations, a tremendous amount of comments and 
data are gathered. The comments signal approval of particular criteria, the addition of 
certain criteria, or criticisms about why the criteria may not be feasible or desirable. For 
example, Susan described a unique situation that some stakeholders described about 
agriculture in some African countries.  
They provide input on “well, this criteria is not going to work for this reason or 
for that reason.” One example from the main agriculture standard is the labor 
criteria regarding child labor. So our standard says that under the age of 15 you 
can’t have children on the farms. So then when we start evaluating this in terms of 
the reality of the different places where the standard is implemented. You see, for 
example, in Africa you have a whole other sort of social issues and how that 
combines with the demographics. For example, AIDS orphans and how that 
criteria may be so much harder to implement there than in other parts of the world 
because you have a lot of young children that are orphans and need to work. So 
how do we balance that with obviously wanting to address labor issues for 
children and all of that? (Susan, Eco Certified) 
Public consultations can produce thousands of comments, and may go through a single 
round or multiple rounds. Next, they 
evaluate all of those comments one by one which is a very time consuming 




stakeholder input into the development of the standard. So once that’s complete 
we take that back to the international standards committee that reviews all of it 
put together so that we can evaluate the initiative as a whole. (Susan, Eco 
Certified) 
 My respondents’ descriptions of the engagement process in the three standard-
setting systems I studied were all very similar. One reason for this is their membership in 
The Global Certification Coalition (GCC), a global partnership for social and 
environmental certification systems that outlines and diffuses best practices for the field. 
Started by several innovative certifiers in the field, the GCC was constructed to spread 
successful practices and improve the impact of certification initiatives. Justice Certifiers 
was a member of GCC and Anthony described their role in this way: 
GCC is all about stakeholder-based standards, not standards chosen by a 
particular NGO.  Joining GCC and becoming compliant with GCC standards also 
affected the global Justice Certification movement because the original standards, 
when it was first created in 1997, … were pretty much organized on the back of 
an envelope by some of the NGO’s who were joining together (Anthony, Board of 
Directors, Justice Certifiers) 
For Justice Certifiers, the emergence of GCC as an institution oriented them toward 
broader stakeholder involvement. When I spoke to a member of GCC, he described the 
importance of the stakeholder engagement in this way: 
You actually have to let participants influence the process. You have to allow the 
process to change or be changed by the people that are involved otherwise they 




made up your mind—you’re just saying “okay now we’re going to have a 
consultation.” (Charles, Global Certification Coalition) 
For GCC, it was important that the engagement and consultation processes were more 
than “just window dressing” but that certifiers genuinely enabled stakeholders to shape 
the process. Their input was needed—not only from NGOs but also from industry and 
small-scale producers, with economic factors taken into consideration. A high-ranking 
manager at Eco Certified described the strength and challenge of this goal: 
The bane of [the certification’s] existence and the strength of its existence is this 
balance: the active, functional [balance that] sometimes almost feels like [a] 
dysfunctional requirement of balance between social, economic, and 
environmental interests. That has brought strength to the system. That makes it 
very difficult at times because by and large these processes were through 
consensus. (Randy, Eco Certified) 
For both business and NGOs, this “balance” means giving something up. Businesses 
must now work with NGOs and others from civil society and allow them to shape their 
practices. At the same time, NGOs which would prefer to have their issues fully 
addressed in standards must be willing to allow economic interests to shape the standard-
setting process. This can often mean that while they prefer a higher social or 
environmental standard, it gets lowered to maintain higher economic reward.  
 This multi-stakeholder model has also spurred some social standards to expand 
into areas that do not explicitly come from social and environmental concerns. For 
example, several certifiers have begun to offer complementary programs for business 




We have the trees program which is a development aid type oriented program that 
has funding from organizations such as USAID, the German government, the 
British government, the Norwegian government, etcetera in which we’re actually 
doing field actions that support primarily small- and medium-sized enterprises to 
be successful as businesses along the lines of developing sustainable products and 
better business practices in their SMEs. (Randy, Eco Certified) 
Some companies even push certifiers to go further in their standards systems by including 
more economically-minded criteria.  
Progressive companies like Unilever and Chiquita and Kraft and Mars—they 
make us run to be quite honest to keep up. They’re pushing us to take standards to 
a whole new level and we’re doing that. We’re beginning to include things like 
quality and productivity and yield and climate change adaptability to the climate 
challenges and so on with the help from, and pushing from, the scientists in these 
companies. (Cory, Eco Certified) 
As certifiers continue to develop these programs, and expand their certifications 
systems, they look increasingly like market actors. For example, while Ethical Sourcing 
once focused on a single issue (child labor), their program has dramatically expanded to 
include a broad array of social and environmental issues related to business activity. 
Sarah noted that as the organization has come to think of itself more as “a standard-
setting organization,” they have begun to function more like a market player. Sarah 
(Ethical Sourcing) stated “We have to be business psyche with those people.” When I 
probed further as to what Sarah meant about this, she described its importance in terms of 




leader at another certification, Justice Certifiers, described this in terms of a “working 
mode”: 
That means you have to have people ready to work at the speed of business to 
solve problems and Justice Certifiers has done that by having a staff … who work 
directly with the producers in order to help them solve this kind of problems. 
When you want to control the logo, you can’t say alright they have a question 
about the use of a logo; you can’t sit back and say “alright we will send it around 
to the thirty NGO’s who belong to us to let them make a decision on it.” You got 
to have an administrative staff and that in thirty minutes can make a decision on 
whether it’s an appropriate or inappropriate use of the logo in advertising or on a 
product.  That’s what we mean by working mode, I mean by working at the speed 
of business and so what you need is people with business expertise, administering 
and running a program that still has ownership by grass root groups and major 
NGO’s.  (Anthony, Chair, Board of Directors, Justice Certifiers) 
These multi-directional set of influences is central to understanding social certification as 
a site for defining new standards for social responsibility. However, within this 
interactional context, there are a variety of other social factors and field-level 
mechanisms that shape the standard-setting process. 
 
Setting the Bar: No One-Sized Fits-All Approach 
 
 In the last chapter, we learned that in SRI, standards for social responsibility can 
also vary in content but the bar for socially responsible practices is calculated through 




producers of socially responsible mutual funds constructed arbitrary formulas and 
thresholds in order to include or exclude a specific percentage of companies. In the world 
of social certification, certifiers do not adopt as consistent of an approach to determining 
the bar for social and environmental standards.  
 Nonetheless, there were two consistent themes in how my respondents discussed 
setting the bar for certification. The first theme addressed stakeholder involvement, and is 
consistent with the previous section’s emphasis on engagement. Specifically, certifiers 
wanted to see that all the stakeholders’ input was meaningfully incorporated into the 
process and that the standard ultimately reflected a balance of these different interests: 
As we went through this consultative process, we got a lot of pressure from 
stakeholders, particularly from the NGO community to [raise the standard]. And 
there’s no way to know whether we’ve gotten that balance right or not. The way I 
would describe [it] is it’s become much stronger as a result of that consultation 
and we’ve taken a lot of that input into account, but we won’t really know 
whether producers are really able to handle all those core requirements. And we’ll 
need to look at that in our next review to decide whether the standard is really 
realistic or whether we need to rethink how these things are worded. (Pierre, 
Ethical Sourcing) 
As Pierre notes, Ethical Sourcing was conscious to incorporate NGO input to make a 
legitimate standard with a high bar. Indeed, they felt the “pressure” to do so, and it has 
resulted in a stronger standard. But he was also concerned about producer input in the 




that bar. He was unsure “whether we’ve gotten that balance right or not,” but for Ethical 
Sourcing and the other certifiers, achieving this balance was a necessity. 
The second fundamental factor for setting the bar for social responsibility is that 
the standard must be perceived as “feasible” to implement—or as Pierre put it, the 
standard must be “really realistic.” Randy described the need for this in balancing the 
differing perspectives at Eco Certified: 
If somebody wants to put something in a standard, it should be something that is 
commercially practiced. In other words, there are examples where it’s being done 
and where there's a clear commercial sense that it’s viable because a lot of times 
what you get are proposals on the social side, environmental side, sometimes even 
on the economic side or technical side of things that are wonderful ideas, but 
nobody’s ever done them. That’s all well and good but this is supposed to be a 
commercially viable system and, yes it’s supposed to push the envelope, but if 
you don’t have things that are built into the system that pass the commercial—
what I refer to as a “commercial straight-face test”—that they’re viable 
economically, then I think you’re going to have a problem. (Randy, Eco Certified) 
Randy has seen recommendations from different stakeholders in the social and 
environmental sectors but a fundamental part of setting the bar is that these not only be 
balanced, but commercially viable as well. While he wants to “push the envelope,” he 
simultaneously argues that for product standards to be competitive in the marketplace, 
that producers must be able to implement them and still remain competitive. He calls this 




feedback that they get from producers and auditors, whose on-the-ground knowledge and 
expertise are vital in the standard-setting process: 
It gives us insights into, okay, well these are some of the realities that we might 
not be necessarily in tune with as we’re sitting here [in] this sort of removed 
process from what’s actually applied on the ground. So auditors as well, auditors 
who go out and see all of these different examples through their experience of 
auditing farms under the standard they also can provide very valuable inputs into 
how realistic it is for us to apply this. Because we tend to, well not tend to but in 
some cases you could say that we want to be very ambitious with some of the 
criteria but the reality is that it would be really difficult for a lot of producers to 
meet because of the economic considerations—it’s just a number of things. 
(Susan, Eco Certified) 
Respondents with all three certifications expressed these sentiments of needing proper 
stakeholder balance and achieving a standard that could be realistically implemented. 
They were conscious of developing standards in a way that reflected realistic on-the-
ground practices, but also would push companies forward in more socially responsible 
and environmentally sustainable business practices. Indeed, as movement actors seek to 
promote change within markets through social certifications, they are subject to market 
realities and constraints (King and Pearce 2010). However, the reality of social practices 
is not an objective realm of possibility but one that is shaped by social and cultural 
factors. As I show in the next section, there are a variety of mechanisms that shape 
actors’ perceptions of feasible practices, their intended goals for certification, and the 





Mediating Mechanisms in Standard-Setting 
 
The field of social certifications, like any field, is structured by social 
configurations that locate actors within a certain set of relations and multi-level 
processes. These configurations are embedded within the institutions, or cultural rules 
that orient actors toward others, and often come to be taken-for-granted (Meyer et al. 
1997; Polletta 2008). Not only do these relations shape what other sets of actors are 
deemed important or that influence their own actions, but the actors themselves are 
disproportionately endowed with forms of capital to strategically shape other actors’ 
perceptions of, and prescriptions for, reality. In the following section, I show how these 
perceptions of reality and their goals in constructing social standards are embedded 
within specific types of social relations and are shaped by economic and cultural 
processes that operate across multiple levels within the certification system. These 
factors, which emerged as themes from my interviews, are presented as mechanisms that 




 It is clear from preceding sections that engagement with not only producers, but 
multiple stakeholders, is an essential dimension of certifications. Furthermore, they seek 
a balance of stakeholders, but the distribution of stakeholders is patterned in a particular 




systems alters how conceptions of social responsibility are ultimately encoded within 
particular. 
 Like in SRI, where social ratings agencies were concerned about maintaining 
good relationships with companies to access further data and maintain dialogues with 
companies voluntarily participating, power also played a role in shaping standard-setting 
processes within social certifications. To examine how power shapes these processes, 
there is no better issue to examine than the development of labor standards. It is in the 
construction of labor standards, which are relatively weak by most accounts, that we can 
see how different forms of capital can shape criteria regarding freedom of association, 
worker representation, and wages. 
 First, it is important to acknowledge that labor standards are included in all three 
cases in this study, and are a dimension of virtually all social certifications more broadly 
(there are some exceptions, such as the Marine Stewardship Council standards). Indeed, 
all my respondents noted the importance of having effective labor standards as part of the 
social certification(s) with which they were associated. The standards themselves, 
generally were taken from a single global standard, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) conventions, which were created by organized labor. As one representative of Eco 
Certified put it, 
Freedom of association and all of the ILO, relevant ILO, standards are very much 
part of our standard and have been from day one. That includes freedom of 
association and a workplace free of sexual harassment and equal pay for equal 
work and prohibitions of child labor and of course for any kind of forced labor, 




have been. So, freedom of association is enshrined there and we work very hard to 
make sure that workers are free to associate with whoever they want. (Cory, Eco 
Certified) 
For all the certifications, labor standards were fundamental to any standard system. 
However, while worker empowerment was so important in principle—this was difficult 
to achieve in a meaningful way. 
Several of my respondents described labor standards as not being constructed in a 
way that truly empowered workers. For example, Alexander represented a labor rights 
organization and he was critical of the labor standards at Justice Certifiers: 
They apparently have no functional complaints process. I have personally met 
more than once [with Justice Certifiers] and … when there are workers or 
representatives such as me in the global south that have concerns about practices 
going on on Justice Certifiers’ certified plantation operations, they have no one to 
turn to who will actually listen to that complaint. [It is a problem] for an 
organization that big and a program that developed and that widespread to not 
have a very serious and very clear and very well-functioning, efficient complaints 
process that can immediately say “oh there’s an accusation of a human rights 
abuse at XYZ Farm in Colombia.” They need to have a way to immediately 
investigate that to see if there’s truth behind it or not in a legitimate way and to 
address that if it is going on, whether that’s decertifying or requiring changes. 
(Alexander, United Workers for Justice) 
From this labor organizer’s perspective, while Justice Certifiers had labor criteria within 




empowering for workers. Naomi ,with the World Workers Association, found that 
workers at a certified producer would be fired if they requested a collective bargaining 
process, which is supposed to be guaranteed by the standard for freedom of association. 
When I asked her how they got certified, she stated “It’s the auditors, it’s the process 
…we’ve found significant flaws in the ability of [Justice Certifiers] to actually implement 
their standard in a meaningful way in the hired labor realm” (Naomi, World Workers 
Association). So in other cases, the problem came with implementing the standard. 
Indeed, other research on social certification has repeatedly confirmed that labor 
standards, and especially standards for freedom of association, are the most difficult 
standards to implement and audit (Bartley 2011). 
 While standards for freedom of association are viewed as being relatively low, 
this cannot be explained by a lack of concern with labor standards or their exclusion from 
certification criteria altogether. Instead, we must look at the processes for how the 
standards are developed and the role that power plays in shaping their development. In 
particular, we must consider the means by which different forms of capital play in 
shaping struggles over developing a meaningful standard. 
 One important way that power shapes labor standards is through the lineage of 
non-organized workplaces. As noted above, certifiers look for business practices that 
have actually been implemented in order for them to perceive something as a realistic 
criterion for companies to meet. If we look at the industries represented in this study, 
including carpets, apparel, and agriculture (e.g. tea, coffee, bananas), it is noteworthy that 





In the apparel sector I think less than one percent of factories are unionized so it’s 
an incredible challenge and one that the unions themselves haven’t been able to 
solve either. So we’re definitely in continuing conversation with global unions on 
this issue and trying to make sure we deliver on that promise of worker 
empowerment. (Sandra, Standards Manager, Justice Certifiers) 
Historically, producers have been very successful at thwarting organizing campaigns and 
preventing unions from forming. In Bourdieu’s terms, this represents a low degree of 
social capital among workers in which their weak social connections with their fellow 
workers puts them at a disadvantage. Therefore, when starting with a standard that 
participating companies can meet, certifiers start with a low bar in which some form of 
organization exists. These may be unions, but they can also be less representative forms 
like managerially-controlled collective bargaining units. Alexander elaborated on the 
problem of creating a standard for worker representation when workers are not self-
organized: 
I think it’s also easier to have kind of a tokenism approach to [worker 
representation] and have one worker on a committee who might not have support 
behind him versus somebody who represents a legitimate organization or a union 
who has an ability to voice their opinions without being intimidated in that kind of 
a setting. (Alexander, United Workers for Justice) 
In my cases, standards for worker representation were largely developed in this context 
where workers were poorly organized and standards where, therefore, constructed based 




organization but with much less authority. Through such “tokenism,” they are more 
easily intimidated, manipulated, or controlled by employers.  
 Furthermore, in some other countries or industries, it might be common for 
multiple unions to exist in a single factory. They would be competing to represent the 
same workers and the result was often that each union represented a small number of 
workers, but was ineffectual. One of the labor representatives described this situation in a 
factory that was certified by Justice Certifiers: 
What we are finding is that one union … was a little bit more edgy [and] didn’t 
represent very many people to begin with (but none of them did), but actually said 
to us that if they were to request a collective bargaining process, they would be 
fired. So, we were like okay, this does not meet the freedom of association 
requirement. (Naomi, World Workers Association) 
In this case, unions existed in a factory and met worker representation standards for 
certification, but they were ineffectual for two reasons. First, multiple worker factions 
competed against each other for members rather than confronting management as a single 
collective voice. Second, and perhaps as a result of this inter-worker competition, the 
standards that existed were not practiced or implemented as they should.  
 Another factor shaping the disproportionate levels of power is the relatively lower 
levels of cultural capital held by many worker organizations, as compared to other NGOs. 
Some scholars working on corporate social responsibility have depicted NGOs and civil 
society actors as having moral authority and a “virtuous disinterestedness” (Boli and 
Petrova 2007; Boli et al 2003) or cultural capital to wield in struggles against 




gives these movement actors their power in these struggles. However, it is important to 
remember that cultural capital can vary significantly across fields or across actors within 
a sub-field.  
 In some of my interviews, it was clear that labor groups did not possess high 
levels of cultural capital or were not discussed in as morally authoritative terms as other 
NGOs. In particular, the symbolic value of union representation was put into question, as 
exhibited by Pierre’s concern: 
How is Ethical Sourcing going to set a standard on freedom of association that 
improves the well-being, or improves the system so that it benefits workers and 
producers and improves the system as a whole? And this was as I say, a little bit, 
not controversial, but a little bit difficult because of the situation in Nepal where 
we have a very volatile political situation and where there’s a prevalence of 
politically affiliated trade unions. So there’s a lot of hesitation amongst producers, 
a lot of them have had bad experiences working with politically affiliated trade 
unions. And so a lot of them don’t see a lot of these trade unions as helpful to 
growing their businesses or to the interests of workers, in some cases … A lot of 
people see them as not being representative, not being democratic, and having 
political agendas that don’t have much to do with workers. And that’s a common 
perception. (Pierre, Ethical Sourcing) 
With my data, it is impossible to determine whether unions in Nepal truly do not 
represent the interests of workers or if they have been framed that way by producers 
seeking to discredit unions. The point, however, is about how they are perceived relative 




India, but can be seen in the US and other locations as well. Regardless of the reality of 
worker representation within unions, the effect is diminished symbolic value attached to 
unions, positioning them as a morally discredited (or discreditable) actor in a field 
conditioned by power relations. With lesser cultural capital, their ability to organize 
workers, function as legitimate representation for workers, or represent their own 
interests within standard-setting is lessened. 
 The grossly unequal distribution of economic capital between businesses and 
certifiers can also shape the standard-setting process. For example, producers that may 
potentially participate in a certification often do so in order to access new markets, which 
may also earn them premium prices. This economic incentive is one leverage point for 
certifiers to engage with producers. However, these markets can often be niche markets 
that do not offer the volume that larger, more price-driven markets can offer. In these 
cases, large retailers like Wal-Mart wield immense economic power against suppliers in 
global value chains (Gereffi et al. 2005; Gereffi 2012). Naomi described this struggle in 
terms of a unionized factory seeking higher wages: 
What we find is that workers will form a union, they’ll have a collective 
bargaining agreement, they’ll sit down to negotiate with management for higher 
wages, and management will say, “Well Wal-Mart only pays me five cents. Look 
at the books, there’s no more money.” And so we recognize that buyers have so 
much power that you can’t take them out of this system of trying to create an 
equilibrium … Again, kind of back to the worker voice. So, whether it’s a union 
or agreement, some sort of mechanism that they can utilize to say, you know, the 




triggers a process under which then the buyer, the supplier and the worker would 
have to work together and to renegotiate how they come into compliance again. 
(Naomi, World Workers Association) 
Naomi’s perspective demonstrates how economic capital of large transnational 
corporations can be mobilized to shape labor practices in factories throughout the world. 
This dynamic must be taken into account when certifiers engage with producers. High 
social and environmental standards can drive up the cost of production, making it 
difficult for producers to compete in the global market, and risk losing business from 
large corporations like Wal-Mart. 
 The role of economic power does not only shape standard-setting in this indirect 
way with producers. It can be more direct when large corporations themselves work with 
certifiers. In particular, certifiers’ need to attract participating producers gives big 
business an additional advantage in developing standards for certification. In markets 
with more than one certification, producers are able to shop around at certifiers to see 
what is the best deal they can get to become certified. Elizabeth described it this way: 
[Large corporations] have enough power because they get to play the one 
[certification] off the other to see what they get. [They are] saying “You want my 
business? Alright, what are you going to do for me?” Eco Certified is going 
“we’ll do this, we’ll do that, we’ll do that, and you don’t have to worry about 
those other things,” and Justice Certifiers is going “oh yeah, you don’t have to 
worry.” This is where the mainstream debate becomes an issue because are they 
trading away what is the minimum expectations in order to capture the volume. 




In this example, we see the certification systems competing with one another for market 
share. While I further discuss how certification competition and differentiation shape the 
standard-setting process below, I want to emphasize the role of power in the process here. 
Because of the sheer size of some producers, they attain an upper hand in negotiating 
standards with certifiers, and are able to acquire lower standards to get their products 
certified. For example,  
In 2005, [Justice Certifiers] walked through a door and this big company went “I 
don’t want any long term commitments, I don’t want to do this, I don’t want any 
advanced payment,” and they went “Okay, will you put our logo on your 
product?” “Uh-huh.” “Okay, done.” I mean they traded away some of these 
minimum criteria for the volume, for the marketing, for the market share. 
(Elizabeth, Director, Trade Justice Network) 
While small producers are unable to attain such benefits, large corporations can use their 
size and resources as a means to get more favorable policies, which means weaker social 
and environmental standards. However, this negotiation is not so simple as a large and 
powerful corporation asserting their dominance over a certifier. From the certifier’s 
perspective, their rationale is also motivated in growing the market for socially 
responsible goods, achieving greater impact for workers and the environment, and 
increasing their visibility in markets where high certification competition exists. In the 
following section, I explore these issues in greater depth. 
 The role of power further affects the standard-setting process by ultimately 
shaping how actors orient themselves to others within the field. Corporations, while they 




earn a premium on certified products, are nonetheless engaged on a voluntary basis with 
certifiers. But as Sarah (Ethical Sourcing) noted earlier, “Of course the initiative can’t 
succeed without partnership directly with the industry.” Certifiers work closely with 
producers to develop and maintain these relations, and without participating producers, 
there can be no standards. While all the certifiers seek to involve labor as well, labor’s 
participation does not make or break the certification initiative in the way that business 
participation does. 
 As a result, actors within certification networks are oriented toward business and 
labor differently. For example, Naomi (World Workers Association) described a 
conference on corporate social responsibility that attracted a variety of stakeholders. 
During one of the industry presentations, a company talked about all the stakeholders that 
were deemed relevant: 
They listed all the stakeholders kind of in supply chains: themselves, suppliers, 
retailers.  The only group of people that weren’t mentioned were workers, and so 
imagine this is a corporate social responsibility conference! (Naomi, World 
Workers Association) 
Conspicuously absent from the list of stakeholders were workers. When I followed up 
with Naomi, she stated that the conference also included NGOs, the community, and 
government actors, but not workers. This comment reflected my own experience 
attending a social certifications conference in Washington, DC, over the course of my 
research. The conference brought together certifiers, industry, and academics, but 




Naomi’s organization was consulted to participate in standard-setting, they found that 
their input was not taken seriously: 
There have been periods where like once a month we’ll be asked to sit on a—to 
give comments to yet another set of standards that are being used and they just 
want to tick the labor box. ‘Cause most of the time the standards are really written 
for the environmental piece but they just want to be able to say that they got buy-
in from a variety of stakeholders or whatever. (Naomi, World Workers 
Association) 
In Naomi’s experience, engagement with labor was not undertaken with the same level of 
importance and urgency as with business. To the degree that some standards needed to 
include them as a stakeholder, they were invited to participate, but they were not able to 
shape the process in a meaningful way.  
As a result of these unequal power relations, organized labor groups were often 
unsatisfied with the outcomes of social standard within these certification initiatives. 
Having such little power in the process, some labor groups have stopped engaging with 
certifiers. Certifiers themselves expressed great difficulty and frustration in being able to 
involve more labor advocates in the process. For example, James described anti-
sweatshop organizations that would not participate in the dialogue with Justice Certifiers: 
We needed to address the entire supply chain and we couldn’t have done that 
politically, I mean there is a strong sweat-free movement in this country … They 
did take part in a number of discussions around it [but] the sweat-free 
organizations are not part of the multi-stakeholder [dialogue] of their own 




the extent that they want to continue being part of that multi-stakeholder group 
but other groups are, including NGOs in India and Central America. (James, 
Justice Certifiers) 
This same problem was found at Ethical Sourcing: 
I was a little surprised when we were doing outreach to bring on labor folks to our 
standard-setting process. There wasn’t a lot of interest in engaging with us. 
(Pierre, Ethical Sourcing) 
Existing quantitative research supports these quotes, showing that labor is drastically 
underrepresented within certification networks while environmental NGOs have the 
heaviest participation (Bartley and Smith 2008, 2010).  
 This uneven participation, then, results from experiences with certification 
standards and frustrations with shaping the standard-setting process. Having much less 
economic capital, insufficient amounts of cultural capital, and a comparatively 
unorganized members upon which to draw from the existing workforce, unions have 
struggled to attain high labor standards within certification systems. Naomi described the 
role of the World Workers Association in the development of Justice Certifiers’ apparel 
standards: 
We brought them to six years and we finally dropped out and said we wash our 
hand of this, we want nothing to do with it, and so did most of the other groups. 
So, I think Justice Certifiers is in the third version of an advisory group ‘cause so 
many have dropped out along the way. And I think that our frame now is back to 




found that without that, we don’t see how it’s a viable, how the certification will 
benefit workers. (Naomi, World Workers Association) 
Having struggled with many certifications to enact high labor standards, the World 
Workers’ Association’s has shifted their strategy and engaged less with certifications in 
general:  
We’ve played several different roles as we tried to figure out how can we steer 
this ship in a different direction whether it just be one certification scheme or kind 
of the whole plethora of them. We’ve, I think, abandoned that approach. (Naomi, 
World Workers Association) 
In sum, certifications have produced relatively low labor standards as a result of 
dramatically unequal power relations in the standard-setting process and interactions with 
existing producers, in which these engagements are embedded. Because of the low 
standards, and dissatisfactory levels of involvement, they are beginning to scale back 
their involvement even further, suggesting that labor input into social standards will 




 One of the major debates within the certification movement, and an important 
factor in analyzing where the bar is set for certification standards, is around the market 
scale for social certifications. The fundamental question shaping the goals for market 
scale, or the intended level of market growth and penetration of a certification, is how 




their assumptions for social change, certifications produced dramatically different 
thresholds for social and environmental responsibility. 
 The issue of market scale revolves around two strategies in promoting the most 
social change. One strategy is to develop very high certification standards, emphasizing 
close relationships with producers to enact significant change but work on a smaller 
scale. The second strategy is to develop weaker standards but work with more (and 
larger) producers that would not otherwise be engaged with higher standards that cannot 
be quickly met. Elizabeth framed these options in this way: 
One of the questions that is on the table is value vs. volume. We’re going to … 
get at some of the assumptions behind each theory of change. Time will only tell 
who creates the most change for artisans and for farmers … If you are solely 
focused on numbers - we need the volume, volume, volume, volume everything is 
sacrificed for volume, including basic criteria. Well that for us is quite a problem, 
obviously … [the other side is that] the depth of the relationship is what creates 
the most change. So, playing with Wal-Mart is good because Wal-Mart has 
volume. You know, no matter how big or small you are, the depth of your 
commitment, the depth of your relationship is what’s going to create the most 
change in the long term.  Those are kind of the two different theories that you’ll 
often hear. (Elizabeth, Trade Justice Network) 
This fundamental question was discussed, in some way, by nearly all of my respondents 
in the field of social certification. It was something that every certification had to grapple 
with, and in producing their standards, to ultimately decide upon when creating their 




saw merit in both of these strategies. By looking closer at the standards themselves, we 
can further examine how these theories, or frames, for understanding and promoting 
change ultimately shape how standards are constructed. 
Eco Certified and Justice Certifiers operate in similar markets, and both certify 
some of the same products (e.g. coffee). When standards for these products are compared 
side by side, Justice Certifiers generally has higher standards for their products. Anthony 
(Board of Directors, Justice Certifiers) stated “the social standards of Eco Certified are 
much, much weaker [than] the social standards of Justice Certifiers.” While respondents 
generally agreed that their social standards were comparably higher, the relative 
stringency on the environmental standards was less clear. In internal analyses conducted 
by my respondents’ organizations, some organizations found one or the other certification 
to be higher standards, and it is likely to vary depending on the relative weighting of 
specific criteria. We can link some of this variation to the respective certifiers’ approach 
to social change. Susan described Eco Certified’s approach in more detail: 
I think one of the things that Eco Certified has developed and managed really well 
is to get a lot of these big players onboard to really raise the profile of 
sustainability and sustainably produced goods in the market. And one of the 
challenges in doing that is when we’re working with some of these really large 
companies that have such potential to enact a positive change and influence 
consumers; that also means that they’re requiring very large volumes of, in our 
case, we’re Eco Certified products. Often times we just can’t—we don’t have a 
factory where we’re just cranking out certified stuff. There’s a whole process of 




which takes an average of a couple of years and then actually producing and 
sending out certified goods. (Susan, Eco Certified) 
By lowering their standards, Eco Certified is able to engage more producers and larger 
corporate producers to improve their social and environmental practices. But these lower 
standards are not just about engagement but the need to meet the high volume demand of 
large corporate producers. Corporate producers in sectors such as coffee, tea, bananas, 
etc., sell enormous volumes of their products. If they were to be held to very high 
standards, such as is found in Justice Certifiers’ standards, there may not be enough 
volume available to meet the market demand. However, the lower standards is twofold: it 
includes both lower thresholds for their criteria (e.g. labor standards) and their quantity. 
In terms of quantity, for a product to use the label of Eco Certified, only 30% of the 
amount of that product must have met the minimum standards. On the other hand, for a 
product to use the label of Justice Certifiers, 100% of the amount of that product must 
have met the standards. Susan described the rationale for this threshold in quantity: 
So I think that was developed as an effort to strike a balance between making a 
positive impact through working with these companies that have such a large 
influence but also making awareness about certified products and sustainably 
produced goods. Of course it is perceived that way that well Lipton Tea why can’t 
they have their—Peachy Tips are one of the examples that has a 30% but why 
can’t it be 100% certified product? Well we actually wouldn’t be able to meet the 
demand for volume for those lines of products for example because that’s how 
they work. It’s very much about for us to be able to promote sustainability and 




that’s sort of the philosophy behind that 30% for example but it is perceived as 
well you’re diluting the value and you’re not being true to what you’re trying to 
do which is to sell 100% certified products … I feel like I can see both sides but 
… one of the sort of maybe not-so-warm-and-fuzzy sides of sustainability is the 
world that we live in. We sort of have to negotiate and make these compromises 
sometimes because supply and demand don’t match all the time and if we want to 
make a difference I think we have to strike a balance somewhere. (Susan, Eco 
Certified) 
When Susan referred to the “not-so-warm-and-fuzzy sides of sustainability,” she was 
invoking her interpretation of production systems as entrenched in highly unsustainable 
practices and being slow to change. It reflects her assumptions about global business and 
how social change can happen within it. She felt that to meet greater market demand and 
promote change in a wide-scale and meaningful way, then it required certifications to 
make necessary, but uncomfortable, compromises.  
 Those outside of Eco Certified have a variety views on their decision to set 
standards in this way. Charles, who has worked with both Eco Certified and Justice 
Certifiers, noted: 
Unilever … decided to go with Eco Certified and that’s 12% of the world’s tea, a 
commitment to run through a standard program. So the implications for impact 
are very quite profound. It can be a big game changer. So many of our standard 
systems are thinking of this kind of strategy, of crafting their standard in such a 
way that it delivers sustainability but at the same time it is approachable or usable 





When I asked Charles what kinds of features would make it feasible, he stated: 
It’s a very difficult line to draw and to manage and it [is] a constant discourse. It’s 
not a bad thing because it keeps everybody honest but you want to make change, 
you want to do the best that you can in terms of creating change in the world, and 
positive change. At the same time if your standard is such that you’re only going 
to attract a niche amount of production and/or consumption if you’re dealing with 
products, then you’re not going to make a whole lot of change right?  So the flip 
side to that though is that sometimes those niche standards can be drivers to bring 
the rest of a sector along, not the whole way perhaps but to move it. As soon as 
the consumers see they have a choice, say we’re talking about supermarkets, 
consumers see they have a choice all of a sudden that changes the landscape for 
industry and encourages the rest of industry to move along. You can see it with 
Wal-Mart right? (Charles, Global Certification Coalition) 
Charles’ comment about the dual-sided nature of certification, and Elizabeth’s comment 
above that it is “not an either/or,” are interesting because they situate individual 
certifications within a broader field of change. It presents them as dialectical in the sense 
that one (weaker) certification can engage corporate producers by pushing them along, 
while another certification with a higher bar can really pull the field into an even more 
socially responsible and environmentally sustainable system of production.  
 However, when standards are weakened in this manner, they look increasingly 




a productive mechanism for social change. Anthony was one person who was skeptical 
about such weak standards: 
Lots of people laugh at that saying what does that say about the other 70%? But 
they are gaining rapidly in the field, getting vey close to having the same quantity 
of sales [of] certified coffee as Justice Certifiers, worldwide, on the basis of being 
a less expensive, less demanding system for the companies to meet. (Anthony, 
Board of Directors, Justice Certifiers) 
For many in the movement, they are confused about how a large majority of a product 
could be labeled as socially responsible when in fact it has not met any kind of standard 
at all. Rather it is mixed in with a smaller quantity, with a minimum of 30% of the total 
as actually certified. On the one hand, this permits large producers to engage in 
certification, for certifiers to expand their programs to large producers, and to increase 
the visibility of social certification within the market—all meant to broaden the impact of 
certification. On the other hand, it hides the fact that much of the product is not actually 
certified, that it meets lower standards, and some wonder if it does more harm than good: 
I think most labor groups actually look at the Eco Certified’s program as too low 
a bar to legitimize a social claim in the marketplace. I know folks in the global 
labor movement who really just consider that program to be essentially [green] 
washing; they’re not doing enough to improve workers’ lives to really make it 
viable. (Alexander, United Workers for Justice) 
My respondents’ views suggest that the labor movement treads cautiously in the field of 
social certifications. Some activists, like Naomi earlier, has abandoned the approach 




do “enough to improve workers’ lives to really make it viable.” These activists view the 
lower standard/high volume approach as not meeting the needs of workers. 
 
Differentiation and Competition Between Certifications  
 
 When developing social and environmental standards, certification systems were 
not only focused on the issues themselves or what problems most needed their attention. 
Because of their position within competitive markets, certifiers were also conscious of 
other labels within the field while developing their criteria and standards. This relational 
positioning, relative to other organizations, led certifiers to include, exclude, or change 
certain criteria in their standard-setting process. Susan summed up this dimension in this 
way: 
We very much work in a competitive landscape of other systems so we have to 
stay on top of sort of where the trends and issues with interest so that has some 
influence on the standards that we develop and the initiatives that we develop. I 
think not just us but other systems are continually trying to be at the leading edge 
of these different issues. For example, climate with the carbon markets and all of 
the different opportunities that are there for the producers and for these systems—
we want to be the first to develop the climate module. (Susan, Eco Certified) 
Certifiers operate in highly competitive markets. Not only must they meet the demands of 
existing producers, meet their own goals in promoting the maximum degree of change, 
and develop criteria that reflect the wants and desires of socially conscious consumers, 
but they must compete with other certifiers in order to do so. This is one of the many 




Certifiers do not rely entirely on internal processes but also on trends and developments 
outside of their immediate network to the broader market of socially responsible 
certification systems. 
 This field-level process was also apparent in the development of Ethical Sourcing 
standards. Ethical Sourcing started out with a focus on certifying that its products did not 
involve the use of child labor, a rampant problem in its industry when it first entered 
certification. Pierre described how their standards system developed over time: 
I think from the beginning, there was recognition that there was a broader context, 
but let’s focus on one thing at a time. So now as we get into the period we’re 
talking about of 2006 and beyond, I can’t say for certain which of our partners 
were the driving force behind thinking, but I think certainly in general, there’s 
been an overall shift towards dealing with that broader set of issues. In part it’s 
also reflecting the other, there are so many other standard systems out there that 
have matured over this time period that are looking at these kind of broader 
issues. So in part it’s a reflection of that. (Pierre, Ethical Sourcing) 
Ethical Sourcing started with a very focused standard, and over time, they broadened this 
to include a vast array of social and environmental criteria. While they recognized that it 
was important to consider the broad context from the beginning of their certification, they 
did not have the capacity or the expertise of how to build such a complex system. As they 
developed, and the overall field of social certification developed, they started to expand 
their criteria (e.g. criteria on adult labor and the environment) into areas that were very 
new for them. This was motivated, in part, by the broader field and the “many other 




considered that in the expansion of their social and environmental criteria. They 
responded to actions by other actors in the field in developing their standards. As Richard 
(Biodiversity Labeling) stated “everyone [has] their own little turf carved out and their 
interests.” They want their certification system to be successful in the market, both in 
terms of impact on production systems and for attracting consumers. 
 In markets with large numbers of certifiers, this sense of competition and 
differentiation is intense enough that it can lead to formal or informal coordination 
among certifiers. A representative of Eco Certified described this type of coordination: 
A few years ago, we had sort of a gentlemen’s agreement with Justice Certified 
that we wouldn’t pretend to be Justice Certified and we never do.  We don’t 
guarantee a premium price, we don’t get involved in buying or selling, and we 
don’t dictate prices.  Like Organic, Eco Certified is market-based so we didn’t 
claim to be Justice Certified and Justice Certified said they wouldn’t talk about 
being “sustainable” but now they use “sustainable” as much as anybody. (Cory, 
Eco Certified) 
In this case, two certifiers informally coordinated (at least in the beginning) to maintain 
certain differences in their standards. This agreement functioned on at least two different 
levels. First, it functioned on the standards and standard-setting itself. Justice Certified 
offered farmers a premium price for their crop, thus focusing on wages and economic 
well-being. While Eco Certified had other labor-related criteria, they did not integrate a 
wage or price-setting criteria into their standards, but instead focused on the more 
environmentally focused concept of “sustainability.” As Susan (Eco Certified) later 




sustainability functioned at a second level, linking the standards to a marketing 
perspective, and emphasized differentiation on branding to distinguish themselves from 
other certifications (such as Justice Certified). Susan added: 
Our marketing and communications teams spend a lot of time ensuring that 
there’s accurate information about our system out there because it’s a battle 
ground. There’s a lot of competition and a lot of desire to increase the visibility of 
each of the different certifications so we have to stay on top of that to make sure 
that the information out there is accurate. I think that absolutely competition in the 
systems has developed the most. That creates a lot of need to respond quickly to 
things and develop responses. (Susan, Eco Certified) 
These comments suggest again the highly competitive nature of the market for socially 
certified goods. Non-profit certifiers must look and act more like businesses in their 
speed and market responsiveness.  
 Within any field, organizations never operate purely in pursuing their own 
interests and objectives. Instead they operate in respect to the “game” in which they 
participate, and respond to other actors within the field. When those other actors develop 
standards to reflect emerging issues or to take a particular position within the market, this 
shapes the trajectory of their own positioning and opportunities. As these cases reflect, 
this can shape the standard-setting process, including what criteria are included or 
excluded from their standard. 
 





Another important dimension that shapes the standard-setting process is sectoral 
differences in production processes. In other words, certifiers must consider the unique 
production processes of different types of industries and different types of products. In 
addition to shaping what criteria are relevant for a particular context, it also affects how 
stakeholders perceive certain types of standards to be realistic or not. 
For example, when they began to expand their criteria, Ethical Sourcing used the 
ILO conventions as a guide to develop its criteria. As perhaps the most widely accepted 
global norm  for labor practices, the ILO conventions were mentioned by many of my 
respondents for shaping social standards. However, the ability to translate these global 
norms into specific criteria also varied by the context of production. Or more specifically, 
standards vary “industry by industry” (Deborah, Responsible Economy). Sarah described 
unique conditions shaping how production is organized in carpet-making that led them to 
exclude criteria that they would have wanted to expect out of their producers: 
There was something that came up early on before we even had the full draft 
standard that was an issue around the provision of regular work and that was a 
provision that we discussed including; but in the carpet industry, it’s not really 
feasible. I mean we would have probably ended up losing a lot of our members 
because there can’t be a provision of regular work if the orders aren’t coming in. 
A lot of it is informal, a lot of it is subcontracted so they aren’t like centralized 
factories where you know. I mean I get why they need to have that kind of a 
standard so a factory owner can’t hire you today and fire you tomorrow.  (Sarah, 
Ethical Sourcing) 




Some of the people we were working with questioned [it] and wanted to really 
make sure that if we’re not including that, there is a good rationale for not doing 
so … [It is] because of the way that a lot of the work is done on a seasonal basis. 
So it might be the primary source of income throughout the year, so there may be 
families, for example, in home weaving that do agricultural work for part of the 
year and then when there’s no agricultural work during that part of the year, they 
may do rug-weaving. (Pierre, Ethical Sourcing) 
Pierre made it clear that labor advocates would expect to know why Ethical Sourcing 
would not be using additional ILO conventions within their standard. But as long as the 
certifier provided a “good rationale” for excluding it, participating members were more 
lenient on this criteria than on criteria for worker representation. He concluded by noting 
that “I think the key is to make sure it’s relevant in the sector that you’re working in.”  
 This was the case in all three certifications that I examined for this research. At 
both the industry and product levels, unique production processes shaped what standards 
were included and how they were measured. Even when agricultural products were 
seemingly similar and grown in the same area, they might have important differences for 
what makes them viable to produce on a certain scale. A good illustration of this is coffee 
and tea, two agricultural products that are Eco Certified: 
We have general standards but the crops’ realities are different of course … So for 
coffee we are always starting to work separate processes. For example in Kenya 
we just had a separate process for local tea interpretation guidelines and a separate 
process for local coffee interpretation guidelines. Not only because the 




are very specific crop issues. For example, in coffee in Kenya, the introduction of 
[a] shade tree layer which brings balance for conservation, for the water cycle, 
additional habitat for local wildlife—that’s an issue but it’s not possible … for the 
tea plantations in Kenya in the islands to have shade trees. They need that high 
sunlight input to have an economically sustainable production. (Neil, Eco 
Certified) 
In this example, we see the variation in indicators for something like environmental 
sustainability. In agricultural production processes, there are literally hundreds of actions 
that can be taken to make production more environmentally sustainable. The exact 
indicators used for these actions, and the bar set for them, however, can vary dramatically 
by product. In Kenya, we see that the more sustainable practices for certified coffee are 
different than the standards for tea, which appears to be a less environmentally 
sustainable practice when we focus in on just these few criteria. However, I do not want 
to generalize about environmental sustainability from this specific example, but rather to 
emphasize that standards for social and environmental responsibility vary based on the 
physical and social characteristics that underlie existing production processes.  
Because of these differences across products and industries, several respondents 
did note that a emphasis on a particular industry can make standards more focused and, in 
some cases, more effective. For example, a former representative at Ethical Sourcing told 
me: “Ethical Sourcing is an amazing example of what you can do when you can get to a 
really industry-specific level of certification and product-specific” (Rhonda, Responsible 
Economy). This notion was repeated by other respondents when reflecting on whether or 




responsibility. By eliminating variation in products, certifiers avoided differences in 
production processes, and the issue of different standards across products. 
 
Local Cultural Differences  
 
 Finally, the development of social and environmental standards is shaped by the 
different local and regional cultural contexts within which the standards must be 
implemented. On the one hand, movement actors seek to promote universal human rights 
and global standards that function the same throughout the world. Throughout my 
interviews, my respondents described the need for global standards for social and 
environmental responsibility. On the other hand, they perceived standards to be shaped 
by the country-specific contexts within which they were embedded: 
The idea was that there would be global, a global standard or a global framework 
for standards and then you would have country-specific indicators that would be 
developed in each country. That was done for a couple different reasons. First, we 
felt that it was by developing local standards you engage people, you get them 
vested in the process.  Number two from a GAT point of view, if you want to be 
in essence World Trade Organization or GAT friendly you want to have a 
consistent global framework. (Randy, Eco Certified) 
The promotion of a single set of standards was motivated, in part, by broader global 
organizations (i.e. the WTO) that demanded uniformity for trade and production rules. 
From a cultural point of view, they also drew upon universalistic human rights frames 
and scientific discourses of ecology. These motivations, and especially the claims for 




respondents. They also emphasized the need to communicate to consumers a clear and 
consistent message about a product’s social and environmental dimensions, which was 
only practical if their standard was implemented the same way across space.  
However, creating consistent global standards is a challenge when there are sharp 
cultural differences at the local and regional levels. As a result, standard-setting is shaped 
by the local contexts within which they would be implemented. Randy continued:  
… but then you want to have, from a fairness point of view, country-specific 
standards. So, this allowed for that kind of issue to be dealt with in a structured 
way. Lastly we were absolutely convinced that there are going to be aspects in 
each country that are going to be different in terms of meeting the [principles and 
criteria], the indicators will have to adapt to that and will have to be changed and 
respond to local conditions, but the idea in general was that the standard would be 
equally difficult across all countries to attain. (Randy, Eco Certified) 
While certifiers and their movement partners sought globally consistent standards, they 
also recognized that local conditions and cultural differences had to be considered in 
constructing social and environmental standards. As Elizabeth (Trade Justice Network) 
stated, “one principle that we have … is about respecting cultural identity.” These 
cultural differences were sometimes important enough that standards were unable to be 
entirely consistent across different contexts. Other times, the local differences made it so 
that an issue was highly important in one area and entirely irrelevant in another. Certifiers 
and their networks of NGOs and activists had to navigate these local cultural differences 
in constructing standards. This interaction between standard-setting and contextual 




included, excluded, or where the threshold for social responsibility was set. 
 In some contexts, local variation had considerable impact on the standard-setting 
process or on the standards themselves. One such area was around wage requirements for 
social responsibility. While one of the most contentious debates within certifications is 
around living wage, no single certification guarantees a living wage—although some do 
require “wage premiums.” The most common wage requirement in social certifications, 
however, is that producers pay at least the legally mandated minimum wage. Some of my 
respondents saw this as an important first step because such laws are often unenforced 
and employers frequently pay below a minimum wage. While this standard would appear 
to be fairly straightforward, unique cultural contexts can shape even this seemingly basic 
criteria: 
Around minimum wage, certified farms need to pay the minimum wage to all 
their workers. They need to comply with local policy, but as we are starting now 
in new countries in Africa, we are facing the scenario for example in Rwanda and 
Manabí, there are no local government definitions of minimum wage … we had to 
come up with a procedure which is based on … a local decision from the local 
stakeholder work[ing] group, which includes labor experts. For example for 
Rhonda, we’re having a discussion with a local ILO, International Labor 
Organization member, etc., to come out for the consensus which says this is the 
minimum level for example for a tea plantation worker that we allow on a 
certified farm. (Neil, Eco Certified) 
When a particular practice or concept (e.g. minimum-wage laws) simply did not exist, 




case, developing a minimum wage law would not conflict with any particular local 
cultural norms, laws, or institutions. Therefore, Eco Certified was able to bring together 
relevant stakeholders and construct a standard where none existed. Within this group, 
ILO members draw upon their cultural capital to assert their definitions regarding wage 
requirements. Rather than leading to divergent standards, certifiers were able to integrate 
new practices into a globally consistent framework.  
In many other cases, however, it was not possible to bridge local conditions to 
global frameworks in such a consistent manner. Sometimes the local cultural context 
varied enough that a more nuanced approach was necessary. Sarah at Ethical Sourcing 
described how a more uniform approach to standard-setting would have made their 
standard less effective: 
The way that you consult with your stakeholders in Nepal or India or the US 
might be different, and one would hope that the local organization can help guide 
that versus having to follow a sort of new approach to everything … If we have to 
harmonize the way we do it country to country, we may have to harmonize in a 
way that limits how well we could work in one country over another because let’s 
say Afghanistan it’s going to be really hard to have the kind of system we have in 
Nepal. (Sarah, Ethical Sourcing) 
Sarah had explained that the cultural context that shaped engagement in Nepal differs 
from that in India. Elizabeth described some examples that relate to hiring and 
discrimination for certifications more generally: 
I mean to say you don’t discriminate by caste in your North American business … 




maybe gender, or sexual orientation, whereas you’re never going to see a 
Ugandan say- You know, in India to say, “well do you discriminate based on 
sexual orientation?” I mean they would look at you like you were completely 
insane, but if you say do you discriminate by caste, now that’s a loaded question. 
So … you have to draw some common thread between 250 very different things. 
You’re looking [to] weave together different pieces. (Elizabeth, Director, Trade 
Justice Network) 
There were a great many more examples where these local cultural differences affected 
the standard-setting process. For example, compared to the US, Europe handles 
immigration status differently in regards to labor rights. How different countries handle 
relations with indigenous peoples varies dramatically—even between the US and Canada. 
Randy (Eco Certified) quipped “it would not be appropriate for us to impose in the 
United States exactly what the Canadians do in terms of their relations with indigenous 
groups”; more dramatic differences exist, for example, between the US and many 
developing countries. In South America, it is common for 300 different farms to operate 
under the same management system, but in Africa, there may be 1,000 to 2,000 different 
farms under a single system. As Susan (Eco Certified) noted, “in terms of auditing and 
scoring and evaluating a farm in a group of farms that becomes something that’s very 
relevant for how you design the system, [including] the scoring system and also the 
certification process.” She later summed up the issue in this way: 
We’re not just in our offices writing out the criteria for the standards, we actually 
have to ensure that it’s applicable in all the regions where the standard is 




considerations that we have to consider. (Susan, Eco Certified) 
One way that certifiers address this situation is to develop abstract principles and 
criteria that function at a higher-level than concrete verifiable criteria. From there, local 
initiatives can then adjust specific criteria and the bar for social responsibility to meet 
local cultural contexts. For Eco Certified, in … 
the standards process, what that then set up was okay now it’s a general assembly, 
we approve principles and criteria. Then what we embark upon is a process where 
there are national initiatives and those national initiatives develop local standards, 
i.e., the local indicators covering all of the principles and criteria.  … you have to 
be careful when you write the indicators, a specific word can mean a different 
thing in a different culture.  So, what you want to try to do is on the one level, 
create a commonality at the principles and criteria level and make sure in general 
that the principles and criteria are being interpreted approximately the same, but 
acknowledge the fact that there are differences and therefore your indicators can 
be different depending on - from country to country. (Randy, Eco Certified) 
The challenge in developing such abstract principles is that local stakeholders may reach 
radically different conclusions about what that abstractly defined social responsibility 
looks like in practice. As Randy noted, “a specific word can mean a different thing in a 
different culture.” A complementary tactic in developing these abstract standards or a 
“commonality at the principles” level, is to construct local guidelines that describe how 
that principle would be implemented in a specific local context: 
The local interpretation guidelines are designed on the country level and for a 




d’Ivoire or Ghana. The work[ing] group—the local work group of national 
experts—are people that write the interpretation … [and which] needs to have a 
balance also. (Neil, Eco Certified) 
Local guidelines were common among the certifications in this study. Furthermore, these 
comments emphasize that the standard-setting process is not entirely centralized and 
forced upon localities, but that there is a degree of both centralization and locally-
controlled standard-setting that is embedded within unique local contexts (Ritzer 2006). 
Finally, in some cases, there are more powerful institutional forces that make 
local differences too powerful to fully implement. This includes laws that actually 
exclude particular rights and freedoms that movements may be trying to promote through 
certification. For example,  
how do you address a requirement relating to a principle in a context where there 
are particular challenges to implementation? And one example of a particular 
challenge is political instability or something of that nature that it is a national 
concern or it could be regional. Or another example could be if Ethical Sourcing 
or another organization were looking to implement or use this standard for work 
in a place like China where freedom of association is not allowed by law. How 
would you implement this standard? (Pierre, Ethical Sourcing) 
In some extreme cases, the global principles for social and environmental responsibility 
contradict existing laws. In these cases, these criteria are likely to be excluded from the 
standard because it forces a producer to follow the law (and risk not getting certified) or 
follow the certification standard—and risk being punished with fines or criminal 




because they could not be sure that they could implement some of their fundamental 
criteria in a way that could adapt to local conditions. Sarah at Ethical Sourcing noted 
“some of us felt like we weren’t ready to go there [in Pakistan] because we didn’t have a 
process at the international level in place to ensure everything was happening there in the 
same way it’s happening let’s say in Nepal or India.” As a result of the local cultural 





 This chapter examined the field of social certification as an arena for shaping 
more socially responsible business practices. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with 
representatives of three social certifications, I illustrated how movement actors use 
certifications to engage with producers and create standards for social and environmental 
responsibility. By developing markets for socially responsible products and mobilizing 
consumers toward ethical consumption, movement actors incentivize company 
participation within standards to regulate their business practices.  
 By looking at the three cases within social certification, I found that there is 
significant variability in standards for social responsibility. I highlighted several 
mechanisms that shape the variation through the inclusion or exclusion of certain criteria, 
or where the threshold for social responsibility is set. For example, I showed how power 
mediates the standard-setting process by examining the role of different forms of capital. 
I showed how actors’ theories about social change, and movement objectives for 




responsible behavior. Differentiation and competition between certifications led certifiers 
to respond strategically to other certification systems, while sectoral production processes 
made some standards more or less feasible for different products. Finally, while certifiers 
sought to develop consistent global frameworks for social and environmental standards, 
they found that standards had to be adapted to local cultural contexts and these could lead 
to the exclusion or alteration of even basic criteria. In sum, these mechanisms enabled 
and constrained standard-setting in the different cases in this research. 
 Now that I have examined standard-setting in cases within SRI (chapter three) and 
social certification (this chapter), I focus next on standard-setting processes across cases 
in both fields. In chapter five, I analyze similar sets of conditions and patterns that shape 
the standard setting process across the fields to identify higher order mechanisms that 
influence the criteria and thresholds for socially responsible business practices. I pay 
particular attention to similarities and differences across the cases to shed light on the role 
of culture, power, and institutions that mediate the development of private standards for 











Chapter 5:  The Meta-Field of Private Social Responsibility 
Standards 
 
The social responsibility movement operates across several fields to promote 
more socially responsible and environmentally sustainable business practices. While they 
also use the media, courts, and law to promote their goals, the two arenas where 
movements develop sets of private social and environmental standards within which to 
embed business practices are SRI and social certifications. In chapters three and four, I 
examined SRI and social certifications to understand how standards were constructed in 
their respective fields, and what opportunities and constraints existed within the 
engagement and standard-setting processes.  
 In this chapter, I shift my focus from looking at cases within an individual field to 
looking at cases across both SRI and social certification. Having conducted within-case 
analyses through process-tracing and cross-case comparisons limited to each field in 
chapters three and four, I now focus exclusively on broader cross-case comparisons. In 
other words, I compare standards across all five cases in this study. I begin by analyzing 
how advocates within each field are positioned relative to producers. While these 
comparisons reveal fundamental differences in how movement advocates initiate 
engagement with businesses across fields, there is a striking number of similarities across 
these interactional contexts. For example, while relying on external organizations using 
outsider strategies to incentivize company participation, SRI and social certification 
advocates adopt common strategies of cooperative multi-stakeholder engagements to 




 Having outlined a range of different social criteria and thresholds in my earlier 
findings, the vast majority of this chapter is then focused on identifying and analyzing the 
higher-order causal mechanisms that shape how standards for social and environmental 
responsibility are constructed across the cases. My intention is to highlight mechanisms 
that may not be visible when focusing on cases within an individual field or to elaborate 
on mechanisms previously identified in each of the two fields. By looking across a larger 
set of cases in this manner, I build more robust explanations suitable to broader 
generalizations. I, therefore, draw upon previous evidence and supplement it with 
additional data to identify the multiple conditions that lead to particular standards of 
social and environmental responsibility.  
 With my focus on these sets of conditions, I build a conceptual bridge from their 
desired goal of social standards to what is actually produced within a social rating or 
certification. Specifically, I show how power relations, local cultural contexts, scientific 
discourses, market scale strategies, organizational infrastructure, and institutional 
contexts all shape criteria and thresholds for socially responsible practices within the 
standard-setting process. For each mechanism, I link the position of particular actors to 
their social objectives and show how their expectations are altered in highly similar ways 
across multiple situations and ultimately become encoded in their associated sets of 
standards. 
 
Processes of Engagement 
 
 Advocates for SRI and social certifications share a similar space within the social 




engage producers and shape their business practices in a more socially responsible 
manner. While these fields differ in how activists initiate engagement with companies, 
the engagement itself is structured in very similar ways. In this section, I give an 
overview of these processes of engagement across my cases, including their emphasis on 
cooperation, multi-stakeholder engagements, and their role as insiders. 
When we look across the fields of SRI and social certification, we see some key 
differences in how engagement processes were initiated. In the field of SRI, socially 
responsible investors began working within a highly institutionalized environment to 
disrupt and reconstruct the institutional logic of investing. On the one hand, some actors 
sought to encourage a new type of investing around moral and ethical issues. While this 
has worked with some individual investors to a degree, this has not been sufficient in 
mobilizing conventional investors and engaging corporate management. Rather, socially 
responsible investors have tended to focus on how social and environmental issues 
themselves are a financial concern. By reframing social issues not only as a moral 
concern but as a business concern, advocates have sought to realign financial objectives 
with social and environmental objectives. This strategy has not attempted to dramatically 
alter institutional priorities, or how investing is conducted, but rather to institutionalize 
social and environmental practices as having financial value.  
In the field of social certification, movement advocates have undertaken more of 
an institution-building project than reconfiguring existing institutions. In the absence of 
any kind of social certification schemes, the certification movement has pioneered its 
own means of engagement with producers. They may have a model in the technical 




have existed for over a hundred years, but their similarities really stop there. They must 
be understood, rather, as growing out of political efforts and developed through new 
channels of engagement across multiple sectors throughout society. As noted in chapter 
four, these schemes emerged in the early 1990s when early NGOs working to end 
deforestation 
pulled together scientists and NGOs and timber company executives and the 
World Bank and international organizations such as that. We locked everybody in 
a hotel in New York City and said “don’t come out until you have a better idea 
than a boycott.” And that’s where the first, where this idea of instead of trying to 
castigate an entire industry, let’s figure out what's the responsible thing to do, put 
it into concrete and measurable verifiable criteria, find the willing and progressive 
actors that are interested in trying to do it, train people to verify that they’re doing 
it, and then give them a Green seal of approval. (Cory, Eco Certified) 
With these early efforts, and similar ones like them, a certification movement emerged 
and began developing market alternatives that produced products in a more socially 
responsible manner (Conroy 2007). They began to form their own organizations and 
networks, which over time, developed new institutions. Working cooperatively with 
industry, sometimes governments, NGOs, and others, certifiers co-constructed social and 
environmental standards for social and environmental responsibility. 
But at the same time, it is clear that the overarching processes of engagement 
were structured in very similar ways across all the cases in this study. Most broadly, these 
two fields marked a significant shift away from a purely contentious approach with clear 




or environmentalist had ever talked to [corporations] in a reasonable way before; it was 
always so confrontational.” Through SRI and social certifications, agents increasingly 
worked cooperatively with business. The formerly confrontational and oppositional 
strategies were transformed into a more nuanced, multi-pronged approach (Conroy 2007). 
 Second, as part of this cooperative process of engagement, activists must function 
as at least partial insiders. While they were somewhat contentious to promote change and 
drew upon their cultural capital to do so, they had to establish their cooperative role as 
insiders within investing or market-driven certification. For example, in both SRI and 
social certifications, we observed activists deploy their symbolic capital that signaled 
their economic interests in socially responsible markets. Cory at Eco Certified did this by 
working with small local producers and farmers who sought to improve their market 
position. He wanted to show companies that they “could be trusted” and “weren’t going 
to get information about how they were misusing pesticides deliberately or not and run 
off to the media” (Cory, Eco Certified). They had to simultaneously establish their 
position as insider while agitating to promote new types of practices.  
Third, engagement is characterized by a diverse multi-stakeholder approach. It 
brings together actors from civil society, organized labor, large and small producers, the 
certifier or SRI group, and occasionally governments. When the differing perspectives of 
these actors are brought together, it can attain greater legitimacy for the standards that are 
developed. As one of my respondents within a social ratings agency put it,  
It’s better than the NGOs coming up with the standard, or the corporations 
coming up with the standard on their own, because the two sides will walk down a 




likely to adopt the NGO’s standard unless they’ve been involved in the 
conversation to develop it. (Steve, Corporate Indexing) 
This multi-stakeholder approach can secure greater buy-in from these diverse groups. It is 
contingent especially on participating companies, who must willingly adopt the standards 
that are created. And while corporations must have an incentive to participate, my 
respondents have noted an overall trend of greater engagement from companies. 
 Fourth, while the engagement is characterized by strategic interaction, there were 
also opportunities to meaningfully influence and be influenced by the process. Within 
these arenas, actors jockey for position to consciously attain the best possible outcome, 
but they can also be changed by the process themselves. As mentioned in chapter four, a 
member of a leading certification group stated: 
You actually have to let participants influence the process. You have to allow the 
process to change or be changed by the people that are involved otherwise they 
know that it’s just window dressing, it’s a bogus consultation, you’ve already 
made up your mind—you’re just saying “okay now we’re going to have a 
consultation.” (Charles, Global Certification Coalition) 
Stakeholders, therefore, either felt empowered by the process and able to shape its course, 
or they exited. For example, when labor groups struggled and failed to shape Justice 
Certifiers’ labor standards, they had felt disempowered and ultimately withdrew their 
participation.  
 Finally, it was perceived that engagement ultimately resulted in new standards 
that translate into identifiable changes in business practices. Advocates attempted to 




number of ways. Through processes of engagement and disciplining corporations to fit to 
industry norms of best practices, the movement attempted to shape practices to fit the 
mutually agreed upon set of standards. They worked strategically with high-ranking 
corporate managers that are in better positions to shape company practices. While not all 
attempts were successful, my respondents have observed some changes in practices, and 
companies have benefitted from diminished risk, improved brand image, and access to 
new markets, which were themselves politically constructed through movement efforts 
(Bartley 2005, 2007a). These outcomes were made possible when standards lead to 
concrete changes in business practices. In the following section, I will examine the 
mechanisms that shape these standards across the cases in my study. 
 
Mediating Mechanisms in Standard-Setting 
 
Standard-setting is embedded within the interactional context discussed above, 
with interactions between standard-setting organizations, companies, and other 
movement actors shaping the criteria and threshold for social responsibility. These 
interactions and the different resources that particular actors have to draw on within them, 
and the strategies that actors adopt, shape the standard-setting process in similar ways 
across the two social movement fields. By looking at standards across fields and across 
the standards within those fields, I have examined patterns of observations across 
multiple sites that show how advocates demands are ultimately shaped into specific 
standards. In this section, I identify these mechanisms and analyze how they shaped 
standards for social and environmental responsibility. Specifically, I illustrate how power 




strategies, auditability, and institutional context all shape outcomes for social and 
environmental responsibility standards.  
 
Power Relations  
 
 Perhaps the single most fundamental mechanism in shaping the development of 
social and environmental standards is power relations, including the role of outsider 
strategies in laying the ground work for effective engagement and standard-setting. SRI 
and social certifications, as fields of power, are organized relationally between actors 
endowed with varying degrees of capital (Bourdieu 1979, 1990). Advocates within these 
fields, which could not exist without the voluntary participation of companies 
themselves, must continuously negotiate fragile relationships that simultaneously 
incentivize producer involvement while developing meaningful standards that alter 
company practices. 
 Within the SRI cases, advocates sought to maintain engagement with companies 
to obtain company data, communicate best practices, and construct multi-stakeholder 
dialogues. For example, in chapter three, I described a struggle within the Responsible 
Investment Coalition (RIC) to effectively engage several large corporations. One 
respondent described his frustrations over the power arrangements: 
I sat down with one of the founders of the RIC, and … I’m terribly frustrated that 
the RIC is willing to sign up companies that then violate the principles, but 
because they sign, they’re not willing to say “we’re throwing you out.” “That 




Ford, would [be to] immediately say: out! We’re there. We’ll do it.” But they 
couldn’t bring themselves to do it. (Jeremy, Climate Change Action) 
RIC relies on voluntary participation from corporations, and in order to maintain some 
level of engagement—their main leverage for change—they were willing to allow 
companies to violate their principles without any penalty. While there is dissent from 
others within the group, leadership within RIC has deemed it worthwhile to maintain the 
engagement rather than ejecting the company from the group. This position of relative 
powerlessness underscores the fragility of voluntary relationships, in which companies 
face little or no penalty for failing to live up to their social and environmental 
commitments. They acquire the symbolic value of their participation but their actual 
practices may not reflect these ideals. 
 Advocates of social certifications described similar power arrangements. While a 
certification can practically exist without involvement from labor or other members of 
civil society, this market-based approach cannot work without involvement from 
producers. Certifiers must be willing to engage companies with their existing practices—
even if those practices are deemed socially irresponsible and highly one-sided. For 
example, organized labor particularly struggled to institute high worker representation 
standards because of existing power dynamics in which worker representation was 
effectively suppressed. With low levels of social capital and worker organization, and 
dramatically overpowered in economic capital, labor asserted little power within the 
standard-setting process relative to corporations. Furthermore, large corporations were 




To negotiate this asymmetrical distribution of power, movement actors relied on a 
combination of outsider and insider strategies. Outsider strategies included a variety of 
corporate campaigns that usually targeted the largest brands in an industry (and 
sometimes the entire industry itself) and were meant to tarnish corporate brands (Conroy 
2007). They used disruptive tactics including public protests, corporate boycotts, 
divestment, celebrity endorsements, and creative attempts to draw media attention in 
order to disrupt and destabilize markets (King 2011). These tactics not only laid the 
ground work for company engagement and effective standard-setting, but they blurred the 
distinction between insiders and outsiders more generally. 
 Throughout my interviews, representatives of SRI and social certifications cases, 
and their various advocates recounted the role of these contentious, outsider strategies. 
For example, one environmental advocate described how a major environmental 
organization (known for its confrontational tactics) hung a banner 
at the bridge in Pittsburgh at the G20 summit a week to ten days ago. Front page. 
Now did it change anything?  I think you can argue that [this environmental 
organization] doesn’t leave a footprint in the sand, but if they don’t get the 
headline then there’s nothing—they’re like the first troops on the beachhead. You 
know, they establish the reality that there’s a problem and then others have to 
come in to do the grunt work. But you know, it wouldn’t work if they didn’t 
establish the reality of the issue. (Jeremy, Climate Change Action) 
For Jeremy and my other respondents, activists perceived negative corporate campaigns 
to have relational effects for other movement activity. But more than merely perception, 




effect on lowering stock price and company revenues (King 2011; Bartley and Child 
forthcoming). These campaigns can serve as a significant lever for change; as Jeremy 
later noted, “They [corporations] can’t break with the past unless they can show there’s a 
real risk to doing what we’re doing.” The risks of lower stock prices and revenues 
provide incentives for a company to respond and change their practices. 
In the face of these risks, socially responsible investors and social certifications 
enter the field to offer companies a market-friendly means of mitigating their risk and 
gaining access to broader markets. For example, one certifier described this relationship: 
 What I think is really innovative about this [certification] program is that for the 
first time companies can potentially reap a competitive advantage from doing the 
right thing. So for years we’ve had campaigning against companies saying they’re 
sourcing from sweatshops. They’ve built up this elaborate factory auditing and 
social compliance network and mechanisms to try to demonstrate that they’re not 
sourcing in sweatshops or that they’re not willfully sourcing in sweatshops. But 
it’s been a risk management approach; companies are taking this action to try to 
avoid being attacked by anti-sweatshop activists. (Sandra, Justice Certifiers) 
When companies agree to participate in social certifications, including their systems of 
auditing and compliance, they are able to minimize risk but can also reap possible 
competitive advantages. They are able to both improve their brands while expanding their 
markets, which can be especially beneficial in hyper-competitive economic downturns.  
 In this way, certifiers and investors seek to increase their power within standard-
setting processes in order to develop higher standards that companies will comply with. 




agree to high standards for social and environmental responsibility. One of their main 
leverage points is to increase their capital, which is inherently a relational resource 
(Bourdieu 1979; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). While they are able to mobilize investors 
and consumers, developing markets for socially responsible products, much of their 
opportunity exists in increasing their cultural capital relative to producers. By tarnishing 
corporate brands and casting certain industries in negative light, this incentivizes business 
involvement with socially responsible actors who hold disproportionately higher levels of 
cultural capital. 
 One very interesting point of variation within the field is the degree of 
coordination across insider and outsider tactics. In some cases, there was little or no 
formal coordination between insiders and outsiders, but they do operate with a conscious 
understanding of their different approaches and their relational dynamic in promoting 
social change. Sarah described this relational dimension in terms of the anti-child labor 
movement: 
If you look at the anti-child labor movement there are a lot of actors and … the 
bigger movement looks to us as a successful actor within the movement and can 
use what we’ve been able to do for advocacy purposes. So, the way in which we 
can highlight child labor as a problem, the stories we can tell by focusing in on 
individual carpet weavers … if you have an industry like cocoa right now that has 
widespread use of exploitative child labor, actually there is something that we can 
do about it and here’s a model to look at. And so I think the sort of more activist 
side has grown to see, okay that may not be my approach, but it’s important that 




business … Perhaps way back when there was definite - there was sort of on both 
sides also the NGO community also having issues and I think more having issues 
with not being able to stop being on attack and going after companies and creating 
that atmosphere. But it’s not an issue anymore. (Sarah, Ethical Sourcing) 
Sarah makes it clear that actors within the anti-child labor movement were not always so 
amenable to the coexistence of insider/outsider strategies, but that activists have come to 
recognize the value of company engagement. She perceives that while these activists 
prefer their outsider strategies, they look to Ethical Sourcing as a model for better 
business practices, and that they can draw on Ethical Sourcing’s success stories in their 
own campaigns. Of course, not all movement actors have been so quick to promote the 
other’s practices. As noted in chapter four, Cory viewed boycotts as “silly” and 
unproductive. Furthermore, movement activists that adopt only outsider strategies can 
often see these modes of engagement as means of cooptation and selling out (Trumpy 
2008). Nonetheless, an increasing amount of informal coordination has become 
institutionalized within both fields. 
 In other cases, there are much higher degrees of formal coordination through 
insider and outsider tactics. These actions may be coordinated through multiple 
organizations within a network, or they can take place within a single organization. As 
discussed in chapter three, a group of shareholder activists coordinated their tactics 
explicitly: 
We’d have protestors outside the shareholder meeting and then we’d be inside and 
even on the inside we’d have tactical diversity. We’d have one of our major 




rationale … [Another one of our activists] gets up and she says “I’m with the 
Ethical Traders and we’re going to piss on your brand and we’re going to drive 
down the value of your stock”—the barking dog. I’m in a really nice suit way 
over on the other side of the room, no association with these people. I get up and I 
say “look, I’m a small shareholder. I don’t want my Coke stock to go down like 
my Nike stock did when these radicals started pissing on the brand. You don’t 
want to get in a pissing match with a skunk, just get rid of him. Give them what 
they want and get rid of them because they’re going to hurt our share price.” 
(Simon, Ethical Trading Imitative) 
Within a single organization, there was immense tactical diversity at a single event. They 
mobilized both protestors using outsider tactics (e.g. protest) and multiple insider tactics 
(science advocacy and shareholder resolutions) to promote specific practices within their 
targeted corporation. The tactics were coordinated in such a way that their messages 
could be perceived across a variety of viewpoints so that, ultimately, investors would 
identify with one speaker over the others but still point to the same outcome (i.e. the 
passing of the shareholder resolution). 
 The significance of SRI and social certifications as fields of power is that to fully 
understand company engagement and standard-setting processes, it is necessary to see 
how the various actors are positioned relative to one another in terms of their objective 
locations (rather than the individual organizations themselves). In voluntary, market-
based arrangements, it is vital to see that the relationship between companies and 
organizations adopting insider strategies, is also structured by the ability of outsider 




outsider strategies, certifiers and their advocates have less power in a standard-setting 
process that is already a very fragile relationship and dependent on willing company 
participation.  
In addition to these power relationships enabling and constraining effective 
engagements, they significantly influence how standards are constructed within these 
fields. On the one hand, corporations and other large producers can use their power to 
lower standards or to avoid penalty from transgressing standards. In SRI, socially 
responsible investors worked cautiously with corporations who could, or did, threaten to 
exit the engagement. Regardless of how egregious industry norms were, SRI advocates 
developed standards that at least some existing companies could already meet. In social 
certifications, large producers used their economic capital to pit one certifier against 
another and negotiate lower standards. Relative to other lesser organized stakeholders, 
especially workers, certifiers were not able to significantly raise labor standards because 
the stakeholders lacked the organizational capacity to implement the standard or the 
economic capital to shape the market demand for products with such high standards. 
While many labor groups pulled out of the standard-setting process out of frustration, the 
certification continued without their support, but it could not have continued without the 
further participation of business. As a result, when socially responsible investors and 
certifiers effectively mobilized their constituencies and were able to deploy their cultural 
capital, they were better able to raise the bar for the social and environmental standards. 
 





 Another important mechanism that shaped standard-setting are the local cultural 
contexts within which global standards are embedded. In the social responsibility 
movement, actors seek to promote uniform standards that address labor rights through the 
conventions of the International Labor Organization, universal human rights, and 
principles of environmental sustainability. Certifiers and their NGO partners draw on 
common cultural principles through global expansion and the construction of a set of 
global standards (Ritzer 2006). However, these seemingly universal demands for social 
responsibility are not as clear or as uniform as some scholars suggest (Boli and Lechner 
2005; Boli and Thomas 1999). As documented in previous chapters, the local cultural 
context also plays an important part in how movement actors construct their standards for 
social responsibility.  
 In chapter three, I reported that data availability is an extremely important factor 
shaping the development of social and environmental standards within SRI. On the one 
hand, this issue arose because there is a lack of consistent reporting mechanisms across 
countries—especially regarding social and environmental performance. Until recently, 
corporations have never considered many social movement concerns (e.g. in areas such 
as human rights, labor rights, and emergent environmental issues) relevant for their 
financial accounting and profits, and have therefore not measured or reported on many 
indicators in these areas. While institutions like the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has 
made some progress in promoting an increasingly standardized reporting mechanism, 
adoption of the GRI has been very uneven and a lack of uniformity across industries 




 On the other hand, data availability also varied significantly by country, due to 
differences across cultural and historical contexts. Based on cultural differences, 
companies in some countries reported on very different types of social and environmental 
criteria. In SRI, where social ratings and measurements are largely dependent on the data 
that is available, this cultural variation shaped what types of demands and criteria could 
be developed for social responsibility standards. For example, Karl went on to discuss a 
variety of cultural differences in reporting. He noted that a British organization 
contracted us to do a chunk of research for them, and they gave us a pre-built 
database …  [it] had environmental and social indicators. But it had a lot of weird 
categories. It had a category that dealt with different benefits, … and I guess a lot 
of these benefits were benefits [that] would be very common in Europe, like 
flexible work hours, job sharing, different sort of mentorship programs, stuff like 
that, that you don’t really get in the states very often. So a lot of this stuff, we had 
no idea how to interpret. They gave us some explanatory documentation, some 
methodologies, and we’d have to sort of figure out to the best of our ability, what 
it is they exactly want, and then we’d have this sort of—do like a cultural 
translation. If we happen to find the other American company that allowed you to 
spend to basically do somebody else’s job to be sort of contracted out to a 
different job for like 2 months, is that job sharing? (Karl, Corporate 
Responsibility Researchers) 
For Corporate Responsibility Researchers, their ability to assign certain criteria to social 




responsible investors, but rather the information available on companies and how 
different investors interpreted the criteria. He concluded by stating: 
So we’d argue a lot about stuff like that, [including] how to interpret somebody 
else’s methodology. But some of the things happened with our own methodology 
and that we were responsible for making; so it was a lot of semantics. We just 
argued, and ultimately, I guess the person who was the most tenacious with 
arguing would win, and we all got tired, and we’d be like “okay, whatever.” 
(Karl, Corporate Responsibility Researchers) 
In this example, Karl compared the social ratings on US firms with those in Europe. 
When his organization sought to evaluate companies across different national contexts, 
he was struck by the variation in categories (seemingly “weird” categories) for measuring 
social and environmental performance. Because of these differences, it was not 
necessarily possible for American investors to make the same claims, or standards, for 
social and environmental responsibility as their Japanese or European counterparts. In 
some of these cases, researchers attempted to do a “cultural translation” that would 
identify commonalities across different contexts, but these could be rather subjective. In 
other cases, there was simply no data available to operationalize and measure company 
performance. 
 As documented in chapter four, social certifications encountered similar problems 
in the development of their social and environmental standards. While certifiers sought 
globally consistent certification systems, they consciously accounted for local and 
national cultural differences in how standards were constructed:  




we interact with indigenous peoples in the United States is very different from the 
way the Canadians do. So, it would not be appropriate for us to impose in the 
United States exactly what the Canadians do in terms of their relations with 
indigenous groups; there's a long and different history there, but by the same 
token there needs to be—you need to address it … You have to be careful when 
you write the indicators, a specific word can mean a different thing in a different 
culture. (Randy, Eco Certified) 
My respondents discussed a variety of other examples that showed national differences in 
reporting and measures for social responsibility. They discussed how Europeans had 
different indicators like job creation; some African countries did not have a legal 
minimum wage, which shaped how they developed wage standards; Japan reports 
“excessively” on environmental indicators, allowing investors to develop more 
sophisticated measures for environmental sustainability; and some localities did not have 
distinctions in how they perceive sexual orientation, making workplace discrimination 
standards different for that context. In each of these cases, the principle for promoting 
more socially responsible business practices was the same (Ritzer 2006), but how those 
standards were constructed varied by local and national cultural contexts. They enabled 
movement actors to develop certain criteria (e.g. job creation in Europe or more 




 In previous chapters, I have documented specific strategies that advocates use to 




investors and businesses. For example, SRI advocates sought to disrupt institutional 
logics that framed socially responsible practices as having negative effects on profit and 
reconstruct them as mitigating risk and actually improving long-term financial 
performance. Similarly, social certifications linked social and environmental indicators to 
expanded market share and are beginning to link such performance to economic outputs. 
However, it became clear that movement advocates were better able to make such 
connections with some criteria than others, based on their ability to quantify these 
relationships and draw upon scientific discourses. 
 In general, movement advocates were more successful at quantifying and linking 
poor environmental performance to poor financial performance. As a result, 
environmental criteria were less controversial and gained more legitimacy, enabling 
broader inclusion of diverse environmental criteria within standard systems. Social 
standards, including criteria for labor rights, gender equality, sexual orientation, and 
much more, were less linked to scientific discourses, more hotly debated, and therefore 
faced more resistance when integrating them within social ratings, shareholder 
resolutions, and certifications. This entire process begins with the quantification of social 
and environmental practices: 
It’s really easy to quantify environmental data, you know. How much do you 
emit, that’s pretty easy. But social data is a lot harder and a lot less researched, a 
lot less developed. (Jessica, Corporate Responsibility Researchers) 
The importance of quantification is central to establishing relationships between social 




much less researched or developed as quantifiable data, it became even more difficult to 
examine its relationship to profitability.  
When the quantitative relationship between social criteria and financial 
performance could not be clearly made, business frames were less powerful in mobilizing 
investors and businesses to support social responsibility standards. This challenge was 
especially clear when SRI advocates sought to make the link for mainstream investors: 
If you’re a financial, or just hard-core Wall Street financial person, you want, 
“Okay, this person, this company, is doing this exact thing in the environment. 
This indicates that they’re three percent worse than this guy and three percent 
means a ten percent loss in stock price, stock value. Or that their variation is 
going to go way up and down, or we need to make that connection better where 
we’re saying environmental data, a flux, a differences between the worst ten 
percent and the worst three percent creates a beta differences of X percent.” And 
we haven’t made that connection yet … How do you put that into a data equation? 
That’s a real tough leap. How do you put it into an equation that they have one 
woman on their board? That doesn’t fit into an equation very well. It also doesn’t 
translate very well into financial risk. Environment does [translate better into 
financial risk]. (Jessica, Corporate Responsibility Researchers) 
It might appear extreme to want to quantify social and environmental concerns in this 
manner, but given the institutions (e.g. investing) and markets in which movement actors 
are seeking to operate, these are fundamental bridging concepts for social responsibility. 




responsibility to financial concerns and fits within the existing priorities of investing 
institutions. Other respondents confirmed this dimension: 
The problems with [different methodologies for creating standards] are that 
because it hasn’t been standardized [by] an accounting body or something like 
[that], it is subjective. But anytime you’re dealing with these type of non-financial 
criteria, it’s going to be subjective. Part of them are becoming, like climate 
change, which people would say is an environmental concern is becoming more 
institutionalized and looking more like a financial concern than just an 
environmental concern that could have ramifications for a company, right? 
(Kristen, Association for Socially Responsible Investment) 
 Given the quantifiability of environmental data, and its easier link to financial 
performance, advocates were better able to draw upon scientific discourses in developing 
environmental criteria. Environmental criteria, specifically, were often seen as more 
scientifically-based and less controversial than social criteria, which were interpreted as 
seemingly personal ethical judgments. For example, certifiers often described the role of 
science in developing a standard. When discussing the standards in one coffee 
certification, a member of a certification scheme reflected on proposals to alter certain 
environmental criteria. He discussed a proposal for determining the amount of tree cover 
in this way: 
Should there be twice as much forest as there is in the sun coffee? So we don’t 
know that—to get at that would require, okay we’ll relax the criterion, we’ll say 
this—you know, without any kind of scientific basis. What we have now is really 




would either be just something kind of willy-nilly, or would seem that way.  
(Richard, Biodiversity Labeling) 
In this case, the basis for environmental standards was scientifically-based field work. 
Anything less than such field work meant that standards would have been developed 
“willy-nilly,” or done in a haphazard, undisciplined, and illegitimate manner. When 
discussing social standards, however, my respondents did not discuss them in the same 
terms. Consider another certifier’s framing of scientifically-based standard-setting: 
We used scientists to broker the conversation so that it wasn’t the same old tired 
dialectic of the environmentalist shouting at the banana companies and the banana 
companies stone walling. So we had scientist to talk to scientist and everyone was 
asked to check their politics and their emotions at the door and then let’s just get 
down to practical matters and see what could be done. (Cory, Eco Certified) 
In this quote, scientists were replacing the “environmentalist”—a seemingly compatible 
(yet different) set of advocates. They were interpreted as compatible because they were 
both interested in the environmental science of agricultural production; they only differed 
in that the scientist was neutral (they avoided any “politics” and “emotions”), whereas a 
traditional environmentalist would have supposedly drawn upon more controversial 
personal values or political positions.  
It is interesting that while several respondents evoked science to discuss 
environmental issues, not a single one of my respondents framed the social standards in 
this manner. It would have been unrealistic to think about a scientist replacing the labor 
advocate when negotiating with a company concerning worker representation or wages. 




scientists”—and as such their position would always be interpreted as having clear 
interests, and checking their “politics and emotions at the door” would not have been 
considered feasible. From the perspective of those involved with developing standards, 
social standards were constructed more from a symbolic position that drew (to a higher 
degree) on moral and ethical principles rather than scientifically-grounded arguments, 
thus making them more controversial.  
This view of social standards as more controversial was summed up well by the 
producer of a socially responsible buying guide, the Sustainability Guide. My respondent 
helped evaluate products based on their health, environmental, and social performance. 
Working with both SRI data and social certifications, he had a particularly good 
understanding of the field. He described the relationship among ratings and criteria in this 
way: 
[Regarding the health criteria, it is] fairly non-controversial … [There is] a little 
more potential for debating our environmental ratings. Social [ratings]: huge 
opportunity to debate it. So if a company has a progressive policy on treatment of 
gay and lesbian employees, is that good or bad? Someone in one place can say 
“good,” someone can say “horrible” … The social category has the most 
opportunity for personal [and] ethical judgments that may vary. (David, 
Sustainability Guide) 
The more scientifically-based set of standards ultimately facilitated environmental 
standards in a way that had no parallel dimension within social standards. As such, 
movement advocates were able to draw upon powerful frames and experts in translating 




privileged environmental criteria, and left social criteria comparatively more dependent 
on power struggles, and other factors, to implement high standards. 
 
Market Scale Strategies 
 
Another important mechanism that shaped standard-setting processes is the 
market scale strategies adopted by SRI and social certifications. As noted in chapter four, 
market scale refers to the size of businesses, or market, that movement advocates target in 
developing standards for social responsibility. Market scale strategies are shaped by how 
movement actors believe they can make the most social change. Depending on their 
theories of change, they can target large corporate actors and affect large percentages of 
the market or they can target small producers, which can promote more rapid change, and 
possibly deeper, changes. The size of the businesses and structure of the industry can 
dramatically shape how social and environmental standards are constructed. 
In terms of my data, those actors targeting large, corporate producers included 
Eco Certified and all of SRI. Certifiers that generally targeted smaller producers included 
Justice Certifiers and Ethical Sourcing. When comparing these two groups across these 
market scale strategies, the bar for social and environmental responsibility tended to be 
set lower for larger, corporate producers than was generally possible with smaller 
companies. In other words, SRI and Eco Certified generally set lower bars than did 
Justice Certifiers and Ethical Sourcing to meet standards for social and environmental 
responsibility.  
 To a lesser degree, this relationship was made apparent earlier (in chapter four) 




tended to have a higher bar set for social and environmental responsibility. They targeted 
smaller producers and worked with larger quantities of smaller batches. For many people 
within Justice Certifiers, and their advocates, this was necessary to promote the type of 
change that they desired. For example, Alexander (United Workers for Justice) had noted 
that “most labor groups actually look at the Eco Certified’s program as too low a bar to 
legitimize a social claim in the marketplace.” 
 On the other hand, many others within the movement argued that working with 
such small producers drastically limited the amount of change that it could bring about. 
Instead, they emphasized the need to target large, corporate producers. As Susan 
described earlier, Eco Certified seeks to  
get a lot of these big players onboard to really raise the profile of sustainability 
and sustainably produced goods in the market. And one of the challenges in doing 
that is when we’re working with some of these really large companies that have 
such potential to enact a positive change and influence consumers. (Susan, Eco 
Certified) 
By targeting large producers, Eco Certified and their advocates perceived that they were 
able to reach a larger number of producers and, while the standards may be lower, the 
reach of their impact would be higher, thus able to promote greater overall change. As 
Charles (Global Certification Coalition) put it, “it can be a big game changer.” He cited 
Eco Certified’s success at certifying Unilever, which is one of the world’s largest tea 
producers. But to be able to get the large volumes needed for this market scale, huge 




large volumes, certifiers have had to accept a lower bar for standards, including the use of 
a certification label on products that only include thirty percent certified content.  
 Like Eco Certified, SRI works with large corporations. In fact, by their very 
definition, SRI works only with large, publicly traded corporations. Working with this 
universe of companies, SRI seeks to differentiate among firms and promote the best firms 
within particular industries. They do not consider the smaller, more socially responsible 
companies that are not publicly traded. For example, one respondent noted that advocates 
working with socially responsible consumers (such as some social certifications) 
can say to people, “look Wal-Mart’s done this and this wrong, here are local 
companies, small firms that you can shop at.”  As an investor, I can’t shop there 
because they’re not public. (Kristen, Association of Socially Responsible 
Investment) 
Within SRI, an investor cannot invest (or “shop”) at small firms because they are not 
traded on the stock market. Accordingly, SRI does not consider their practices as part of 
the feasible set of socially and environmentally responsible activities.   
As noted above, Unilever is a very large global corporation that sells Eco 
Certified teas. Within SRI, they are also rated highly on many social ratings and were 
carried on socially responsible mutual funds. However, in comparison to some of the 
smaller producers certified by agencies working at a smaller market scale, some of my 
respondents did not consider them to be socially responsible: 
Unilever’s a great example. They’re on most of the, or they are carried by a lot of 
socially responsible funds. They put a lot of money into—I think it’s clean water 




Africa and you have to look at their report because I don’t know the specifics. But 
I know they do donate a lot of money and they get a lot of praise for that, but 
they’re the largest company in the world when it comes to teas [and] tea 
distribution. And if you know anything about the tea industry, you know that the 
tea farmers are suffering and they get a lot of it from India; these farmers make a 
pittance. And Unilever is perfectly fine with that because that means that their 
teas are cheap. Well how about, if you’re really a responsible company, you 
would say “we want to pay you more for you tea, so that you can actually send 
your children to school.” I think that that is a perfect example of a company that is 
considered to be socially responsible but does not have sustainable practices in 
place. (Natalie, Responsible Economy) 
Like labor advocates quoted in chapter four, Natalie does not accept the claim that many 
of these large corporations are socially responsible. While they achieve the relatively 
lower standards in certifications and ratings that target larger market scales, their 
practices do not hold up to the standards that some smaller (but more niche) producers 
are able to meet. Natalie went on to describe the challenges that these larger companies 
face: 
I don’t think that a company has to be small in order to be sustainable, but it 
definitely … the difficulty of achieving sustainability across the board is 
exponentially more difficult the larger a company gets. (Natalie, Responsible 
Economy) 
Not only must larger companies be able to source larger volumes from their supply 




organizations. This requires a dramatic wholesale change in the ways that corporations 
are run, which can increase costs (at least in the short term). If these costs cannot translate 
into identifiable market advantages, then companies are much more likely to adopt 
piecemeal changes that are less extensive to keep prices low (including low wages to its 
workers and fewer safeguards for the environment) and remain competitive. Thus, these 
voluntary, market-based schemes are less capable of incentivizing the organization-wide 





 One of the fundamental goals of the social responsibility movement is to promote 
transparency and accountability within business operations. At the center of this goal are 
systems of independent monitoring, auditing, and verification. Therefore, one of the 
standards for social and environmental responsibility that exists is for independent 
monitoring and auditing of company practices. A major motivator for these systems is the 
fact that corporations have often used deception and made dubious claims about their 
own socially responsible practices (Laufer 2003). In response to “greenwashing” and 
deceptive practices, movements have sought to build these systems of monitoring and 
verification into their standards. These external third-party assessments about a 
producer’s practices (and their claims about those practices) promote greater legitimacy 
and incentivize compliance by increasing transparency in a producer’s practices.  
 The degree that advocates could incorporate auditing and monitoring into their 




contexts are shaped by both national and institutional structures, and are a source of 
contention for some actors seeking to promote further change. 
 Karl described an SRI conference that brought together various stakeholders 
within the field. Some SRI advocates and institutional investors expressed concern about 
whether or not company practices matched up with their claims. As noted in chapter 
three, socially responsible investors’ social ratings of companies is largely dependent on 
information provided by the companies themselves. This included data reported to the 
SEC, published in their CSR and sustainability reports, or provided to other reporting 
agencies and public statements. Given this form of voluntary reporting, in which 
companies have a high incentive to paint themselves in a positive light (especially when 
social movements have exposed negative corporate practices), advocates and investors 
wanted more transparency in their reporting and accountability in their practices. They 
proposed on-the-ground monitoring systems that would be able to independently monitor, 
audit, and verify company practices regarding their social and environmental practices. 
As an organization that provides social ratings data and socially responsible mutual 
funds, Corporate Responsibility Researchers had this reaction: 
The general response was what do you want us to do about it? We don’t have 
enough money or infrastructure to do anything about it. I mean, yeah it would be 
nice if we had a monitoring infrastructure you know, on the ground wherever that 
is around the world.  But you know it’s simply not gonna happen. Who is gonna 
do it? Where is the money gonna come from?  Imagine the massive bureaucracy 
you’d have to create just to—[it is] simply a question of how do you do it?  And 




At Corporate Responsibility Researchers, they perceived this proposal to be highly 
unrealistic because it would require large resources and organizational capacity that 
simply did not exist in the field of SRI. Based on how SRI evaluates companies—which 
is to rely on unaudited self-reported data and to evaluate large numbers of companies 
across all industries—advocates lacked the capacity for requiring and implementing any 
type of monitoring or verification system. 
 Yet, there are already systems in place where such infrastructure and monitoring 
practices exist. These systems are at the heart of all third-party social certification 
systems. Certifiers including Eco Certified, Justice Certifiers, and Ethical Sourcing all 
have on-the-ground monitoring and auditing systems to evaluate producer practices and 
compliance with their criteria. It is inherently tied to the standards themselves, and such 
monitoring practices are not independent of the standard-setting process either. Indeed, 
they are intricately connected whereby standards are constructed only to the degree that 
they are verifiable and auditable. 
 Part of what enabled such a system, however, was certifiers’ focuses on specific 
industries and sectors. While SRI adopted a blanket approach, whereby they evaluated all 
industries (like conventional investing) from the beginning, certifiers have constructed 
standard setting and verification systems one industry at a time. This has enabled them to 
develop the specific organizational, technical, and professional expertise necessary to 
monitor and implement their standards. This institution-building project (Bartley 2007a) 




While the fields largely differed in how they monitored and verified company 
practices on the ground, there was some national variation in the auditing of corporate 
claims for social responsibility: 
Speaking of verification, this is a benchmark that we also did look at; whether 
companies actually subject themselves to third-party auditing, to external 
verification, and very few companies actually do in the states. Very, very few. 
Very few companies subject their annual reports or their CSR reports to third 
party auditing. A lot of Japanese companies do. In fact it’s a big section in many 
Japanese public reports; there’s a whole section on how that report was factually 
verified by an external third party auditor. If we saw that, then we would—that 
was a benchmark that we had—then we would record that, but mostly we didn’t 
have, but Corporate Responsibility Researchers, we certainly didn’t have a third-
party auditor, and most American companies don’t subject their own 
documentation, I don’t think, to that.  (Karl, Corporate Responsibility 
Researchers) 
In this case, while third-party auditing was nearly nonexistent with US companies, it was 
very common in the Japanese context. This national variation enabled some higher level 
of independent auditing to provide external validation and legitimacy for their claims of 
socially responsible practices. With this information, it enabled socially responsible 
investors to evaluate different companies regarding their social responsibility reports and 
made possible these definitions of social responsibility within SRI. However, some critics 




more on technical aspects of auditing requirements than the production of credible proof 
(Power 1997).  
 In sum, for independent auditing and the evaluation of data on social and 
environmental performance, organizational and institutional practices converge in unique 
ways to enable and constrain specific demands of, and criteria for, socially responsible 
practices. For many movement activists, they expect that socially responsible companies 
have transparent business practices that are verified by independent third parties. This has 
always been a fundamental dimension to social certifications, which are built on a 
network of organizations that monitor, audit, and enforce social and environmental 
standards. In SRI, many markets lack the capacity for this due to insufficient 
organizational infrastructure and resources in countries where it is not normative to have 
reporting verified, and reporting on social and environmental performance is voluntary 
and uneven. However, in national contexts where external auditing has been normative, 
there is organizational infrastructure for these criteria to be integrated into social 
standards. Such reporting does not go as far as social certifications (in terms of on the 
ground monitoring), but it nonetheless signals a more complex approach to auditing and 
verification than has been implemented in the US context or emphasized in exiting 




 When we look across fields, there are further institutional factors that shape 
standard-setting processes for social and environmental responsibility. Within each field, 




specific goals and outcomes. They prioritize actions, influence how actors evaluate 
competing meanings and decisions, and shape how they collectively select among the 
alternatives for social and environmental standards. When comparing SRI and social 
certifications, these institutional contexts ultimately lead organizational actors down 
divergent paths as they engage with companies and construct their social and 
environmental standards. 
 Compared to social certifications, advocates in SRI have a much more 
constraining set of institutional priorities in which they must navigate. For example, 
consider Responsible Economy, an organization that promotes socially responsible 
consumption. Responsible Economy works with many businesses (especially small 
businesses) selling socially certified products to help them develop their businesses. 
However, they also partner with SRI organizations, and I spoke with Natalie who had 
knowledge of both certifications and SRI: 
I feel like outside of investing—there’s a little bit—I feel like groups that work on 
sustainability or responsibility issues are a little bit … less forgiving. Just because 
a company donates money to a charity or donates to an educational project does 
not make it responsible. I think we’re a lot more focused on hard issues that 
pertain to companies’ actual workings. So I think that that’s the main difference. 
That’s not to say that socially responsible funds don’t look at any of that stuff, but 
sometimes it’s not enough to keep a company off of a responsible fund … I think 
that we have the pleasure of taking it, the most objective stance possible, and 




For Natalie, SRI has lower standards and is more “forgiving” for poor social 
performance. She noted that her organization can be more “objective” than advocates 
working in SRI. When I asked her what she meant by this “objectivity,” she stated 
I think maybe objectivity in this case would be tantamount to being as critical as 
we feel like we need to be for a company to make good on its commitment to its 
workers, to the community, to the environment. (Natalie, Responsible Economy) 
While Natalie over-simplified the types of criteria that socially responsible investors use 
to evaluate companies, she held a common view within the social responsibility 
movement that is critical of the types of practices that allow a company to meet investors’ 
standards for social and environmental responsibility. She felt that, within her field, she 
was able to be more critical and develop more rigorous standards than socially 
responsible investors. 
The objective therefore, is to understand, what mechanism enables and constrains 
this ability to be more “objective.” Of course, power relations, market scale strategies, 
and other mechanisms identified above play a role in shaping this perceived objectivity. 
However, layered on top of these factors is an institutional context that shapes the 
standard-setting process in other important ways. As a representative of the Association 
for Socially Responsible Investment (and a partner with Responsible Economy) stated: 
I think part of what Responsible Economy is pushing … is a full-scale change in 
the way that corporations behave and the way that consumers behave and their 
consumption patterns. So because they’re dealing with consumers, they’ve got a 
lot of leverage that we as an SRI industry don’t have … They can put their money 




to put their money, whereas investing is much more narrow and limited, and on 
top of trying to make social and environmental [and] governance changes, 
investors have a duty to make money for those people whose money they’re 
managing … So I think that, by the different nature of the investment world 
versus the consumer marketplace world, there are real differences … and 
organizations like [consumer-oriented organizations] that use similar tactics have 
much more flexibility than you do in the investment world, because there’s so 
many things that investors have to comply with that just restrict their ability. 
(Kristen, Association of Socially Responsible Investment) 
Kristen stated that SRI is “much more narrow and limited” because of their “duty to 
make money for those people whose money they’re managing.” As noted in chapter 
three, this duty refers to the notion of fiduciary responsibility, or the laws that require 
fund managers and money managers of all funds (including SRI funds) to prioritize the 
financial interests of the investor. Henry (Corporate Responsibility Researchers) stated 
that “If you don’t comply with your fiduciary responsibilities, then you’d get thrown in 
jail … The law is a big player when it comes to investment.” Unlike social certifiers and 
other advocates of socially responsible consumption, SRI must consider these laws that 
regulate the institution and guide its priorities. 
 The institution of investing, however, is more than just formal laws and 
regulations. As David (Responsible Investment Initiative) described it, “there are all 
kinds of cultural barriers that I think are very important but they are also incentive 
structures.” To promote SRI, advocates must interact with conventional investment 




in business schools and through professional licensing examinations to focus exclusively 
on financial criteria when evaluating companies and making investments. They follow 
principles of investment, including portfolio diversification, that promote favorable 
evaluation across industries with poor social and environmental performance. In addition, 
incentive systems are structured within the institution to make as much profits (especially 
short-term profits) as possible, regardless of the social or environmental costs (although it 
is normally expected that they must stay within the law). These institutional actors play a 
central role for SRI advocates, with whom they must continuously interact and navigate 
in pursuing their own objectives.  
 One of the ways that the institution shapes these interactions is in struggles over 
passing shareholder resolutions. Jeremy described attempts by investors to pass 
shareholder resolutions at Exxon, but how the company has largely been able to deflect 
these challenges by drawing upon their institutional resources: 
The challenge that those guys [SRI advocates] have is that industry knows how to 
respond to that. There’s a routinized system. You put a question before the 
shareholders [and] you got a very tough set of rules that you gotta’ go by, and 
they know how to deflect it. So, the best you’re gonna’ get is that you get three or 
six or whatever percentage vote of the shareholders … and you’re not gonna’ get 
them um to vote for something that sends some sort of signal. So in a sense if you 
actually get six percent—okay say you sent a signal, but that’s happened a couple 





The “very tough set of rules” includes SEC regulations that allow management to omit or 
restrict certain types of shareholder proposals (A. O’Rourke 2003). While the institution 
is not without its own contradictions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2003) that can be 
leveraged by movement actors (see chapter three), it has more “routinized systems” (i.e. 
institutional constraints) in place where actors heavily endowed with capital within the 
field can use it to respond to, and thwart, efforts at change. Such actors can draw on their 
social capital to mobilize shareholders against a proposal and their cultural capital (e.g. as 
successful businessmen) to reframe social performance as irrelevant for the company’s 
financial gains. Accordingly, the overall structure and culture of the institution 
continuously orients actors toward the financial criteria, and mediates the alternative 
framing of SRI investors and their advocates. In the example above, it constrains SRI 
advocates’ ability to identify and promote particular socially responsible practices when 
drafting shareholder resolutions. While they may desire higher standards, the institutional 
structure, alters their desired standards and reduces them to lower, institutionally-
compatible expectations for corporate practices. 
The institutional constraints have additional effects on the social ratings within 
SRI. Specifically, they shape where standards for social responsibility can be set in order 
to meet the demands and priorities of the institution. For example, consider Jennifer’s 
attempt to make a rigorously benchmarked fund and how it shaped her perceptions of 
social ratings: 
When I first started at Corporate Responsibility Researchers, I was like I am 
going to make the perfect fund … I’m gonna be the bad guy and see if there’s any 




human rights is important, I think environment is important, animal testing—and I 
had zero tolerance on all those things. And you know, I had like five companies 
[laughs]. So clearly you can’t be as restrictive as you would like to be in an ideal 
world; it’s impossible to do that. (Jennifer, Corporate Responsibility Researchers) 
The importance of this cannot be underestimated because it is in these moments that 
shape how actors construct what is actually considered a social problem, how they 
differentiate between the real and the ideal world, and what social changes are considered 
possible and impossible. As Jennifer sought to use SRI to produce a really socially 
responsible fund—the “perfect fund,” she came to the conclusion that there was not 
enough companies that lived up to her values. At that point, Jennifer could have gone in 
one of two directions. First, she might have concluded that there simply are not many 
truly responsible corporations out there. She could have criticized the social ratings 
systems as being too weak and not recognized companies that pass with such low scores. 
Jennifer might have decided to focus on shareholder resolutions, or given up on SRI and 
promoted more socially responsible practices through other means, maybe joining the 
social certification movement.  
Indeed, some of my respondents that worked outside of SRI saw these types of 
social ratings as too “watered down.” For example, Natalie (Responsible Economy) said 
“In investing, CSR is a little bit different what I’m looking for, and so a lot of times, I 
feel like, it’s a lot more watered down than what we’re looking for.” Jessica’s experiment 
could have led her in that direction. But instead, she took a second path. She lowered her 
expectations and considered that kind of evaluation impossible and idealistic. This is one 




irrational, or inefficient” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2007). In this case, Jennifer’s sense 
of reality was adapted to fit the needs and priorities of the institution, of financially-
motivated investors. From her perspective within the institution, and its need to produce 
diverse and profitable portfolios that meet their fiduciary responsibility, such rigorous 
standards seemed unthinkable. It serves as an example of how an institution can mold 
how actors perceive competing cultural frameworks, assigning some alternative meanings 
as irrational, and thus constituting a sense of reality. 
 But as Kristen discussed above, consumer organizations like social certifications 
have “much more flexibility” than investors do. They operate independently of the 
institutional restrictions of SRI. Without the laws of fiduciary responsibility, SEC 
regulations, principles of portfolio diversification, and educational/training systems that 
shape the standard-setting process in a largely conservative manner (i.e. they reproduce 
the status quo rather than more significant change), standard-setting processes in social 
certifications function with fewer institutional constraints. As Natalie put it, they can be 
more “objective” and “critical.”  
 Of course, this is not to say that social certifications are a neutral field or that 
certain priorities and practices have not been institutionalized. As I showed above, both 
SRI and social certifications are subject to market logics and asymmetrical power 
relations that often heavily favor producers (especially when large corporate producers 
are involved) and support for existing practices. The data does, however, emphasize the 
very different institutional trajectories that characterize the two fields. Within SRI, 
advocates have entered a field that has long been institutionalized and has fairly well 




institution (Bartley 2007a). As an institution, it is comparatively less dependent on (or 
almost entirely independent of) governmental regulation, and is not embedded within the 
same systems of education and training. To the degree that it has been institutionalized 
(e.g. through organizations like the Global Certification Coalition), standard-setting is 
facilitated by best practices within the field, such as multi-stakeholder involvement, 
emphasis on transparency and openness, and cross-certification learning. Such 
institutionalization is more enabling than constraining within standard-setting and 




 This chapter examined patterns in processes of engagement and mechanisms 
within standard-setting that shape the construction of private standards within the social 
responsibility movement. By building upon chapters three and four that individually 
examined cases within SRI and social certifications respectively, I looked across all five 
cases in my study to understand both the interactional context and higher-order 
mechanisms that shape the standard-setting process. After identifying some patterns in 
how the relational and interactional field is structured, I focused on the conditions that 
alter standard-setting in unique and identifiable patterns across the cases. First, I 
discussed how power relations structure standard-setting processes, demonstrating the 
fragile relationships that movement actors navigate to maintain engagement with 
voluntarily participating companies, and how they leverage outsider campaigns to 
increase their symbolic capital in negotiating standards. Second, I show that while 




shaped by different cultural contexts. Third, I illustrated how movement actors’ ability to 
draw on scientific discourses can serve as an additional resource in promoting strong 
environmental standards, but not social (e.g. labor) standards, which tend to be low 
compared to other criteria. Fourth, market scale strategies dramatically shape how high 
(or low) of a bar gets set for social and environmental standards, with standards aimed at 
corporate producers being set much lower. Fifth, the organizational infrastructure within 
social certifications and some national SRI contexts enabled standards for auditability 
and monitoring in some cases, while constraining it in others. Finally, institutional 
contexts, including formal laws and regulations, and informal norms and practices, 




Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
In the last several decades, there has been an explosion in the discourse around 
social responsibility and what constitutes a socially responsible business. This has been 
driven by social movement organizations seeking to regulate global corporations, and has 
proliferated in the new strategies used to develop standards for socially responsible 
practices. In promoting this agenda, virtually every organized labor group and every 
environmental or human rights NGO that works with business today has made some type 
of demand for business to adopt such practices. And in response, at least every major US 
corporation today makes some kind of claim—even if it is more rhetoric than reality—
that they are a socially responsible member of society. These claims of social 
responsibility vary so wildly that it can be hard to differentiate between them or make 
sense of what it all means. 
 For instance, consider Nike, the iconic apparel manufacturer that was discussed at 
the beginning of chapter one. After years of struggle with Nike in the late 1980s and 
1990s, the company eventually relented to movement pressure. By the early 2000s, Nike 
finally began engaging with stakeholders to develop social responsibility standards and 
adopt such practices. As a result of Nike’s new commitments, they were able to meet and 
pass the minimum standards established by the Fair Labor Association (FLA) 
(MacDonald 2011). While they had been ejected from the Domini Social Index and other 
social ratings in the late 1990s, Nike’s new practices allowed it to later pass their social 
ratings. As of this writing, Nike passed the vast majority of SRI ratings (including the 




portfolios. According to these standards, Nike has emerged as a socially responsible 
company and a corporate leader within the apparel industry.  
At the same time, the anti-sweatshop movement continues to be highly critical of 
Nike’s business practices. Many in the movement see the Fair Labor Association (FLA), 
which is not a social certification but rather a mechanism for evaluating “the presence of 
systems and procedures required for successfully upholding fair labor standards,” as 
having too weak of standards. For example, United Students Against Sweatshops has 
started a group called FLA Watch to monitor the organization and argues “the 
organization has demonstrated itself over the years to be nothing more than a public 
relations mouthpiece for the apparel industry” (FLA Watch n.d.). As recently as 2008, 
human trafficking was found in Nike factories and activists have documented continued 
worker abuses with Nike workers (Associated Press 2008). No Nike products are likely to 
be certified by Justice Certifiers, which recently developed a social certification for 
garments and apparel. From these perspectives, Nike is clearly not a socially responsible 
corporation.  
The dilemma of how Nike could meet certain standards for socially responsible 
practices, but yet fail other standards with such heavy criticism, is a central theme in 
understanding the field of social responsibility. To determine whether Nike truly meets 
standards for a socially responsible business or if they produce socially responsible 
products, we must look at the standards themselves, and how they were constructed. This 
research has shed much light on the processes through which these standards are built 




responsibility and its potential as a site for regulating business in our era of global 
capitalism. 
First, this study helps us understand what it means for companies (such as Nike) 
to be identified as a socially responsible company (or not), and to differentiate between 
claims, within the fields of SRI and social certification. For example, for Nike to pass 
Corporate Indexing’s social rating, they were first evaluated based on five broad issue 
areas: labor/workplace, human rights, community relations, the environment, and 
governance. Each issue area consisted of multiple indicators, using data about company 
programs and practices, and collected mostly from company self-reports rather than 
audits of independently verified practices. The available data was then aggregated on a 
scale and Nike earned a total score for each area. Nike was then plotted with all the other 
companies in their sector (manufacturing and apparel) and the scale was normalized. It 
was very intriguing to find that for any given industry, the threshold was arbitrarily set so 
that approximately the bottom thirty-five percent of the companies in their industry 
would not pass the rating. For Corporate Indexing to proclaim Nike a socially responsible 
company, which passed their rating, means that they were among the top sixty-five 
percent of the largest corporations (which excludes smaller producers). While Nike was 
not involved in Justice Certifiers’ certification system, if they were, their products would 
have needed to meet more strict standards and undergone independent monitoring to 
verify their practices were actually compliant. Furthermore, the standards would have 
been approved by an even broader set of stakeholders, even if some dissenting voices (i.e. 




Second, this study can shed light on the role of cultural ideas in challenging or 
reproducing capitalism. When beginning this research, I largely viewed the social 
responsibility movement from a Gramscian point of view. Cultural ideas—like the social 
ratings that deemed Nike socially responsible—were used to create a new moral vision 
for corporations that legitimate and uphold their dominant position within society. These 
standards, which guarantee most corporations are considered socially responsible ipso 
facto, do not change the structure of capitalism (Brown and Gertz 2008) and actually 
serve the ideological function of reproducing its relations of domination (Gramsci 1971; 
Manokha 2006). I began to see that my respondents viewed capitalism as both inevitable 
and simultaneously a socially responsible system; it was “common sense” among those 
involved within the social responsibility movement (Gramsci 1971). However, it became 
clear that, for at least some of my respondents, their perceptions of capitalism and their 
strategies in using the market to promote counter-hegemonic ideas was more nuanced 
than this.  
 Third, by identifying the mechanisms that shape standard-setting processes, this 
research has built knowledge about the opportunities and constraints in promoting 
socially responsible business practices through SRI and social certifications. For 
example, my findings presented earlier revealed many constraining mechanisms that 
movement actors face in developing more strict standards for social and environmental 
responsibility. However, these sites were not entirely dominated by corporations and 
imbued with hegemonic ideas, but allowed for certain opportunities in which movements 
could leverage the market to promote alternative arrangements that benefitted workers, 




I link my findings to these broader themes throughout the remainder of this 
chapter. In the next section, I return to my original research questions to summarize my 
findings and show how my findings can inform these issues. I then discuss the main 
contributions of this study for understanding the field of social responsibility and 
theorizing social movements. Because the findings also have important implications for 
globalization, I situate these findings in discussions about global culture, power, and 
global governance. 
 
Constructing Private Social Responsibility Standards 
 
This dissertation has raised several important questions. First, how are standards 
for social responsibility constructed? Second, what field-level conditions shape the 
standard-setting process? Third, how are standards embedded within processes of 
engagement? Fourth, what do these practices and the construction of these standards tell 
us about the organization of power between corporations and the movements seeking to 
regulate them? In this section, I will summarize my findings to address the first three 
questions. In the following sections, I will extend these findings and discuss the final 
question, while addressing larger theoretical and substantive issues related to the social 
responsibility movement and the regulation of global capitalism. 
 
Standards and Engagement 
 
 While investigating how movement advocates developed social responsibility 




standards were embedded. Positions within each field are linked relationally and the 
strategies advocates used to mobilize investors or consumers and engage companies 
reveals how they are positioned and respond to one another (Emirbayer and Johnson 
2008). Engagements with companies were particularly fundamental because it was 
through these strategic engagements that social movement actors sought to get the buy-in 
from participating businesses and translate standards into actual practices. In this section, 
I briefly summarize how standards are embedded within these processes of engagement. 
While they are deeply connected to the standard-setting process and mechanisms that 
shape its outcomes discussed in the next section, I present it separately here for analytical 
purposes and clarity. 
 In SRI, movement actors worked to engage companies with standards through 
shareholder resolutions, social ratings, and multi-stakeholder dialogues. In each case, 
they attempted to link social and environmental factors to financial performance to 
reconstruct institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). In shareholder resolutions, 
this meant that socially responsible investors identified specific social and environmental 
practices that they request or recommend that a company adopts to mitigate their risk. 
Shareholder resolutions are generally used when other attempts to engage a company has 
failed. They become a public means that can draw negative attention to a company, and 
use institutional channels to force some level of dialogue (A. O’Rourke 2003). For many 
socially responsible investors, the value in shareholder resolutions is less about the 
specific request in the resolution than about developing a dialogue with the company 




engaging companies on a broader array of socially responsible practices that they identify 
and develop through social interaction. 
 Through social screening, the standards also became a lever for engagement. For 
example, Corporate Indexing used their social rating to publicize when a company moved 
from pass to fail on a social rating. They found that some previously unengaged 
companies would then be willing to enter into dialogue with them. Adam and Shavit 
(2008: 899) argued that “when all firms are publicly ranked according to SRI index 
parameters, such indices can indeed create a market incentive for increased investment by 
firms in improving their performance in the area of social responsibility.” While they 
based this relationship on a mathematical model, other empirical studies have showed 
how these engagements can be a pathway for communicating social and environmental 
standards to companies and an attempt to “discipline” corporations into adhering to 
industry norms (Chatterji and Toffel 2010; Slager 2010). 
 In the social certifications discussed in this research (and in multi-stakeholder 
dialogues within SRI), engagement occurs throughout the standard-setting process. In 
these cases, participating businesses are central actors in developing standards, and the 
standards could not exist without their participation. The engagement is meant to get 
producers invested in the process and facilitate the development of “feasible” or 
“realistic” standards that socially responsible companies are able to meet. While the 
standards must be set in a way that they do not make it impossible to meet the standards, 
the certification network actively seeks to develop strict standards that will achieve the 
best outcome in regards to their issues of interest. They draw upon scientific experts and 




standards, public consultations, and field-testing in preparation for a final set of 
standards. Once standards are adopted, certified companies must agree to audits that 
facilitate continued engagement over time.  
 Furthermore, as discussed in chapter five, these engagements share several 
similarities in relationship to standard-setting. For example, while they depend on 
confrontational outsider strategies to motivate company engagement (discussed below), 
they are cooperative processes in which advocates work constructively with companies. 
They are at least partial insiders whose interests align, to some degree, when setting and 
promoting social and environmental standards. They also draw upon, and interact 
through, a diverse set of stakeholders that shape the standards and company practices. 
Given this context, movement advocates maximize the level of engagement with 
companies and the legitimacy of social standards that they develop (Bernstein 2011; 
Conroy 2007). 
It is also important to note that throughout the engagement, participants have the 
opportunity to shape each other and the process itself; influence is multi-directional.  So 
while movement advocates strive to develop rigorous standards with a high bar, 
businesses have incentives to change as little as possible and influence the process in 
ways that benefit themselves. For example, corporations may attempt to coopt 
movements to serve their own agenda (Jaffee 2010). Like we have seen in cases 
throughout SRI and social certifications, they are likely to promote weaker standards 
(Jaffee and Howard 2010). Each weakening of the standard, whether it is done to attract 
larger corporate producers or to achieve some more seemingly feasible set of criteria, 




corporations appear to be socially responsible and moral actors, thus legitimating their 
dominant position (Gramsci 1971).  
By examining how my respondents interpreted this interactional context and 
adopted strategies within it, I explored not only how movement actors shaped business 
practices through engagement, but how they themselves were influenced by businesses 
promoting their own agenda. In many cases (e.g. Corporate Responsibility Researchers, 
Corporate Indexing, Eco Certified), my respondents significantly altered their beliefs 
about business and their standards after engaging with companies. They greatly admired 
companies that engaged with them and viewed them as exemplary of a form of capitalism 
that was genuinely more socially responsible. They echoed the need for “realistic” and 
“feasible” standards used by their business partners and promoted standards that other 
respondents viewed as too diluted. Consider Jessica who, like some other respondents, 
was highly critical of corporations when entering the field of SRI but, after determining 
that her “perfect” socially responsible fund was impossible to construct, she ultimately 
abandoned her critical edge. She lowered her expectations to fit existing corporate 
practices and the needs of the institution; she viewed the existing system as a natural, 
even common sensical way of organizing the world. In short, the field of social 
responsibility provides capitalism with moral leadership and helps promote capitalism as 
a hegemonic form (Manokha 2006). 
Some other respondents held more firmly to their expectations of business, but 
interpreted these engagements as a long-term strategy for change. For example, two of 
my respondents that were fully ingrained within SRI self-identified as socialists and were 




limitations with SRI, but emphasized the opportunities it provided to engage corporations 
in new ways and make incremental changes at a time when they believed that other 
political opportunities for broader social change did not exist. Many of my respondents 
who worked in the field of social certification, especially those who worked with Justice 
Certifiers and others that did not work with corporations, promoted alternative forms of 
business such as cooperatives and worker-owned small businesses. They were changed 
less by the engagement process, but interpreted it as an imperfect but necessary strategy 
in promoting long-term change. They can be interpreted as struggling against cooptation 
in a counter-hegemonic war of position for broader structural change (Gramsci 1971; 
Jaffee and Howard 2010). 
These engagements emphasize the importance of the interactional context for 
developing social responsibility standards. They are essential to understanding how 
actors perceived power, their taken-for-granted assumptions about social institutions and 
change, and how they believed that they could affect the most social change given the 
structure of political and cultural opportunities. The standards themselves are embedded 
within these interactions between relationally situated actors. The ultimate outcome is a 
politically-mediated set of standards that is further shaped by the mechanisms discussed 
in the next section (Bartley 2007a). 
 
Constructing and Shaping Standards 
 
 The interactional context, within which movement actors engage business with 
social standards, is only one dimension of the standard-setting process. I will now 




broadly and what field-level mechanisms shaped the process, which are linked to broader 
theoretical and substantive issues within the social responsibility movement.  
In SRI, advocates develop piecemeal standards through shareholder resolutions 
and broad sets of standards through social ratings. In shareholder resolutions specifically, 
socially responsible investors identify specific practices that they request or recommend 
that management take. Under SEC guidelines, anyone who owns $2,000 US (or 1%) of a 
company’s stock for at least one year qualifies to file a shareholder resolution (A. 
O’Rourke 2003), and my respondents discussed social ratings agencies, mutual fund 
producers, NGOs, and institutional investors that initiated shareholder resolutions. The 
issues proposed in the resolutions cover the entire range of concerns expressed within the 
social responsibility movement, from human rights to labor and environment (Monks et 
al 2004; Proffitt and Spcier 2006). Each proposal, however, identifies very specific 
practices (e.g. publishing a sustainability report, disclosing campaign contributions, 
limiting executive compensation) within these broad issue areas. They frame the social or 
environmental practice in financial terms to reconstruct the institutional logic and appeal 
to mainstream investors. Their sponsors seek to get as many co-signers as possible for the 
proposal and thus consider potential co-signers and their audience when identifying 
practices within the proposal.  
 The SRI cases I examined also developed standards for social ratings used in 
socially responsible mutual funds. These social ratings agencies identified issue areas and 
criteria from their network of partners, clients, and the broader field. Some ratings (and 
mutual funds) were unique to particular ideologies (e.g. religiously based funds), but I 




important (e.g. climate change) or less important (e.g. ending apartheid in South Africa), 
the issue areas and criteria within social ratings changed with these trends. As 
competitors developed new criteria, social ratings agencies were likely to develop similar 
benchmarks to keep pace, and strive to stay at the cutting edge of emergent issues. They 
identified these new issues by working with NGOs and through interactions with other 
agencies, clients, and industry-level associations and research institutions.  
Once they have an issue area of concern, the subsequent phases of the standard-
setting process are very similar to sociological research. The social ratings agency 
operationalizes each issue by identifying specific criteria to measure the issue and 
combine multiple criteria into scales or indices. Next they collect data on every company 
for those particular criteria. However, developing standards for these issue areas was 
dependent on their ability to operationalize and systematically collect this data (Chatterji 
and Levine 2006). This ability to collect data and measure specific aspects of socially 
responsible practices functioned as the socio-technical infrastructure for social ratings 
systems and mediated what types of criteria could or could not be integrated within their 
standards. If sufficient data was not available across the universe of companies, that 
particular issue or criteria was excluded from the ratings. Data availability also varied, to 
some degree, across national contexts and was shaped by public issues in these unique 
cultural contexts.    
 The most interesting part of the standard-setting process within social ratings 
agencies was how they developed thresholds for socially responsible practices. At 
Corporate Indexing, they took each of five scales across issue areas and normalized 




threshold that excluded a certain percentage of companies that was one or two standard 
deviations below the mean. This ensured that a total of thirty-five percent of firms failed 
the social ratings ipso facto. This strategy was meant to promote “best-in-class” investing 
whereby they excluded the poorly performing companies and invested in the top two-
thirds of firms. However, it also meant that if poor social performance (e.g. poor labor 
practices) was the norm in an industry (e.g. apparel), then those companies could still be 
considered socially responsible. Furthermore, other ratings (e.g. Corporate Responsibility 
Researchers) sought to exclude as little as five to ten percent of companies, thereby 
defining more companies as being socially responsible.  
 Beyond the socio-technical infrastructure of data and measurability, there were 
several other field-level mechanisms that shaped social responsibility standards within 
SRI. While movement actors sought broader criteria and more rigorous thresholds, these 
mechanisms altered their expectations in similar ways across cases and ultimately shaped 
how those demands were encoded within the standards themselves. First, power relations 
shaped the standard-setting process in several ways. While I discuss this issue in detail in 
the following sections, an effect of power was that social ratings agencies low in 
economic resources and dependent on corporations for data required that they take the 
data at face-value and engage companies on friendly terms to acquire additional 
information. Another instance of power illustrated how SRI activists self-censored their 
demands in multi-stakeholder dialogues and led them to look the other way when 
companies violated the principles to which they committed.  
Second, financial concerns and investment principles constrained demands for 




market-oriented investors tended to have lower standards, and principles of portfolio 
diversification prevented strict standards that might exclude entire sectors or investing in 
countries where companies help prop up regimes that systematically violated human 
rights. Third, socially responsible investors had to continuously work with investment 
professionals trained in conventional business programs and operating with traditional 
financial incentives, thereby excluding criteria that could not be linked convincingly to 
financial outcomes. By trying to transform the institution of investing, SRI advocates had 
to struggle endlessly to link social responsibility to the accepted methods of financial 
analysis central to conventional investing, which was often difficult for a field that cannot 
easily quantify and monetize social criteria. Finally, formal investing laws and 
regulations added an additional institutional layer that constrained social responsibility 
standards. For example, management was able to exclude many SRI-related shareholder 
resolutions because they did not meet SEC regulations. Social ratings agencies avoided 
rigorous standards that might prevent them from meeting their legally mandated fiduciary 
responsibility. All these mechanisms mediated how socially responsible investors 
constructed standards in shareholder resolutions and social ratings. 
 I also examined standard-setting within three social certification cases. Based on 
their membership in the Global Certification Coalition and the GCC’s principles for best 
practices, the social certifications each adopted similar processes in developing their 
standards. Preliminary standards were developed through multi-stakeholder dialogues 
that included members from NGOs, large and/or small businesses, the certifier, academia, 
and sometimes government. Certifiers took care to enlist representatives from different 




across the relevant issue areas. Through these processes, they identified specific criteria 
that could be audited and established thresholds for socially responsible practices. A 
preliminary set of global standards was then developed and made available for public 
consultation for a specified period of time. The thousands of comments that were 
generated were then reviewed for support or criticism of the criteria and analyzed by 
stakeholder group (e.g. NGO, industry, government, etc). If the certifier did not receive 
what they considered to be sufficient stakeholder balance or support, then they would 
work through multiple rounds of public consultations to attract broader participation and 
consensus in developing the standards (although not all stakeholders were evaluated 
equally, as demonstrated by high business involvement and often low labor 
participation). The standard would then go into a pilot phase where it would be tested in a 
limited number of locations before being fully implemented. 
 Throughout this process, my respondents discussed the need to develop feasible 
standards, but several mechanisms shaped what they considered to be realistic standards 
and how that translated into the final standards to be implemented. First, power relations 
shaped this process in several ways. For example, certifiers relied on voluntary company 
participation, which meant that they could not push companies too hard on standards or 
they risked company exit. Instead, certifiers and NGOs had to rely on their cultural 
capital and external pressure, while mobilizing consumers and other businesses (Conroy 
2007) to develop the markets for their socially responsible products. I will address the 
role of power relations more fully in the following sections. A second and related 
mechanism that shaped standard-setting was the market scale strategies adopted by the 




change, with some certifiers believing they needed high standards even if that meant 
working with fewer producers and niche markets. Other certifiers argued that working 
with big corporations who controlled large percentages of their markets, and which could 
increase the visibility of certified products, would lead to the most change. Certifiers 
adopting this latter approach worked with corporations that needed high volumes which 
were more difficult to meet in the long process of certifying farms and other producers. 
Change in these corporations also required massive resources which may not give them 
the return on their investment, thus creating a disincentive for wide-scale change, and 
resulted in more piecemeal efforts. Furthermore, they have much greater economic 
capital and were able to pit one certifier against the other, giving them more power to 
negotiate lower standards, relative to certifiers with smaller market strategies. So even 
though these actors preferred higher thresholds, larger market scale strategies clearly led 
to lower thresholds in the standards. 
 Several other field-level mechanisms further shaped standards within social 
certifications. For example, certifiers operated with a conscious understanding of 
competing certifiers within the field. On the one hand, given the highly competitive 
market they were operating in, they sought to differentiate their standards by establishing 
unique criteria for their brand. On the other hand, as new issues emerged like in SRI, they 
also worked to keep up with the competition. This led to some isomorphism across 
standards to include common types of criteria (e.g. workplace and labor standards, 
environment, human rights, etc). Given that different commodities also have very unique 
production processes within global supply chains (Gereffi et al 2005; Gereffi 2012), there 




given context. In the case of Ethical Sourcing, they found that handmade carpets are 
produced in such a way that forced them to exclude certain ILO conventions, such as the 
regular provision of work. Finally, while certifiers promoted universal principles, cultural 
differences shaped how a global standard could be developed for local contexts. For 
example, criteria for racial discrimination varied with how race was conceptualized in 
different cultures, reflecting how some criteria may have to be defined differently or 
excluded altogether. 
 In addition to the power relations, market scale strategies, and cultural contexts, 
there were several other mechanisms that operated across both SRI and social 
certification fields and were important forces shaping private standard-setting processes 
more generally. For example, movement actors’ ability to draw on scientific discourses 
enabled an additional cultural resource in developing standards. This particularly enabled 
stronger environmental standards while constraining social standards, which were harder 
to link to scientific legitimacy or financial performance. The organizational infrastructure 
of monitoring and evaluation in different fields and countries also shaped auditing 
standards. Most importantly, institutional contexts shaped standard-setting. While 
institutional practices associated with the Global Certification Coalition strengthened 
multi-stakeholder dialogue and enabled broader participation within social certifications, 
SRI was largely constrained by existing institutional contexts. For example, formal laws 
of fiduciary responsibility, SEC regulations, and the training and incentives of 
mainstream investment professionals, all constrained socially responsible investors in 
how they developed and framed social responsibility standards, consistently pushing the 




 These processes of engagement and mechanisms expose a variety of opportunities 
and constraints in the fields of SRI and social certification. On the one hand, they have 
functioned as additional pathways for promoting more socially responsible business 
practices. Movement actors can leverage these opportunities when their cultural capital 
relative to corporations or industries is relatively high, when they can translate social or 
environmental criteria to financial performance, or when they can draw upon scientific 
discourses to legitimate their criteria. They can increase their organizational capacity by 
developing coalitions with other groups (including participants in local contexts) and 
developing infrastructure for monitoring and enforcement. 
On the other hand, there are many constraints that force investors and certifiers to 
exclude particular criteria or to accept a lower thresholds for social responsibility. These 
include the lack of social and environmental data, a dependency on voluntary company 
participation, certain institutional laws and practices, powerful corporate involvement in 
standard-setting, and differences across local cultures and production processes. 
Movement actors that understand these power dynamics and cultural rules of their 
particular field, and can maximize the opportunities available to them, will be more 
effective advocates for social responsibility. 
  
Theorizing the Social Responsibility Movement 
 
The research findings summarized above have many important theoretical and 
substantive implications for the study of social movements in general and the social 
responsibility movement in particular. I discuss these issues below by first focusing on 




discourse that has emerged in recent decades. Next, I discuss how implication of my 
findings for our conception of social movements and theorizing insider and outsider 
strategies. In the following sections, I will go on to discuss the role of the social 
responsibility movement within globalization, including the spread of global culture and 
its effects on structures of global governance and power.  
 
Making Sense of Social Responsibility 
 
 One of the most important contributions of this study is to better understand the 
complex world of social responsibility. By studying the actual practices of developing 
these standards, I have positioned the study of social responsibility in its material and 
symbolic contexts to examine the many forces shaping the process of standard-setting. 
This research has offered a theoretical framework for understanding these broad 
discourses by analyzing what social responsibility means, how it is encoded within 
particular standards in the fields of SRI and social certifications, and how these standards 
are used to influence company practices. By examining these processes, this research 
reveals how meanings get assigned to these claims of social responsibility and how these 
relate to movement attempts to regulate business. 
 The evidence presented here emphasizes both the need and method to 
differentiate between competing claims, showing that claims can vary significantly across 
standards inside or outside of the same field, even for the same company, industry, or 
commodity (Raynolds et al 2007). While they share similar language, and all seek to 
make business practices more socially responsible, claims made in one field or set of 




across particular indicators and measurement, it can actually make Millsian comparisons 
of similarities and difference (and subsequent explanations) impossible (McDermott et al 
2008, 2009). Instead, each case must be examined in its own unique context of 
development (process-tracing) and then compared to one another on a relative basis 
(George and Bennet 2005; Bartley 2007a, 20011). Depending on how a particular set of 
standards is constructed, it will be more likely to include or exclude certain criteria, or to 
have higher or lower thresholds of social responsibility. The emphasis therefore is on 
process and the use of analytic generalization to identify causal mechanisms (Yin 1994; 
Firestone 1993).   
These standards analyzed here, which were all third-party standards, are believed 
to have the greatest degree of legitimacy (Conroy 2007; Berstein and Cashore 2004; 
Bernstein 2011). It is expected that these types of systems would lead to the highest 
standards possible, although this study cautions against making such broad 
generalizations. If I would have examined other standards, such as industry-led 
certifications, we could have developed an even fuller picture of the social responsibility 
field. While this is one limitation of this study, it is likely that we would have observed 
many of the same mechanisms, but without broader stakeholder involvement, they may 
lead to even lower standards. Such a study might also reveal additional mechanisms 
unique to industry-led initiatives. 
 Nonetheless, this study does offer a framework for analyzing and making sense of 
these other social responsibility initiatives and fields. One might consider that another 
lively area in which definitions of social responsibility has proliferated is the business 




corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a construct since the 1950s. Many other studies 
have examined how businesses themselves have measured (Korhonen 2003) and defined 
CSR (Silberhorn and Warren 2007), or differentiated between social responsibility as an 
ethical position or business strategy (Wan-Jan 2006). These studies have all made claims 
about what social responsibility is supposed to mean and what responsibilities business 
has to society.  
 The business literature is often heavy on normative prescriptions for social 
responsibility. In contrast, they are weak on understanding how these definitions 
themselves are constructed and how they translate into specific practices and standards. 
This study suggests that this business literature itself should be conceptualized as a field 
where not only businesses struggle to shape meanings of social responsibility (as a 
countermovement) but that academics are also active agents in the social responsibility 
field. Like SRI advocates and certifiers, they are embedded within particular networks, 
have taken-for-granted assumptions based on their location within certain institutions, 
and have specific interests in shaping the discourse around social responsibility.  
 To understand what social responsibility means requires an examination of 
individual fields within which such meanings are constructed. I have examined two fields 
which have become increasingly important sites for framing social responsibility and 
demanding more socially responsible practices from businesses. On the one hand, the 
cases in this study suggest that meanings of social responsibility can vary wildly. Some 
socially responsible investors focus on narrow religious concerns while some social 
certifications emphasize individual issues (e.g. child labor). On the other hand, most 




human rights, labor rights and the workplace, and the environment. They struggled in a 
competitive field to stay on the cutting edge of social issues and typically covered similar 
concerns. 
 A casual observer might expect, therefore, that the standards themselves look very 
similar. But this was not necessarily the case. By examining how these broad discourses 
about social responsibility are translated into concrete standards for business practices, I 
showed how seemingly similar claims actually had very different meanings. A company 
like Nike, which is carried on many socially responsible funds, could not come close to 
passing Justice Certifiers’ new standards for garments and apparel. Some coffees certified 
by Eco Certified could also not meet the coffee standards with Justice Certifiers. Some 
companies certified by Ethical Sourcing would not even be found on a social ratings 
index because they’re not large publicly traded corporations.  
 In short, the context in which these claims are made is incredibly important for 
shaping what social responsibility means. How social responsibility is defined in business 
journals will be different than how SRI ratings evaluate corporations or whether a 
company meets a social certification. While they share some important similarities, 
conceptions of social responsibility will differ in legislation or in court cases (Dale 2011; 
Shamir 2004). These fields will all function in different ways compared to how social 
responsibility is framed in the media. Each field has a game-like structure with its own 
objects of value, cultural rules, forms of social control, and objectives, which converge to 
provide unique structures of opportunity and constraint (Crossley 2002a). As shown 
above with SRI and social certifications, certain social conditions including the power 




how social responsibility is defined. How movement actors interact and engage with 
companies, and their strategies of creating the best possible outcomes, will ultimately 
shape how meanings of social responsibility become encoded within sets of standards. 
Only by understanding what a particular rating, certification, or other claim for social 
responsibility represents, and how it was constructed, can we evaluate competing 
statements about the social responsibility of particular actors. Furthermore, it is by 
analyzing these processes that we can better understand the nature of power between 
corporations and social movements seeking to regulate them, and discern the 
opportunities and limitations for shaping global corporations with private social 
responsibility standards. These issues will be taken up in the next several sections. 
 
Theorizing Social Movements, Insiders, and Outsiders 
 
 In terms of social movement theory, the most important implication of this 
research concerns how we define social movements, the distinctions between insider and 
outsider strategies, and distinctions between institutional members and challengers. 
Traditionally, social movement theorists have defined movements as existing outside of 
institutional channels with clear distinctions between movement actors and their targets, 
and an emphasis on shaping the state (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). However, scholars 
have increasingly noted that much contemporary movement activity, including the social 
movement fields discussed here, take place within institutional channels and seek to 
transform not only the state, but corporations, culture, and other non-state targets 




2002a, 2002b). This research lends further support for this broader view of social 
movements.  
Within this broader movement paradigm, the distinction between insiders and 
outsiders is increasingly blurry and the relationships between them are complex. On the 
one hand, in this study, movement actors that challenged market institutions and sought 
to transform them in new ways were often members of those same institutions. 
Shareholder activists held shares in a corporation and were therefore partial owners of it. 
Certifiers offered business services to small producers, and in some cases, integrated 
economic criteria into their standards. On the other hand, they sometimes also adopted 
contentious tactics or had close ties to organizations that adopted highly contentious 
outsider strategies.  
The relationships that these insider organizations had to outsider organizations 
can also help us better understand the interplay of movement organizations and the 
structure of political opportunity (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). A good illustration of 
these relationships is discussed in an edited book, Good Cop/Bad Cop (Lyon 2010), 
where contributors from academia and major environmental NGOs discussed their 
strategies toward business through different roles of being a “good cop” or a “bad cop.” 
By being a good cop, NGOs serve as partners with corporations and engage them to 
construct new alternatives, such as the ones we find in SRI and social certifications. By 
being a bad cop, NGOs function as corporate critics that use confrontational outsider 
tactics. While many observers tend to view these movement actors as “either confronters 
or cooperators,” the NGOs increasingly prefer to have flexibility in selecting their roles 




Lyon and his contributors go further to discuss the relational dynamic between 
the good cop and bad cop. Kert Davies, research director at Greenpeace, noted that its 
“reputation for radical actions positions it particularly well to play the bad cop that can 
drive a target organization to partner with groups that seem more middle-of-the-road in 
orientation” (Davies 2010: 199-200). Lyon (2010: 169) argued that “sometimes a 
coordinated effort between different NGOs taking on good cop and bad cop roles can 
have an ever greater impact” than a single strategy in isolation. This is similar to the 
notion of a radical flank effect, in which radical movement can create (or close off) 
opportunities for more centrist activities (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In the interplay 
between insiders and outsiders in this study, they worked by deploying social capital in 
restructuring the cultural capital of the field to create political opportunity. By mobilizing 
their network of NGOs to serve as bad cops and attack corporate brands, they devalued 
corporate cultural capital and thereby enlarged the relative volume of cultural capital for 
the good cop, thus creating company incentives to engage with them. This is one of the 
primary tools for NGOs to leverage their capital into a more powerful position in 
developing stronger standards for social and environmental responsibility. 
However, Lyon and his collaborators often assume clear and consistent 
boundaries between NGOs and their targets and across their strategic actions. Evidence 
presented in this study suggests this view can be problematic. NGOs like Green Economy 
and Ethical Traders, and social ratings agencies, purchased shares of corporations to be 
able to file shareholder resolutions and develop socially responsible mutual funds. At the 
request of participating companies, Eco Certified and others began to incorporate 




other cases, movement actors did not only partner with corporations but became a part of 
them and their structure of accumulation, blurring the boundaries between outsider and 
insider, and aligned their market interests.  
Furthermore, an additional strategy for NGOs is to also play good cop and bad 
cop simultaneously. For example, in chapter three, I discussed an example at Ethical 
Traders, where Simon and his colleagues deployed confrontational tactics both inside and 
outside a shareholder meeting at the same time that Simon manipulated cultural symbols 
within the meeting to serve as a financially-motivated investor that supported their 
shareholder resolution. They functioned simultaneously as insider and outsider, 
strategically blurring the boundaries between the tactics, which was unknown to their 
targets. These examples highlight the increasing fluidity of boundaries between these 
roles and troubles the traditional mutually exclusive distinctions between them (Tarrow 
and della Porta 2005). 
One function of being both insider and outsider can be access to additional 
cultural resources to innovate and challenge existing frames within a field. On the one 
hand, as insiders, actors have a “feel for the game” and know the language, practices, and 
rituals of the field to be taken seriously by their audience (e.g. investors, business, 
regulators, etc). On the other hand, as outsiders, they have “alternative institutional logics 
from which to draw” (Markowitz et al 2012: 2). Rather than taking dominant institutional 
orders for granted, this access to competing messages enables actors to better see 
institutional contradictions and ambiguities that are opportunities for change (Rao and 
Giorgi 2006; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Blending these qualities as insider and outsider 




environmental costs as financial concerns (De Clercq and Voronov 2009; Markowitz et al 
2012).  
This emergent set of relationships raises an entire new series of questions relevant 
for movement research. For example, when does an organization adopt particular good 
cop (insider) or bad cop (outsider) roles? How do they coordinate these roles across 
advocacy networks within a field? When do actors strategically adopt both roles 
simultaneously? When do these coordinated efforts create political opportunities and 
shape outcomes? These are all interesting questions for future research and will 
contribute to theorizing contemporary social movements.  
 
Globalization and Culture 
 These social responsibility fields also have interesting implications for shaping 
and theorizing globalization, including cultural globalization. The social responsibility 
movement and its associated NGOs are major drivers of global cultural principles of 
rationalization and norms such as human rights (Ritzer 2004, 2006; Boli and Thomas 
1999). But, as I show below, the processes by which they promote globalization are 
different from the type of globalization promoted by TNCs. These struggles over shaping 
globalization, and the unique ways that they interact with local cultural contexts, merit a 
closer look in the context of contemporary debates within globalization theory.  
Theorists of global culture agree that globalization produces both cultural 
homogeneity at the same time global-local interactions produce new and diverse cultural 
forms. However, they disagree over which force tends to dominate in the production of 




forms lead to many more diverse forms as local actors interpret and reconfigure global 
meanings in new ways. Emphasizing the local forces in shaping cultural processes, he 
refers to increasingly cultural heterogeneity as “glocalization.”  
In his book The Grobalization of Nothing 2, Ritzer (2006) constructs a theory of 
grobalization that counters the glocalization hypothesis. Grobalization refers to “the 
imperialistic ambitions of nations, corporations, organizations, and the like and their 
desire, indeed need, to impose themselves on various geographic areas” (Ritzer 2006: 
15). From this perspective, the world is becoming more homogenous because the power 
behind these “imperialistic ambitions” far outweigh the capacity of localized individuals 
and groups to construct themselves and their own worlds. It emphasizes the uni-
directional flows from the grobal to the local/particular forces. The global media and 
commodities are particularly important in these flows because of their relatively coercive 
power over the individual. However, such grobalizing forces are not total; local/glocal 
forces continue to exert influence and interact with the grobal.  
In global capitalism, TNCs are largely a grobalizing force in that they seek to 
impose themselves on localities throughout the world (Ritzer 2006, 2010). In pursuit of 
greater accumulation, corporations adopt similar labor and environmental practices that 
maximize their profits. They also promote similar consumption practices by developing 
McDonaldized systems of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control (Ritzer 
2004). While the content of these systems may vary from place to place (e.g. McDonald’s 
serve McSpaghetti in the Philippines), thus promoting some glocalization (Caldwell 
2004; Simon 2009), the overarching principles and rationalized forms of accumulation 




discussed in this study, local groups can, and do, resist such forces and seek to reshape 
how global processes interact at the local level. While individuals can impart some local 
interpretations to these grobalizing practices, they lack the time, resources, and power 
that corporations do in shaping the end outcomes (Ritzer 2006, 2010). 
 The implications of the social responsibility movement for the grobal/glocal 
debate are interesting, and they do not fit neatly along the global/local continuum. On the 
one hand, transnational NGOs and the transnational networks involved in SRI and social 
certifications, are the conduits of global cultural principles, including global norms for 
social responsibility (Boli and Thomas 1999; Boli and Lechner 2005). They draw upon 
conceptions of universal human rights, which are a largely individualized, Western 
approach to rights. They promote universal principles and standards to “help regulate and 
calibrate social life by rendering the modern world equivalent across cultures, time, and 
geography” (Timmermans and Epstein 2010: 70). Like TNCs and other organization, in 
this sense, they are a grobalizing force that aims to reproduce itself on further areas of the 
world.   
 On the other hand, many of these broad principles are meant to both allow for 
local interpretation and empower local groups to shape business practices in response to 
powerful globalizing corporations. Global standards were shaped by local contexts in 
both fields. In SRI, standards for social responsibility were shaped by local norms in 
company reporting and societal expectations. For example, concerns about job creation 
and job benefits in Europe led to different standards for companies operating there as 
compared to the US. Social certifications produced global standards, but permitted 




racial diversity or against discrimination by sexual orientation) to reflect how local 
cultures interpreted different social categories and how they related to business practices. 
Within standard-setting processes, these global-local interactions resulted in unique 
glocal standards for social responsibility. 
However, these interactions go further than processes of glocalization, which 
merely emphasize local cultural interpretation in the production of new cultural forms. 
Instead, the standards themselves draw upon global principles to empower local groups to 
exercise greater control over the economic practices within their communities. For 
example, social standards drew upon global ILO conventions for workers’ rights to self-
organize and for indigenous communities to help decide about the fate of local forests 
(Bartley 2011). The standards promoted global cultural principles, implemented through 
transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999) to strengthen local 
communities in shaping how global processes shaped their own lives. As such, local and 
national struggles were nested within broader global grievances and mobilizing efforts 
(Smith and Johnston 2002), even if global-local cleavages do exist within the movement 
(Boström and Hallström 2010). The cultural processes, therefore, are not simply 
unintended interactions, but can also be conscious coordination of local and global needs 
and interests. This suggests that the global social responsibility movement may be better 
conceptualized as a multidimensional process of grobalization and glocalization, rather 





Global Governance and the Impact of Private Regulation 
A final implication of this study is for global governance and the potential 
impacts of rule-setting that takes place outside of the state and legally mandated 
regulation. Global governance has become an increasingly important topic within 
globalization and especially in relation to transnational corporations. In our era of 
globalization, transnational corporations have dispersed their networks of production all 
across the world through global commodity chains (Gereffi et al 2005; Gereffi 2012). 
These TNCs grown dramatically in size, number, and power since the 1970s (Sklair 
2007/2010). At the same time, nation states have either undergone deregulation or failed 
to pass regulations on TNCs (Stigler 1971; Strange 1996; Hale and Held 2011; Robinson 
2004; Harvey 2007).  
While the social responsibility movement continues to promote corporate 
regulation through state policy, they have used SRI, social certifications, and other means 
to influence corporate activity directly. Through these fields, movements have sought to 
embed corporate practices in standards or rules that exist outside the state. This form of 
rule-making has been referred to as “governance without governments” (Rosenau and 
Czempiel 1992) or “governance beyond the state” (Hale and Held 2011). As Conroy 
describes social certifications, “when a wide range of stakeholders comes together with 
corporate representatives to develop standards for social and environmental behavior by 
corporations, both the outside stakeholders and the corporations are participating in 





This trend in global governance of corporations and the economy should be seen 
as part of a broader trend of private governance structures that have proliferated in recent 
decades (Klooster 2005, 2010). Hale and Held (2011) view states as insufficient rule-
makers for activity that is simply much bigger than their geographic area. They argue that 
“in an interdependent world, no individual state, no matter how competent, can address 
transnational issues” which vary from technocratic problems like basic Internet 
architecture to political issues like those discussed in this research (Hale and Held 2011: 
3). Private governance has been seen by some as a way to address many transnational 
problems and business practices are only one manifestation of this larger process. Others 
view private governance more critically as part of a more market-driven model that 
simply reproduces the power of corporations and forestalls the passing of more 
aggressive legal regulations. 
While private governance structures have proven effective at many problems, 
have they effectively shaped business practices in a more socially responsible manner? 
While evaluating the implementation of standards is beyond the scope of this study, other 
research has begun to look at the actual impacts of social and environmental standards. 
The results, thus far, are mixed. In SRI, one study found CSR rankings as having no 
significant impact on corporate practices (Scalet and Kelly 2010) while others have 
shown them to be effective at shaping political and economic activity (Paul and Aquila 
1988) by “disciplining” corporations to a norm of prescribed practices (Déjean et al 2004; 
Chatterji and Taffel 2010). A qualitative study has shown that social ratings are 
successful at getting corporations to measure and manage their social practices (Slager 




received incredibly low favorable votes, but much of the gains from resolutions 
increasingly comes from engagement with the associated dialogue than the content of the 
resolution itself (A. O’Rourke 2003). So there is evidence that limited gains have been 
made, but they do not challenge the notion of fiduciary responsibility or the overall 
structure of corporate capitalism (Markowitz et al 2012).  
The results on social certifications are similarly mixed. Studies of Fair Trade have 
found that it has provided community development and other limited gains for small 
coffee farmers (Valkia and Nygren 2010) but very little impacts for tea plantations 
(Moore 2010). Forestry certifications have had some effects, but this has varied by region 
(McDermott et al 2008). For example, Bartley (2010b) has found some disturbing results 
in certified areas like Indonesia (Bartley 2010b). Amongst other results, he identified the 
certification of labor standards in Social Accountability-certified factories in Indonesia 
where companies violated labor standards (Bartley 2010b). In one case, a factory lost 
their certificate, but in another case where a factory fired union organizers and violated 
freedom of association requirements, they did not lose their certificate. The problems 
with auditing for standards are widespread and can cast doubt on the integrity of a 
certification system. Like SRI, we can still only conclude that social certifications have 
had limited gains on business practices. 
In conclusion, private governance structures like SRI and social certifications are 
imperfect mechanisms for regulating transnational corporations. But while the standard-
setting process is fraught with power struggles and heavy constraints, and their impacts 
have been limited, some gains can be seen. At a minimum, corporations have ceded 




norms even if the standards have not been fully implemented (Rowe 2005). Furthermore, 
as my cases illustrate, they have facilitated NGO engagement with corporations in a way 
that never existed before, giving them access to individuals and groups from which they 
were previously cut off. Even if the systems have their flaws, this is an improvement over 
self-regulatory systems and industry-led certifications. They have also facilitated 
transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1999) whereby actors in one country 
can help to empower local actors in their own struggles. Companies have also begun to 
open themselves to monitoring and auditing, enabling them and their critics to identify 
problems in factors and on farms, and sometimes these opportunities have led to changes. 
It has also mobilized and educated more investors and consumers about these issues, 
which can build broader markets for socially responsible goods. As the movement 
continues to grow and reaches more investors and consumers, it is likely to help further 
pressure corporations and increase their incentive to participate in these types of 
programs in a meaningful way. Yet while there is reason to be hopeful, continued 
practice and further research is needed to know if the standards will ultimately deliver on 
their promise to significantly improve outcomes for workers, their communities, and the 
environment. Finally, these gains can be fleeting and private regulations should never be 








Appendix 1.  List of Respondents 
  
    
 
Int Title Organization(s) Interview Date 
 
     1 Research Analyst Corporate Responsibility Researchers 9/27/2006 
 
2 Operations Manager Corporate Responsibility Researchers 11/26/2006 
 
3 Research Analyst Corporate Responsibility Researchers 11/1/2006 
 
4 Research Analyst Corporate Responsibility Researchers 10/16/2006 
 
5 Team Lead Corporate Responsibility Researchers 11/19/2006 
 
6 Director Corporate Responsibility Researchers 11/17/2006 
 





Association of Socially Responsible 
Investment 11/7/2006  
9 Research Analyst Responsible Economy 10/31/2006 
 
10 Advocacy Manager Corporate Indexing 11/28/2006 
 
11 Research Manager Corporate Indexing 11/28/2006 
 
12 
Director Climate Change Action 
10/6/2009  
Director (Former)  Environmental Advocates 
 
13 Director SRI Research Institute 3/18/2010 
 
14 Research Scientist Biodiversity Labeling 3/24/2010 
 
15 Director Trade Justice Network 4/5/2010 
 
16 Director Sustainability Guide 6/21/2010 
 
17 
President Building a Better America 
7/22/2010  
President (Former) Responsible Investment Management 
 
18 Research Analyst Responsible Economy 7/26/2010 
 
19 




(Former) Ethical Sourcing  
20 
Director of Sustainable 
Agriculture Eco Certified 7/27/2010  
21 Senior Program Advisor National Religious Aid 7/30/2010 
 
22 Vice President Eco Certified 8/25/2010 
 
23 
Research Director Green Business Network 
8/31/2010  
Research Analyst (Former) Corporate Indexing 
 
24 
Vice Chair, Board of 
Directors Eco Certified 9/3/2010  
Director Ethical Consumers 
 
25 Executive Director Ethical Sourcing 9/7/2010 
 
26 Deputy Director World Workers Association 9/9/2010 
 
27 Executive Director Ministry Alliance on Ethical Business 9/16/2010 
 
28 Standards Manager Ethical Sourcing 9/28/2010 
 
29 
Vice Pres, Sustainabile 
Investing Sustainable Investing 10/8/2010  








31 Impacts Manager Global Certification Coalition 10/15/2010 
 
32 




(Former)  Ministry Alliance on Ethical Business  
Advisory Board Chair 
(Former)  Corporate Indexing  
33 
Economic Justice 
Coordinator Ethical Traders 12/17/2010  
34 Chair, Board of Directors Justice Certifiers 1/20/2011 
 
35 Operations Manager Eco Certified 2/10/2011 
 
36 Relations Manager Justice Certifiers 2/10/2011 
 
37 Board Member Justice Advocates 2/11/2011 
 
38 Standards Manager Justice Certifiers 2/18/2011 
 
39 Policy Coordinator United Workers for Justice 3/15/2011 
 







Adam, Avshalom and Tal Shavit. 2008. “How Can a Ratings-based Method for 
Assessing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Provide an Incentive to Firms Excluded 
from Socially Responsible Investment Indices to Invest in CSR?” Journal of Business 
Ethics 82: 899-905. 
 
Armstrong, Elizabeth.  2002.  Forging Gay Identities Organization Sexuality in San 
Francisco, 1950-1994.  Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
 
Armstrong, Elizabeth, and Mary Bernstein.  2008.  “Culture, Power, and Institutions: A 
Multi-Institutional Approach to Social Movements.”  Sociological Theory 26: 74-99. 
 
Associated Press. 2008. “Nike: Malaysian Factory Violates Major Rights.” MSNBC 




Baron, David. 2003. “Private Politics.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 
12: 31-66. 
 
Bartley, Tim. 2003. "Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the 
Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields " Politics and 
Society 31(3):433-464. 
 
Bartley, Tim.  2005.  “Corporate Accountability and the Privatization of Labor Standards: 
Struggles over Codes of Conduct in the Apparel Industry.” Research in Political 
Sociology 12: 211-244. 
 
Bartley, Tim.  2007a. “Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of 
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions.”  American 
Journal of Sociology 113: 297-351. 
 
Bartley, Tim.  2007b. “How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of 
an Organizational Field and the Rise of Forest Certification.”  Social Problems 54: 229-
255. 
 
Bartley, Tim. 2010a. “Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The Limits of Forest 
and Labor Standards Certification in Indonesia.” Business and Politics 12 (3): 1-34. 
 
Bartley, Tim. 2010b. “Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation.” Working Paper No. 






Bartley, Tim. 2011. “Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of 
Public and Private Standards.” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 12 (2): 517-542. 
 
Bartley, Tim, and Curtis Child. Forthcoming. “Movements, Markets, and Fields: The 
Effects of Anti-Sweatshop Campaigns on U.S. Firms, 1993-2000.” Social Forces. 
 
Bartley, Tim, and Shawna Smith. 2008. “Structuring Transnational Fields of Governance: 
Network Evolution and Boundary Setting in the World of Standards.” Working Paper, 
Department of Sociology, Indiana University. Bloomington, IN. 
 
Bartley, Tim, and Shawna Smith. 2010. “Communities of Practice as Cause and 
Consequence of Transnational Governance: The Evolution of Social and Environmental 
Certification.” Pp 347-374 in Transnational Communities: Shaping Global Economic 
Governance, edited by Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast.  
1998.  Analytic Narratives.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Beckert, Jens. 1999. “Agency, Entrepreneurs, and Institutional Change: The Role of 
Strategic Choice and Institutionalized Practices in Organizations.” Organization Studies 
20: 777-799. 
 
Benford, Robert. 1997. "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing 
Perspective." Sociological Inquiry 67(4):409-430. 
 
Benford, Robert, and David Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment." Annual Review of Sociology 26:611-639. 
 
Benford, Robert, Timoth Gongaware, and Danny Valadez. 2000. “Social Movements.” 
Pp. 2717-2727 in Encyclopedia of Sociology, Volume 4 (2
nd
 edition) edited by Edgar 
Borgatta and Rhonda Montgomery. New York: Macmillan Reference. 
 
Bernstein, Mary.  2005.  “Liberalism and Social Movement Success: The Case of the US 
Sodomy Statues.”  Pp 2-18 in Controlling Sex: The Regulation of Intimacy and Identity, 
edited by Elizabeth Bernstein and Laurie Schaffner.  New York: Routledge. 
 
Bernstein, Steve. 2011. “Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State Global 
Governance.” Review of International Political Economy 18 (1): 17-51. 
 
Bernstein, Steve, and Bejamin Cashore.  2004.  “Non-state Global Governance: Is Forest 
Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?”  Pp. 33-63 in 
Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environmental and 





Boli, John and Frank Lechner. 2005. World Culture: Origins and Consequences. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Boli, John and Velina Petrova. 2007. "Globalization Today." in The Blackwell 
Companion to Globalization, edited by George Ritzer. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers.  
 
Boli, John and George M. Thomas. 1999. Constructing World Culture: International 
Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Boli, John, Michael Elliott, and Franziska Bieri. 2003. "Globalization." in Handbook of 
Social Problems: A Comparative International Perspective, edited by George Ritzer. 
Sage Publications. 
 
Boström, Magnus, and Kristina Tamm Hallström. 2010. “NGO Power in Global Social 
and Environmental Standard-Setting.” Global Environmental Politics 10 (4): 36-59. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979/1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 
Cambridga, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1993. The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc J.D. Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. 
Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
 
Brown, Sandy, and Christy Getz. 2008. “Privatizing Farm Worker Justice: Regulating 
Labor Though Voluntary Certification and Labeling.” Geoforum 39 (3): 1184–1196. 
 
Buzbee, William. 1997. “Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional 
Determinism.” William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 21 (1): 1-67. 
 
Caldwell, Melissa. 2004. “Domesticating the French Fry: McDonald’s and Consumerism 
in Moscow.” Journal of Consumer Culture 4 (1).   
 
Campbell, John. 2006. "Institutional Analysis and the Paradox of Corporate Social 
Responsibility " American Behavior Scientist 49(7):925-938. 
 
Campbell, John, and Leon Lindberg.  1990.  “Property Rights and the Organization of 
Economic Activity by the State.”  American Sociological Review 55: 634-647. 
 
Carmin, Joann, and Deborah Balser. 2002. “Selecting Repertoires of Action in 






Carroll, Archie.  1999.  “Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional 
Construct.”  Business and Society 38 (3): 268-295. 
 
Carruthers, Bruce.  1994.  “When is the State Autonomous? Culture, Organization 
Theory, and the Political Sociology of the State.”  Sociological Theory 12: 19-44. 
 
Cashore, Benjamin, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom.  2004.  Governing Through 
Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority.  New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Charmaz, Kathy. 1983. "The Grounded Theory Method: An Explication and 
Interpretation." in Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings, edited by 
Robert Emerson. Waveland Press. 
 
Chatterji, Aaron, David Levine, and Michael Toffel. 2009. “How Well do Social Ratings 
Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?” Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy 18 (1): 125-169. 
 
Chatterji, Aaron, and David Levine. 2006. “Breaking Down the Wall of Codes: 
Evaluating Non-Financial Performance Measurement.” California Management Review 
48 (2): 29-51. 
 
Chatterji, Aaron, and Michael Toffel. 2010. “How Firms Respond to Being Rated.”  
Strategic Management Journal 31 (9): 917-945. 
 
Clarke, Thomas, and Marie de la Rama. 2004. “The Impact of Socially Responsible 
Investment upon Corporate Social Responsibility.” In Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, edited by David Crowther, and Lez Raman-Bacchus.  Ashgate. 
 
Conroy, Michael.  2007.  Branded! How the ‘Certification Revolution’ is Transforming 
Global Corporations.  Gabriola Island, BC, Canada: New Society Publishers. 
 
Crossley, Nick.  1999.  “Working Utopias and Social Movements: An Investigation using 
Case Study Materials from Radical Mental Health Movements in Britain.”  Sociology 33 
(4): 809-830. 
 
Crossley, Nick. 2002a. Making Sense of Social Movements. Philadelphia, PA: Open 
University Press. 
 
Crossley, Nick. 2002b. “Global Anti-Corporate Struggle: A Preliminary Analysis.” 
British Journal of Sociology 53 (4): 667-691. 
 
Dale, John. 2011. Free Burma: Transnational Legal Action and Corporate 





Davies, Kert. 2010. “Greenpeace.” In Good Cop/Bad Cop: Environmental NGOs and 
their Strategies Toward Business, Thomas Lyon (Ed.). Washington, DC: RFF Press. 
 
De Clercq, Dirk, and Maxim Voronov. 2009. “The Role of Cultural and Symbolic Capital 
in Entrepreneurs’ Ability to Meet Expectations about Conformity and Innovation.” 
Journal of Small Business Management 47 (3): 398-420. 
 
Dean, Paul. 2009. "Defining Social Responsibility: How Social Screening Practices 
Shape Discourse in Socially Responsible Investing." Paper presented at American 
Sociological Association annual meeting.  August 9
th
, 2009, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Déjean, Frédéique, Jean-Pascal Gond, and Bernard Leca.  2004.  “Measuring the 
Unmeasured: An Institutional Entrepreneur Strategy in an Emerging Industry.”  Human 
Relations 57: 741-764. 
 
Della Porta, Donatella, and Mario Diani. 2006. Social Movements: An Introduction, 2
nd
 
edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell.  
 
Delmas, Magali, and Vared Blass. 2010. “Measuring Corporate Environmental 
Performance: The Trade-offs of Sustainability Ratings.” Business Strategy and the 
Environment 19 (4): 245-260. 
 
Dicken, Philip. 2007. Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World 
Economy. 5th edn. Sage, London. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter Powell (Eds). 1991. The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Domhoff, William. 2010. Who Rules America? Challenges to Corporate and Class 
Dominance. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Donovan, William. 2008. “Is Nike a Goldmedal SRI Stock?” About.com August 18. 
(Available at http://socialinvesting.about.com/b/2008/08/18/is-nike-a-gold-medal-sri-
stock.htm, last accessed December 13, 2011). 
 
Elgert, Laureen. 2012. “Certified Discourse? The Politics of Developing Soy 
Certification Standards.” Geoforum 43 (2): 295-304. 
 
Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Victoria Johnson. 2008. “Bourdieu and Organizational 
Analysis.” Theory and Society 37: 1-44. 
 
Entine, John. 2003. “The Myth of Social Investing: A Critique of Its Practices and 
Consequences for Corporate Social Performance Research.” Organization & 





Falleti, Tulia, and Julia Lynch.  2009.  “Contexts and Causal Mechanisms in Political 
Analysis.”  Comparative Political Studies 42 (9): 1143-1166. 
 
Featherstone, Liza. 2002. Students Against Sweatshops. London: Verso Publishers. 
 
Firestone, William. 1993. "Alternative Arguments for Generalizing from Data as Applied 
to Qualitative Research." Educational Researcher 22(4):16-23. 
 
FLA Watch. No date. “About FLA Watch.” Retrieved March 26, 2012 from < 
http://flawatch.usas.org/about/>. 
 
Fligstein, Neil.  2001.  “Social Skill and the Theory of Fields.”  Sociological Theory 19: 
105-125. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. 
New York: Pantheon Books. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: 
Vintage. 
 
Friedland, Roger and Robert Alford.  1991.  "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, 
Practices, and Institutional Contradictions."  Pp. 232-263 in The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul DiMaggio.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Friedman, Milton. 1970. “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits.” The New York Times Magazine 13 September 1970. 
 
Fridell, Mara, Ian Hudson, and Mark Hudson. 2008. “With Friends Like These: The 
Corporate Response to Fair Trade.” Review of Radical Political Economy 40 (1): 8-34. 
 
Gale, Fred. 2004. “The Consultation Dilemma in Private Regulatory Regimes: 
Negotiating FSC Regional Standards in the United States and Canada.” Journal of 
Environmental Policy and Planning 6 (1): 57-84. 
 
Galvin, Kevin. 1996. “Investors Take a Stand Against Sweatshops.” The Associated 
Press September 18. (Available at http://www.viet.net/web/nike//public_html/ap-
reject.htm, last accessed December 13, 2011). 
 
Gereffi, Gary. 2012. “Global Value Chains.” Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization. 
Ritzer, George (ed). Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon. 2005 “The Governance of Global 





George, Alexander, and Timothy McKeown. 1985. “Case Studies and Theories of 
Organizational Decision Making.” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 
2: 21-58. 
 
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organizaiton of Experience. 
Harper Colophon. 
 
Global Reporting Initiative. 2011. “What is GRI?” 
<http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/> accessed 8 December 2011. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International 
Publishers. 
 
Gulbrandsen, Lars H. 2006. “Creating Markets for Eco-Labeling: Are Consumers 
Insignificant?” International Journal of Consumer Studies 30:477–89. 
  
Hale, Thomas, and David Held. 2011. “Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in 
Transnational Governance.” In Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and 
Innovations, edited by Thomas Hale and David Held. Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
 
Hall, Peter.  2003.  “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics.”  Pp. 
373-404 In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by J Mahoney 
and D Rueschemeyer.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Harvey, David. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Haufler, Virginia. 2003. “New Forms of Governance: Certification Regimes as Social 
Regulations of the Global Market.” Pp. 237–47 in The Social and Political Dimensions of 
Forest Certification, edited by Errol Meidinger, Chris Elliot, and Gerhard Oesten. 
Remagen-Oberwinter: Forstbuch. 
 
Hellsten, Sirkku and Chris Mallin. 2006. "Are 'Ethical' or 'Socially Responsible' 
Investments Socially Responsible." Journal of Business Ethics 66:393-406 
 
Hickey, Gordon, John Innes, Robert Kozak, Gary Bull, and Ilan Vertinsky. 2006. 
“Monitoring and Information Reporting for Sustainable Forest Management: An Inter-
Jurisdictional Comparison of Soft Law Standards.” Forest Policy and Economics 9: 297-
315. 
 
Hockerts, Kai and Lance Moir. 2004. "Communicating Corporate Responsibility to 






Holvoet, B, and Bart Muys. 2004. “Sustainable Forest Management Worldwide: A 
Comparative Assessment of Standards.” International Forestry Review 6 (2): 99-122. 
 
Holzmeyer, Cheryl. 2009. “Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The 
Alien Tort Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal.” Law & Society 
Review 43 (2): 271-304. 
 
Hwang, Hokyu and Walter Powell. 2005. “Institutions and Entrepreneurship.” Pp 179-
210 in Sharon Alvarez, Rashesh Agrawl, and Olav Sorenson (Eds), Handbook of 
Entrepreneurial Research. New York: Springer. 
 
Jaffee, Daniel. 2010. “Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation, and Social 
Movement Responses in the United States.” Journal of Business Ethics 92: 267-285. 
 
Jaffee, Daniel, and Philip Howard. 2010. “Corporate Cooptation of Organic and Fair 
Trade Standards.” Agriculture and Human Values 27: 387-399. 
 
Jasper, James. 2007. “Social Movements.” Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Ritzer, 
George (ed). Blackwell Publishing. Blackwell Reference Online. 
 
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink.  1998.  Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   
 
Kellner, Douglas. 2002. “Theorizing Globalization.” Sociological Theory 20 (3): 285-
305. 
 
King, Brayden. 2008. "A Social Movement Perspective of Stakeholder Collective Action 
and Influence." Business & Society 47(1):21-49. 
 
King, Brayden. 2011. “The Tactical Disruptiveness of Social Movements: Sources of 
Market and Mediated Disruption in Corporate Boycotts.” Social Problems 58 (4): 491-
517. 
 
King, Brayden, and Nicholas Pearce. 2010. “The Contentiousness of Markets: Politics, 
Social Movements, and Institutional Change in Markets.” Annual Review of Sociology 
36: 249-267. 
 
Klooster, Dan. 2005. “Environmental Certification of Forests: The Evolution of 
Environmental Governance in a Commodity Network.” Journal of Rural Studies 21 (4): 
403–417. 
 
Klooster, Dan. 2010. “Standardizing Sustainable Development? The Forest Stewardship 
Council’s Plantation Policy Review Process as Neoliberal Environmental Governance.” 





Korhonen, Jouni.  2003.  “Should We Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?”  
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 10: 25-39. 
 
Laufer, William. 2003. “Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing.” Journal of 
Business Ethics 43: 253-261. 
 
Lipschutz, Ronnie, and Cathleen Fogel. 2002. “‘Regulation for the Rest of Us?’ Global 
Civil Society and the Privatization of Transnational Regulation.” Pp. 115–40 in The 
Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, edited by Rodney Bruce Hall and 
Thomas Biersteker. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lofland, John, David Snow, Leon Anderson, and Lyn Lofland. 2005. Analyzing Social 
Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis. Wadsworth. 
 
Lounsbury, Michael, Marc Ventresca, and Paul Hirsch. 2003.”Social Movements, Field 
Frames, and Industry Emergence: A Cultural-Political Perspective of US Recycling.” 
Socio-Economic Review 1: 71-104. 
 
Lyon, Thomas (Ed.). 2010. Good Cop/Bad Cop. Washington, DC: RFF Press. 
 
MacDonald, Kate. 2011. “Fair Labor Association.” In Handbook of Transnational 
Governance: Institutions and Innovations, edited by Thomas Hale and David Held. 
Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
 
Mahoney, James. 2000. “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology.” Theory and Society 
29 (4): 507-548.  
 
Mahoney, James. 2001. “Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory 
and Method.” Sociological Forum 16 (3): 575-593. 
 
Manheim, Jarol. 2001. The Death of a Thousand Cuts: Corporate Campaigns and the 
Attack on the Corporation. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
 
Manokha, Ivan. 2006. “Business Ethics and the Spirit of Global Capitalism: Moral 
Leadership in the Context of Global Hegemony.” Journal of Business Ethics 2 (2): 27-41. 
 
Markowitz, Linda, Denise Cobb, and Mark Hedley. 2012. “Framing Ambiguity: 
Insider/Outsiders and the Successful Legitimation Project of the Socially Responsible 
Mutual Fund Industry.” Organization 19 (1): 3-23. 
 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1848/1967. The Communist Manifesto. New York: 
Penguin.  
 
Mater, Catherine, Will Price, and V. Alaric Sample. 2002. Certification Assessments on 




Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) Programs. 
Washington, DC: Pinchot Institution for Conservation. 
 
McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framings, edited by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
McAdam, Doug, Sydney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.  2008.  “Methods for Measuring 
Mechanisms of Contention.”  Qualitative Sociology 31 (4): 307-331. 
 
McBarnet, Doreen, Aurora Voiculescu, and Tom Campbell. 2009. The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law. BK Norton. 
 
McDermott, Constance, Benjamine Cashore, and Peter Kanowski. 2009. “Setting the Bar: 
An International Comparison of Public and Private Forest Policy Specifications and 
Implications for Explaining Policy Trends.” Journal of Integrative Environmental 
Sciences 6 (3): 217-237. 
 
McDermott, Constance, Emily Noah, and Benjamin Cashore. 2008. “Differences that 
‘Matter’? A Framework for Comparing Environmental Certification Standards and 
Government Policies.” Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 10 (1): 47-70. 
 
McLaren, Duncan. 2004. “Global Stakeholders: Corporate Accountability and Investor 
Engagement.” Global Stakeholders 12 (2) 191-201. 
 
McMichael, Philip. 2008. Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Meidinger, Errol. 2003. “Forest Certification as a Global Civil Society Regulatory 
Institution.” In Errol Meidinger, Chris Elliot, and Gerhard Oesten (Eds.). The Social and 
Political Dimensions of Forest Certification. Remagen-Oberwinter, Germany: Forstbuch.  
 
Meridian Institute. 2001. Comparative Analysis of the Forest Stewardship Council and 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative Certification Programs. Washington, DC: Meridian 
Institute. 
 
Meyer, John, John Boli, George Thomas, and Fracisco Ramirez. 1997. “World Society 
and the Nation State.” American Journal of Sociology 103: 1444-1481. 
 
Meyer, David, and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. “Movements, Countermovements, and 






Monks, Robert, Anthony Miller, and Jacqueline Cook.  2004.  “Shareholder Activism on 
Environmental Issues: A Study of Proposals at Large US Corporations (2000-2003).”  
Natural Resources Forum 28: 317-330. 
 
Moore, Kelly.  1999.  “Political Protest and Institutional Change: The Anti-Vietnam War 
Movement and American Science.”  Pp. 97-118 in How Social Movements Matter, edited 
by Marco. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly.  Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Moore, Lindsey. 2010. “Reading Tea Leaves: The Impact of Mainstreaming Fair Trade.” 
LSE Development Studies Institute Working Paper Series No. 10-106. London: 
Development Studies Institute. 
 
Nicholls, Alex, and Charlotte Opal.  2005.  Fair Trade: Market-Driven Ethical 
Consumption.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Njølstad, Olav.  1990.  “Learning From History? Case Studies and the Limits to Theory-
Building.”  In Arms Races, Technological and Political Dynamics, edited by Nils Petter 
Gleditsch and Olav Njølstad. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
O'Rourke, Anastasia. 2003. "A New Politics of Engagement: Shareholder Activism for 
Corporate Social Responsibility." Business Strategy and the Environment 12:227-239 
 
O’Rourke, Dara.  2003. “Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-governmental Systems 
of Labor Standards and Monitoring.” Policy Studies Journal 31:1–29. 
 
Oliver, Pamela, and Hank Johnston. 2000. "What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in 
Social Movement Research." Mobilization 4(1):37-54. 
 
Orlitzky, Marc, Frank Schmidt, and Sara Rynes. 2003. "Corporate Social and Financial 
Performance: A Meta-analysis." Organization Studies 24 (3): 403–441. 
 
Oxfam. 2002. “Nike Worker Speaks Out.” Accessed online October 15, 2011 at < 
http://webfw.oxfam.org.au/explore/workers-rights/nike/nike-worker-speaks-out>. 
 
Paul, Karen and Dominic Aquila. 1988. "Political Consequences of Ethical Investing: 
The Case of South Africa." Journal of Business Ethics 7:691-697 
 
Pleyers, Geoffrey. 2010. Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in a Global Age. Malden, 
MA: Polity. 
 
Polanyi, Karl.  1944/2001.  The Great Transformation.  Boston: Beacon. 
 






Polletta, Francesca. 2008. “Culture and Movements.” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 619: 78-96. 
 
Power, Michael. 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Proffitt, W Trexler, and Andrew Spicer. 2006. "Shaping the Shareholder Activism 
Agenda: Institutional Investors and Global Social Issues." Strategic Organization 
4(2):165-190. 
 
Putnam, Todd. 1993. “Boycotts are Busting out All Over.” Business and Society Review 
85: 47-51. 
 
Ragin, Charles. 1992. “Introduction: Cases of ‘What is a Case?’” In What is a Case?: 
Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry, edited by Charles Ragin and Howard 
Becker. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ragin, Charles, and Howard Becker (Eds). 1992. What is a Case?: Exploring the 
Foundations of Social Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ragin, Charles, Joane Nagel, and Patricia White. 2004. "Workshop on Scientific 
Foundations of Qualitative Research." Washington, DC: National Science Foundation. 
 
Rahman, Noushi, and Corinne Post. 2012. “Measurement Issues in Environmental 
Corporate Social Responsibility.” Journal of Business Ethics 105 (3): 307-319. 
 
Rao, Hayagreeva, and Simona Giorgi. 2006. “Code Breaking: How Entrepreneurs Exploit 
Cultural Logics to Generate Institutional Change.” Research in Organizational Behavior 
27: 269-304. 
 
Rao, Hayagreeva, Calvin Morrill, and Mayer Zald. 2000. “Power Plays: How Social 
Movements and Collective Action Create New Organizational Forms.” Research in 
Organizational behavior 22: 239-282. 
 
Raynolds, Laura, Douglas Murray, and Andrew Heller. 2007. "Regulating Sustainability 
in the Coffee Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Third-Party Environmental and Social 
Certification Initiatives." Agriculture and Human Values 24: 147-163. 
 
Ritzer, George. 2004. The McDonaldization of Society: Revised New Century Edition. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Ritzer, George (Ed). 2007. The Blackwell Companion to Globalization. Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
 





Ritzer, George. 2010. “Romanticizing the Consumer and the Local: Is McDonald's (or 
Starbucks) Really that Powerless in the Global Age?” Conference Presentation at State of 
Buying Conference. Temple University, April, 2010. 
 
Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization. London: Sage. 
 
Robertson, Roland. 1995. “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity.” 
In Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds., Global Modernities. 
London: Sage. 
 
Robinson, William.  2004.  A Theory of Capitalist Globalization: Production, Class, and 
State in a Transnational World.  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Rosenau, James, and Ernst Otto Czempiel, Eds. 1992. Governance Without Government: 
Order and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rowe, James. 2005. "Corporate Social Responsibility as Business Strategy." in 
Globalization, Governmentality, and Global Politics, edited by Ronnie Lipschutz. 
Routledge. 
 
Sabel, Charles, Dara O’Rourke, and Archon Fung. 2000. “Ratcheting Labor Standards: 
Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace.” KSG Working Paper 
No. 00-010; Columbia law and Economic Working Paper No. 185; Columbia Law 
School, Public Law Research. 
 
Sandelowski, Margarete.  1995.  "Sample Size in Qualitative Research."  Research in 
Nursing and Health 18: 179-183. 
 
Scalet, Steven, and Thomas Kelly. 2010. “CSR Rating Agencies: What is their Global 
Impact?” Journal of Business Ethics 94: 69-88. 
 
Schneiberg, Marc. 2002. “Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New 
Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 
1900–1930.” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 19:39–89. 
 
Schneiberg, Marc, and Tim Bartley. 2001. “Regulating American Industries: Markets, 
Politics, and the Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation.” American 
Journal of Sociology 107:101–46. 
 
Schneiberg, Marc, and Michael Lounsbury. 2007. “Social Movements and Institutional 
Analysis.” In The Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, edited by Royston 
Greenwood, Chistine Oliver, Roy Suddaby, and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson. Thousand 





Schröder, Michael. 2007. "Is there a Difference? The Performance Characteristics of SRI 
Equity Indices." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 34: 331–348. 
 
Schueth, Steve. 2003. "Socially Responsible Investing in the United States." Journal of 
Business Ethics 43:189-194. 
 
Seidman, Gay. 2007. Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and 
Transnational Activism. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Shamir, Ronen. 2004. "Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the 
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility." Law & Society Review 
38(4):635-663. 
 
Shamir, Ronen. 2010. “Capitalism, Governance, and Authority: The Case of Corporate 
Social Responsibility.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 6: 531-553. 
 
Silberhorn, Daniel, and Richard Warren. 2007. "Defining Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A View from Big Companies in Germany and the UK." European 
Business Review 19(5):352-372. 
 
Simon, Bryant. 2009. “The Not-So-Flat World: Exploring the Meaning of Buying at the 
Intersection of the Global and the Local at a Starbucks in Singapore.” Comparative 
American Studies 7 (4): 319-337. 
 
Skalir, Leslie. 2001. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Sklair, Leslie. 2002. Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Sklair, Leslie. 2007/2010 [updated content in 2010]. "Global economy." Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Sociology. Ritzer, George (ed). Blackwell Publishing. Blackwell 
Reference Online. Accessed 02 December 2011 
<http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com> 
 
Slager, Catharina. 2010. “What Gets Measured Gets Managed? Responsible Investment 
Indices and Responsible Corporate Behaviour.” Working Paper, International Centre for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, University of Nottingham Business School. 
 
Smith, Jackie, and Hank Johnston. 2002. “Globalization and Resistance: An 
Introduction.” In Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social 
Movements. Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston (eds). New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
 
Snow, David.  2004.  “Social Movements as Challenges to Authority: Resistance to an 






Snow, David. 2007. "Frame." Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Edited by George 
Ritzer. Blackwell Publishing. Blackwell Reference Online. Accessed online 03 October 
2009 <http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com> 
 
Social Investment Forum. 2010. “2010 Report on Socially Responsible Investment 
Trends in the United States.” Washington, DC: Social Investment Forum. Accessed 
online (12 December 2011) at 
http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf. 
 
Soule, Sarah. 2009. Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sparkes, Russell, and Christopher Cowton. 2004. "The Maturing of Socially Responsible 
Investment: A Review of the Developing Link with Corporate Social Responsibility." 
Journal of Business Ethics 52:45-57. 
 
Staggenborg, Suzanne and Verta Taylor. 2005. “Whatever Happened to the Women’s 
Movement.”  Mobilization 10: 37-52. 
 
Stigler, George. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science. 2: 3-21. 
 
Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stryker, Robin. 2000. “Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for 
Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations.” Research in the Sociology of 
Organizations 17:179-223. 
 
Tarrow, Sidney, and Donatella Della Porta (eds). 2005. Transnational Protest and Global 
Activism. New York: Rowman & Little field Publishers. 
 
Taylor, Peter. 2005a. “A Fair Trade Approach to Community Forest Certification? A 
Framework for Discussion.” Journal of Rural Studies 21 (4): 433–447. 
 
Taylor, Peter. 2005b. “In the Market but not of it: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest 
Stewardship Council Certification as Market-based Social Change.” World Development 
33 (1): 129–147. 
 
Thornton, Patricia, and William Ocasio. 2008. “Institutional Logics.” In Royston 
Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Salin Kersten Andersen, and Roy Suddaby (Eds). 
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, pp 99-129. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 





Timmermans, Stefan, and Steven Epstein. 2010. “A World of Standards but not a 
Standard World: Toward a Sociology of Standards and Standardization.” Annual Review 
of Sociology 36: 69-89. 
 
Tonkiss, Fran. 2012. “Economic Globalization.” Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Globalization. Ritzer, George (ed). Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Trumpy, Alexa. 2008. "Subject to Negotiation: The Mechanisms Behind Co-Optation and 
Corporate Reform." Social Problems 55(4):480-500. 
 
Valkia, Joni, and Anja Nygren. 2010. “Impacts of Fair Trade Certification on Coffee 
Farmers, Cooperatives, and Laborers in Nicaragua.” Agriculture and Human Values 27 
(3): 321-333. 
 
Vogel, David. 1978. Lobbying the Corporation: Citizen Challenges to Business 
Authority. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Vogel, David. 2008. “Private Global Business Regulation.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 11: 261-282. 
 
Voss, K. 1996. “The Collapse of a Social Movement: The Interplay of Mobilizing 
Structures, Framing, and Political Opportunities in the Knights of Labor.” In 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, & Cultural Framings, edited by Dough McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer 
Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press. 
 
Wan-Jan, Wan Saiful.  2006.  “Defining Corporate Social Responsibility.”  Journal of 
Public Affairs 6: 176-184. 
 
Weiss, Robert Stuart. 1994. Learning From Strangers: The Art and Method of 
Qualitative Interview Studies. Free Press. 
 
Wlkinson, John. 2007. “Fair Trade: Dynamic and Dilemmas of a Market Oriented Global 
Social Movement.” Journal of Consumer Policy 30: 219-239. 
 
Yin, Robert. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. Sage 
Publications. 
 
Zadek, Simon. 2006. “The Logic of Collaborative Governance: Corporate Responsibility, 
Accountability, and the Social Contract.” Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative 
Working Paper No. 17. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University. 
 
